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Abstract 
This thesis aims at measuring the impact of agricultural policy on water use and farms’ incomes in 
the northeast of the Syrian Arab Republic. The scope of the research is confined to the three 
governorates of Deir-Ezzour (DEG), Al-Rakka (RAK), and Al-Hassakeh (HAG). The choice of these 
governorates, that together form the Northeast of Syria, is due to their heavy reliance on policy 
regulated crops, which makes them relatively more sensitive to any policy reform. Moreover, the 
negative impact of the current policy on water balance is evident in the Northeast, especially in the 
area of Al-Khabour basin, located almost entirely in HAG. 
In the thesis, irrigated agriculture of the Northeast of Syria has been modelled by a set of 
representative farms, using the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS). The representative 
farms’ programming models are calibrated on data on observed cropping patterns and water use of 
2005. Then, the policy reforms that have occurred after 2005 are considered in the models by 
changing the values of the relevant policy parameters and new baseline results obtained, inclusive 
of the most recent implemented reforms. 
The comparison between the baseline results of 2005 and the post-reform baseline results show 
that the recent reform is expected to have a limited impact on water use and farm income. 
Predicted changes in water use are less than +5% on average, over the entire region, although they 
vary across the three governorates of the region, with negative change in Al-Hassakeh, and positive 
in Al-Rakka and Deir-Ezzour. On the other hand, changes in income levels and stability are more 
noticeable in the three governorates and are always positive. The changes in average income levels 
range from +15% in Deir-Ezzour to +3% in Al-Hassakeh. The impact on the stability of income is of 
the same magnitude in percent terms. It is of interest to note that the impact of the recent policy 
reforms, due to the stabilization of maize price, is greater on income stability than on average 
income levels in the three governorates. 
The next analysis has involved simulation of alternative policy scenarios, including introduction of 
modern irrigation technology, reform in the farm credit system, and stabilization of alternative 
crops’ prices. The simulations reveal interesting policy implications. They illustrate that adoption 
of modern irrigation techniques, even by all farms in the region, would not solve the water scarcity 
problem in Al-Khabour basin where there will still be a noticeable deficit. This is due to the still low 
efficiency of modern irrigation schemes in the current condition of the region, but also because our 
model predicts that water saved thanks to the adoption of modern irrigation schemes will allow 
expansion of irrigated land. In addition, the results show that decoupling access to official credit 
from strategic crops would have negligible effects on cropping patterns and, consequently, water 
use. Similar results come out if the subsidy currently linked to cotton irrigated from private wells 
would be decoupled. Of the various possible simulated policies, stabilizing cumin price would have 
the largest positive impact on water consumption, because of expanding cumin cultivation, which 
is a crop with irrigation requirements, at the expense of wheat and other winter crops.  
The thesis adds to the evidence that price policy is potentially the instrument that affects farmers’ 
decision the most. If effective in stabilizing price for water saving crops, this may be an important 
tool to combine farm welfare improvement with increased sustainability in water use. 
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Introduction 
By the year 2050, it is expected that the number of people to be fed will be increased by three 
additional billions, in addition to the already existing 6 billion people. Food production may need 
to increase by about 80% compared to the level of the year 2000. If no improvement will take place 
in the efficiency of water use, agricultural water consumption has to increase by the same 
percentage (De Fraiture et al. 2004). 
Nowadays, irrigated agriculture provides some 40% of the world food production on only 17% of 
the total cultivated land. It is estimated that 60% of the extra food required to meet the increasing 
world demand must come from irrigated agriculture. Most of this increase must come from 
improvements in the existing irrigation systems as new sites for further development are scarce. 
About 75% of total irrigated land is located in developing countries where agriculture is dominated 
by smallholders, which means that significant improvements should be expected from a sector still 
dominated by small producers who may need help in order to adjust and adopt improvements in 
their farm practices (Hasnip et al. 1999). 
In Syria, a developing Country whose economy is still dominated by the agricultural sector and is 
characterised by dry and semi-arid climate, irrigated agriculture is a vital component for its 
economic development. Irrigated cropping produces almost 100% of summer crop outputs and 
some 40-70% of the winter crops depending on rainfall availability that is characterised by 
considerable fluctuations from year to year. Consequently, the Government of Syria (GOS) puts in 
place many interventions to increase the irrigated agriculture area that indeed has increased 
steadily in Syria over the last decades, almost doubling since 1985. The rationale of expanding 
irrigation is that summer cropping is impossible without irrigation while the latter is necessary for 
winter cropping whether to reduce the effects of rainfall variability or/and to increase yields (NAPC 
2005a). 
Moreover, Syrian agriculture has been, for the last two decades, dominated by a few crops that are 
considered strategic from the viewpoint of the GOS. Cotton occupies about 20% of the irrigated 
area, while wheat (and barley to some extent) are cultivated in all parts of the Country, as a rainfed 
or irrigated crop depending on the rainfall and available irrigation water. The importance of these 
crops lies in the fact that wheat is thought to be the main source of food for the Syrian population 
and the GOS has always attempted to maintain a high level of self-sufficiency in this politically 
sensitive commodity. Cotton is the second main provider of foreign currency (after petroleum) 
necessary to finance imports and to improve the position of balance of payments, and when 
coupled with sugar beet and wheat they together form the main providers of raw materials for a 
bulk of the public sector industry (Westlake 2001). 
That is why the GOS has always paid attention to these three crops, whether through favouring 
them by setting floor or fixed producer’s prices that are usually set at a level higher than their 
counterparts prevailing in the world markets, or by favouring their production through the credit 
policy (refer to section 2.2). Consequently, Syria became a net-exported of wheat from early 
nineties. Cotton production has increases significantly so that Syria, in 2002, ranked the tenth in 
terms of total outputs and the fourth in terms of national yield at the world level. In addition, 
although the area cultivated under sugar beet does not exceed 3% of the total irrigated cropping 
area, it produces about one third of the Country demand for sugar processed in factories owned by 
the State. 
However, since these crops require much irrigation water to yield acceptable levels of output in the 
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context of the Syrian agro-ecological conditions, they have significantly contributed to the water 
scarcity problem, given the already limited water resources in Syria with respect to the Country’s 
needs. Their negative effects on water is obviously observed in the north-east of the Country, 
especially in Al-Khabour basin (AKB), where cotton and wheat dominate the cropping patters. The 
problem of water scarcity is exacerbated given that Syrian water resources are quite limited as 
compared to the needs of the Country, in which recent estimates show that the overall water 
balance is negative with a deficit of more than three thousand million cubic meter (CM) per year. 
The AKB experiences the major part of the deficit where in 1999 its deficit exceeded the national 
one since some hydraulic basins demonstrated surpluses in that year (Varela-Ortega & Sagardoy 
2001). 
In addition, it is estimated that some 85-90% of the total use of the Country is consumed in 
agricultural production, where highly inefficient irrigation practices are predominant. Recent 
estimates record that about 85% of the irrigated land is still under flood traditional irrigation 
systems that cause enormous field water wastage. Furthermore, the record of water deviated to the 
irrigation of the strategic crops is estimated to be roughly of 7.5 billion CM, which is about 45% of 
the total water use of the Country and 55% of the agricultural use (Sadiddin 2009a).  
In addition, several other factors are challenging the development of Syrian agricultural sector, 
including population growth and urbanisation, changing food habits, and most importantly the 
increased exposure to external factors resulting from the steadily increased integration of Syrian 
economy with the international markets. The latter will require the Syrian farmers to produce more 
in compliance of with the international standards. Doing so while coping with the shortage of water 
will require additional efforts, for which the agricultural support system will have to provide 
guidance and support (Lançon 2005). 
Farmers’ revenues are also at risk, due to the limited size of most farms and growing competition 
from imports. Moreover, farmers will be more exposed to risk as a consequence of the gradual 
withdrawal of the Government support that demonstrated its first strong sign by the recent 
dramatic increase of diesel price by about 235%, after a long period during which diesel was highly 
supported. Furthermore, this withdrawal may be very soon extended to the price support policy as 
this policy has caused drainage on public money, since the domestic prices of most strategic crops 
are set at a level higher than their international counterparts, causing a drainage on the public 
budget. In 2000, wheat, cotton and sugar beet caused a public loss of about SP 36 billion, a sum 
that formed 4.5% of the Syrian GDP then (Westlake 2001). 
Given the above, the first objective of this research thesis is to assess the impact of the current 
policy on the agricultural use of water in the North-East of Syria, and to measure the impact of 
possible changes in the cropping patterns or/and the irrigation techniques adopted by the farmers 
as a result of foreseeable policy changes. In addition, one of the predictable side effects of any 
policy reform is the modification of the exposure to income and consumption risk of farmers and 
their families, leading to the other objective of the this thesis, which is to evaluate the potential 
additional risks to which farmers may be exposed as a result of the policy reforms. The scope of the 
research is confined to the three governorates of Deir-Ezzour (DEG), Al-Rakka (RAK), and Al-
Hassakeh (HAG). The choice of these governorates that together form the northeast of Syria is 
caused by their heavy reliance on strategic crops that make them relatively more sensitive to any 
policy reforms. Moreover, the negative impact of the current policy on water consumption is 
evidently observed there especially in HAG where the AKB is located. 
The analytical method used in the analysis is the representation of the irrigated farms of the region 
in question through a set of mathematical programming models coupled with farm representation 
techniques. This method allows deriving the supply functions of agricultural outputs and the 
demand functions for agricultural inputs (such as water and labour) of the representative farming 
systems, it also allows aggregating these the individual functions to the governorate level and to the 
level of total targeted region. These aggregate water demand and output supply functions are then 
used in assessing the incidence of possible alternative policies on water use and crops’ production. 
In addition, by assuming that incomes of the farming households generated outside the 
agricultural sector hold unchanged, farms’ gross margins and ‘certainty equivalents’ are used as an 
indicator of income level and stability respectively, by simulating the impact of some expected 
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policy reforms on them. 
The thesis is organised in five chapters. The first chapter is devoted to literature review and it is 
composed of five sections. The first section is a review of risk issues related to agricultural 
production. Definitions of risk and uncertainty as well as their sources and consequences are 
reviewed and discussed. Moreover, risk management institutions and mechanisms are reported 
and assessed. The second section is devoted instead to the importance of irrigation and water 
management for agricultural and rural development. In this context irrigation current and 
alternative policies and institutions related to irrigation water management are reviewed and 
assessed. The third section provides a discussion on alternative analytical methods, justifications to 
the choice of the adopted method are discussed through reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of 
most alternative approaches in light of the scope and the objectives of this thesis. The last two 
sections are then devoted to a critical review of the past research on water and risk issues in Syria 
to further justify the choice of the topic and the analytical method adopted through demonstrating 
the novelty of this thesis. 
The second chapter is focused on describing the general farmers’ environment within which the 
targeted farmers operate. It starts with a general description of the study area, followed by brief 
description of public policy and socio-economic factors surrounding farmers and affecting their 
behaviour. The third chapter presents in details the elements of the analytical model and describes 
the data used in the analysis. Setting up and solving the mathematical programming models are 
presented and the model validation is then described and discussed. 
The fourth chapter is a presentation of the results of selected policy simulations. It is composed of 
two man sections. The first demonstrates the expected impact of the recent policy reforms that 
took place between 2005 (the reference year of the study) and 2009, while the second section 
illustrates the predicted effects of some other scenarios. The fifth and last chapter of the thesis 
presents a discussion of the results, their policy implications and their limitations. The chapter is 
ended with a number of suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 1. Literature Review 
This chapter is devoted to review the literature related to the topics of this thesis. It starts with a 
conceptual review of risk and uncertainty that covers their definitions, sources and consequences 
with special focus on agriculture. Risk management mechanisms and risk sharing institutions are 
then discussed with an emphasis on the potential role of public policy. Subsequently, a similar 
section is devoted to irrigation water use. The relevance of irrigation for agricultural risk mitigation 
is presented together with potential problems usually faced in managing water as a scarce resource 
and the role of public policy to deal with such problems. 
The third section of the chapter reviews the literature of applied economics on decision making 
under uncertainty. The rationale behind the choice of the analytical method adopted in the study is 
presented through discussing alternative research methods in light of their strengths and 
weaknesses and in light of the objective of the thesis. The chapter ends with a critical review of past 
studies on water use and risk in the Syrian agriculture highlighting their strengths and weaknesses 
for the sake of demonstrating the novelty of the thesis topic and analytical method. 
1.1. Risk related issues in agriculture 
1.1.1. Risk and uncertainty: definition, sources and consequences 
Agriculture has been often considered in economic textbooks to be a case of economic activity 
burdened by risk. Many risk management tools such as forward contracts and futures markets have 
their origin in agriculture. In addition, many support programmes are warranted as safety net for 
agricultural producers against risk. While there is nowadays a general consensus on the economic 
definitions of risk and uncertainty, it is maybe useful to illustrate the way different authors and 
researchers have approached this matter (Coble & Barnett 2008). 
In some economic literature, risk and uncertainty are not strictly interchangeable. In this regard, 
risk has a rather precise meaning distinct from the subjective sense of uncertainty. Therefore, risk 
is confined to conditions where probabilities can be attached to the occurrence of a specific event 
influencing the outcome of the decision making process. Uncertainty, on the other hand, refers to 
situations where it is impossible to attach probabilities to the occurrence of events (Ellis 1993). 
However, research of risk analysis has not been recently based on this distinction between risk and 
uncertainty. This is because what is relevant in most decision making is not a superhuman 
knowledge concerning the likelihoods of uncertain events, but it is the relevant decision maker’s 
personal degree of belief about the occurrence of events. In this context, risk still refers to 
probabilities, but now they are subjective probabilities attached by the decision makers’ beliefs. Of 
course, the analysis of risk does not require only probabilities, but it is important also the way they 
enter economic decision. Thus, risk is used to describe the entire mechanism by which decision 
making is done with respect to uncertain events. Uncertainty, in contrast, has nothing to do with 
probabilities or their nonexistence, but it is just a descriptive sense to character the economic 
environment confronting agricultural activities (Ellis 1993). 
Hardaker et al. (2004) define uncertainty as an imperfect knowledge while they define risk as 
uncertain outcomes, particularly exposure to unfavourable consequences. With the same line of 
concepts, Robison & Barry (1987) define risky events to be those events whose outcomes are not 
known with certainty, but they go on to state that uncertain events are only important when they 
alter a decision maker’s material or/and social well-being. Newbery & Stiglitz (1981) argue that 
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farmers are concerned with income variability and how it affects consumption rather than variable 
factors such as price or yield. They also argue that price variability itself is not the appropriate 
metric to judge risk. They also discuss the distinction between risk and uncertainty, but take a 
subjective probability approach as suggested by Savage (1954) to indicate that the distinction is 
largely irrelevant. However, Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) do make a strong assertion that it is 
relevant to distinguish between systematic and non-systematic risk, so that systematic risk follows 
a predictable pattern with known relationships where non-systematic variability arises from shocks 
and other variability in markets supply or demand due to unforeseeable forces that come to bear on 
market prices. 
Some authors define risk as the uncertainty that matters, and may involve the probability of losing 
money, causing harm to human health, repercussions that may affect important resources such as 
irrigation water and credit, and other types of events that affect a person’s welfare. So uncertainty, 
which is a situation in which a person does not know for sure what will happen, is necessary for 
risk to occur, but uncertainty need not lead to a risky situation (Harwood et al. 1999). Alternatively, 
Chavas (2004) defines risk as representing any condition where some events are not known with 
certainty. 
We can infer from the above review that there is no clear consensus on the distinction between risk 
and uncertainty. One can, however, notice two schools of thought, one arguing that risk and 
uncertainty are not equivalent and that the distinction between the two is the ability to make a 
probability assessment, while the second deals with both of them as synonyms. However, an 
important aspect of the debate about the distinction between risk and uncertainty is about the 
existence and interpretation of probability. Although this discussion is intuitive on the theoretical 
basis, but has not led to much empirical analysis and thus we do not draw any sharp distinction 
between risk and uncertainty and uses the terms interchangeably in this thesis. 
Sources of risk and uncertainty in agriculture are defined and explained in many economic 
textbooks and other sources. Ellis (1993) classifies these sources under four main categories: 
natural hazard, market fluctuations, social uncertainty and state actions and wars. Adverse climate 
and other natural hazard phenomena (such as pests and diseases) may affect the outcome of 
planting decisions at any stage from cultivation until harvest. In addition, sale prices of outputs are 
unknown at the time decisions are made due to the long lag that separates production decisions 
from output sale. Note also that the capacity to control pests and diseases may depend on the 
ability to purchase relevant inputs. 
In addition, Both Huirne et al. (2000) and Hardaker et al. (2004) distinguish two major types of 
risk in agriculture. First, Business risk includes production, market, institutional and personal 
risks. Production risk is caused by unpredictable weather and biological performance. Market risk 
is caused by fluctuating prices of outputs and, sometimes of inputs. Institutional risk is due to 
unpredicted government actions and policies, for instance, laws constraining the use of pesticides 
for environmental concerns. Personal risks are due to uncertain life events such as death, divorce, 
or illness. Second, financial risks result from different means of financing the farm activities. 
Relying on borrowed funds involves that interest charges are met before equity is rewarded which 
may create risk due to leverage. Additionally financial risk is exacerbated when loans are 
unavailable due to a rationing policy, which is common in developing countries due to the scarcity 
of credit resources, this may cause the interest rates of alternative sources to rise significantly 
further worsening the already existing financial risk. 
Baquet et al. (1997) define five major sources of risk that are almost identical to those defined 
above although they are classified differently using sometimes other names for the same concepts 
as: production risk, marketing risk, financial risk, legal risk, and human resources risk. 
Alternatively, Moschini & Henessy (2001) prefer to talk about sources of uncertainty in agriculture, 
singling out production uncertainty, price uncertainty, technological uncertainty, and policy 
uncertainty. 
The World Bank (2000) and Holzmann & Jorgensen (2001) classify risks in six different types: 
natural, health, social, economic, political and environmental. They also cross this typology with an 
additional dimension of systemic characteristics of different risks: micro or idiosyncratic risk that 
affects the individual, Meso-risk affecting a whole community, and Macro or systemic risk affecting 
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a whole region or Country. All the risks they mention affect farmers in some way, particularly 
natural (rainfall, landslides, floods, droughts, etc), health (animal and plant) and environmental 
risks. Furthermore, most of these risks eventually take the form of economic risk that affects the 
stream of income, consumption and wealth. 
Any classification of risk sources underlines the fact that an individual farmer may be facing very 
different risks at the same time. In these conditions, the optimal choice of a strategy to deal with 
them requires that correlations among risks be accounted for. A deep review of the literature on the 
sources of risk in agriculture, correlations among them and their relative importance is also 
presented in Coble & Barnett (2008). Moreover, all classifications of risk sources discussed above 
consider several sources of risk and uncertainty that are not intrinsic for agriculture and they are 
embedded in all economic activities such as those classified under personal, health, institutional, 
and social sources of risk. 
This means that the only sources of risk that are inherent in agriculture are those that can be 
classified under natural hazard risks and market risks. The first is due to the high reliance of 
agricultural production on natural resources and phenomena, but also due to its high exposure to 
unfavourable weather conditions. The second is mainly caused by high fluctuations in prices of 
primary agricultural products due to relatively inelastic demand for and supply of these products. 
Aspects of financial risks such as access to credit fall under market risks since poor access to credit 
is caused by failure of credit market. Consequently, we care in this paper about these two classes of 
risk that make agriculture an economic activity in which risk and uncertainty form a major 
characteristic. 
Having defined risk and uncertainty and their various sources, one may ask: “does risk matter?” A 
simple direct answer will be ‘yes’ if they alter the well-being if the decision maker in question. 
Hardaker et al. (2004) argue that people are usually risk averse, implying that although they do 
take risks, the certainty equivalent they assign to any risky prospect is less than the expected 
money value of that prospect. So people do take risks provided there is an incentive to do so; 
however, their degree of risk aversion may differ. This implies the existence of a utility function of 
income that is of a positive but decreasing slope. In addition, Hardaker et al. (2004) state another 
reason why risk must matter in agriculture, and they call it downside risk, which is taken to mean 
that the payoff from a risky prospect will be reduced if conditions are not as assumed. This type of 
risk, they argue, can arise from two different causes. First, it can occur when decisions are made 
under assumed certainty based on ‘best estimate’ of the consequences. Second, it may arise when a 
risky outcome depends on a non-linear interaction between a number of uncertain quantities. 
Furthermore, Ellis (1993) states some common consequences of risk and risk aversion. He argues 
that risk aversion results in sub-optimal decisions at the microeconomic level. It has been observed 
that poor farmers apply sub-optimal quantities of inputs (e.g. fertilisers) to guarantee a minimum 
level of output if unfavourable weather conditions take place. In addition, risk results usually in 
slowness in the adoption of innovations such as high yielding varieties and may cause poor farmers 
to continue growing subsistence crops even when food may be purchased more cheaply, an 
observation also made by Upton (2004). Risk has also a greater impact on poor people, thus 
reinforcing social differentiations. 
Roberts et al. (2004) argue that risk often influences farmers’ production incentives even when 
costs of risk-coping are small, when the latter are large, risk affects production incentives in 
entirely different ways, and it may even influence the structure and organisation of the agricultural 
sector. In other words, risk matters even when all markets are functioning perfectly. However, if 
this were the case, people could manage risk using risk-sharing mechanisms. However, when 
markets are far from perfect as usually the case, adverse selection and moral hazard that are 
associated with asymmetric information cause the risk-sharing mechanisms to fail. 
Roberts et al. (2004) also criticise the emphasises in economic literature on the importance of 
farmers’ attitudes towards risk, while risk can affect farmers decision through different channels. 
For example, greater uncertainty about rainfall may alter a farmer’s fertiliser applications 
regardless of her attitude toward risk. In other cases, risk consequences are similar regardless of its 
source; however, policy implications may be different according to the channel through which risk 
affects farmers’ decision. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the relative importance of different 
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risk channels. The idea is that risk is difficult to measure and its effects can be easily confused with 
effects of other factors such as location, climate and soil quality. 
1.1.2. Risk management: mechanisms and institutions 
If risk matters for whatever economic activity, risk management becomes a very relevant issue for 
any decision to result in acceptable outcomes. Risk management is a systematic application of 
management policies, procedures and practices for the sake of identifying, analysing, assessing, 
treating and monitoring risk, with the objective of avoiding, mitigating, or coping with it. It should 
be an integral part of any ‘good’ management since it is a way of organisation to avoid losses and 
maximise opportunities. It is not a set of principles to follow or a group of practices to pursue, once 
and ever. This is impossible in a changing world where the nature and the consequences of risk are 
changing too. It is rather an ongoing adaptation process that must be incorporated into all aspects 
of farm management (Hardaker et al. 2004). 
Hardaker et al. (2004) distinguish two types of risk management strategies: on-farm strategies and 
risk-sharing strategies. The former can be classified under the following five headings: avoiding or 
reducing exposure to risk, collecting information, selecting less risky technologies, on-farm and off-
farm diversification, and flexibility. They define the strategy of avoiding or reducing the exposure 
to risk to be all preventive measures that reduce or eliminate the possible occurrence of 
unfavourable events such as accidents, fire, the spread of disease, etc. But it also includes actions 
and measures that abate the negative consequences when an unfavourable event occurs. 
While the benefit of more and better information is obvious regardless of the decision maker’s 
attitude towards risk, they also argue that risk also can be sometimes managed and mitigated by 
selecting appropriate technologies that give higher and more stable returns. Diversification of on-
farm activities and off-farm income sources is also regarded always as a good strategy to smooth 
income, which helps smooth consumption.  Flexibility of farm structure might help mitigating risk 
in a fast changing world. Asset flexibility is an example that implies investing in assets that have 
more than one use or/and can be with slight adjustments adapted to other uses. The same idea may 
apply to product flexibility, so that the focus is on producing products that have several uses and 
maybe several markets. Keeping fixed costs as low as possible while relying more on variable costs 
might be a good strategy to manage risk, e.g. it may be better to lease machinery rather than 
purchase it. Another aspect of flexibility is related to time that entails the speed in which necessary 
adjustments are made (Hardaker et al. 2004). 
Concerning the risk-sharing strategies, they define five mechanisms that farmers can use to 
manage risk. First, external credit can be used to finance farm business. However, an increase in 
financial leverage may magnify the impact of farm returns, and therefore, this raises the question 
of optimal financial structure for the farm, whose determination depends on risk preferences that 
are usually affected by the information available to the farmer on future income levels. Second, 
insurance can also play a role in farm risk management in form of contracts against fire, theft, 
death, workers’ injury, etc. However, most insurance programmes are provided under subsidised 
government schemes due to market failures that characterise insurance markets. Third, share 
contracts (e.g. sharecropping arrangements) are also a mechanism that helps farmers sharing risk 
with others, these are very much common in developing countries although still practiced in some 
developed countries such as the USA. 
However, Upton (2004) considers share contracts to be a risk-spreading mechanism rather than a 
risk-sharing. He confines risk sharing to the mechanisms when various individuals earning from 
different sources of income agree to pool at least part of their incomes and share the associated 
risks, which is a strategy that works out only when income sources are not positively correlated. 
Risk-spreading, on the other hand, occurs when a single risky project is shared by more than one 
individual as the case of sharecropping. 
Forth, contract marketing whether through price pooling or through forward contracts, are widely 
used in developed countries to manage price risk, and they are used to some extent in developing 
countries. Price pooling is operated by a group of farmers collectively buying their inputs or/and 
selling their outputs through a cooperative or a marketing board. It help farmers in two different 
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ways: protecting individual farmers from short-term fluctuations of prices through some kind of 
averaging, and obtaining lower input prices and higher output prices through gaining some market 
power. However, forward contracts are viewed by Hardaker et al. (2004) a better strategy as long 
as risk management is concerned, since farmers under such arrangements receive guaranteed 
prices for their outputs regardless of the market conditions. Fifth, derivatives trading can be used 
as well to reduce price risk through hedging on commodities futures market and options trading. 
Other economists have viewed and classified strategies and mechanisms available to farmers to 
deal with risk in different ways, each may have different policy implication. Dercon (2002), 
focusing on conditions of developing countries, distinguishes risk-management tools from risk- 
coping strategies. Farmers use the former in an attempt to reduce risk ex-ante, so they are income-
smoothing strategies. Examples are diversification of farm activities and income sources achieved 
by combining activities with low positive correlations, and income skewing achieved by carrying 
out only low-risk activities even at the cost of lower returns. Risk-coping strategies includes self-
insurance through precautionary savings and informal group-based-risk-sharing to deal with 
outcomes of income risk in order to smooth consumption. Farmers can insure themselves by 
building assets in good years to deplete them in bad years, while group-based-risk-sharing can be 
made among members of formal or informal groups to support each other in case of hardships. 
World Bank (2005) classifies risk management mechanisms and strategies under two main groups: 
formal and informal, each in turn includes ex-ante and ex-post strategies. Informal ex-ante 
strategies are characterised by diversification of income sources and choice of production 
technology. One strategy producers can employ is to avoid risk. People caught in the so-called 
‘poverty trap’ may be very risk-averse and they often avoid activities that involve risk but could 
carry larger gains. However, once people have decided to engage in farming activities, the 
production strategy is of essential role in reducing negative risk effects. Crop diversification and 
intercropping systems are in many places means to mitigate risk. Households also seek to smooth 
income by diversifying its sources. Buffer stock accumulation of crops and liquid and the use of 
credit undoubtedly provide tools to smooth consumption. The adoption of advanced technologies 
such as irrigation, fertilisation and resistant varieties can also be useful. Sharecropping 
arrangements in land renting and labour hiring can also provide an effective way of risk 
management through sharing risk between individuals, thus reducing producer’s exposure to risk. 
Informal ex-post strategies are typically the sale of assets (land and livestock e.g.) or the 
reallocation of family labour resources. Gadgil et al. (2002) argue that farmers in the south of India 
can switch quickly from 100 percent on-farm labour activities to largely off-farm activities if the 
monsoon rains are expected to be poor. 
Formal risk management mechanisms are in turn classified as publicly provided or market-based. 
Government policy can play a major role in agricultural risk management both ex-ante and ex-post. 
Education and services provided by the agricultural extension help familiarise producers with the 
consequences of risk and help them adopt strategies to deal them. Government can also reduce risk 
effects by developing infrastructure and adopting social schemes and cash transfers for reliefs after 
shocks have occurred. Market-based strategies proposed by World Bank (2005) are forward 
contracts that allow producers to lock into a certain price. In specific markets and for certain 
products, forward contracts have evolved into futures contracts, traded on regulated exchanges on 
the basis of specific trading rules and for specific standardised products. This reduces some risks 
associated with forward contracts such as default. The development of price options represent a 
further evolution in hedging opportunities for farmers, which allows farmers to benefit from a floor 
price but also from the possibility of taking advantage of positive price changes. A detailed 
description of these market derivatives is available and their usefulness for managing risk 
associated with market fluctuations is described in Hull (1996). 
While futures and options are appropriate instruments to deal with spatially correlated risks, 
World Bank (2005) argues that crop insurance is appropriate for independent risks such as risks 
related to agricultural production. However, these risks as they lack spatial correlation, they also 
lack high degree of spatial independent and therefore, crop insurance markets do not work at their 
best. 
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Coble (2009) argues that more concrete risk management strategies can be grouped into three 
categories according to the objectives they are supposed to achieve which are: risk prevention, risk 
mitigation and risk coping. The first includes measures that help reduce the probability of an 
adverse event occurring, the second includes practices and measures that help reduce the potential 
impact of an adverse event, while the third includes measures that assist in relieving the impact of 
a risky event once it has occurred. So this classification of risk management strategies go in line 
with that pursued by Dercon (2002) even though the latter uses somehow different terminology, 
since prevention and mitigation strategies aim at income smoothing while coping strategies aim at 
consumption smoothing. Coble (2009) also bases the possible strategies on arrangements made at 
different institutional levels: farm household or community level, market-based mechanisms and 
public policy exactly as in World Bank (2005) and therefore no need to repeat which measures fall 
in which group. 
Fafchamps (2003), on the other hand, argues that the distinction between ex-ante and ex-post 
strategies, although useful, can be misleading since many ex-post mechanisms require ex-ante 
planning if they are to be effective. Using savings to cope with potential hardships is effective only 
if savings are available when they are needed. He proposes that a more useful distinction is 
between strategies that seek to reduce risk itself and those that insulate welfare from risk, which 
can be called preventive and curative measures respectively. Fafchamps (2003) also argues that 
care should be taken with using the term ‘risk management’ when referring to the poor since much 
risk is unmanageable by the poor, and so the term belittles their experience. Therefore, risk-coping 
is a preferable term that encompasses all possible strategies by which individuals to reduce the 
negative effects that risk has on their well-being, whether they are ex-ante or ex-post strategies. 
Ellis (1992: 1993) and Upton (2004) emphasise the role of public policy in helping farmers to deal 
with risk and reduce its negative impacts on their welfare. They classify proper policy instruments 
according to different sources of risk, assuming that the most relevant ones are risk associated with 
natural hazard and market risks. For the former, Ellis (1993) defines three possible measures 
government can promote. Promoting irrigation is the most obvious policy in response to natural 
uncertainty when it is expressed in rainfall variability. Crop insurance may be a solution in face of 
potential disasters, but it faces almost insuperable practical problems since average risk aversion 
needs to be demonstrably high for the benefit of a crop insurance to outweigh the formidable 
administrative costs. And so he argues that the development of resistant varieties may be a much 
better option due to its lower cost relative to its potential benefits. 
For risks associated with the functioning of markets, price stabilisation is clearly the main 
economic argument against price risk. This in turn can take many forms, ranging from minimum 
floor prices to fixed producers prices. The pricing policy of the strategic crops in Syria is an 
example of this. However, price stabilisation policy may exacerbate income variance if yields 
remain highly variant when there is in place a ceiling price or fixed price. This is because under 
market conditions, prices rise in low yield years and fall in high yield years resulting in some 
smoothing out of annual incomes as stated by Ellis (1993). However, this is only true when markets 
are not largely integrated, when they are, price fluctuations are resulting from the interaction of 
supply and demand in national and international markets (Upton 2004). 
Ellis (1993) and Upton (2004) recognise also the role that government can play in reducing 
farmers’ exposure to risk through information diffusion since some risk aversion is partially 
attributed to inadequate information. They also regard credit provision as an effective tool to 
reduce risk aversion. This is because, as Eswaran & Kotwal (1989; 1990) argue, differences in risk 
behaviour do not necessarily result from differences in subjective risk preferences, but they may 
result from differences in the ability to manage fluctuations in income across time in order to 
ensure continuity of consumption. Ellis  (1993) also argues that credit is useful for overcoming 
resistance to the adoption of new technologies. However, participatory forms of rural credit instead 
of agricultural development banks may be favourable since the latter with their subsidised credit to 
farmers have been rife with difficulties. Jaffer (1999) demonstrate how solidarity microfinance can 
play a major role in overcoming the problem of asymmetric information that cause conventional 
lending to fail. He shows how solidarity lending, instead, can reduce information costs especially 
when the institutional setting is weak and borrowers’ projects are small, and thus he argues that it 
might be an alternative to the conventional lending to target the rural poor. 
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Having reviewed most individual and collective strategies that farmers can use to cope with risk 
and public policies that help farmers deal with risky events, it is interesting now to discuss their 
limitations since they do not always work, each one for specific reasons. Self- protection strategies 
pursued at the farm level face several technological and environmental constraints. Income 
diversification may be impractical if returns to alternative activities are too low to warrant 
investments in them or if increased returns require specialisation (Fafchamps 2003). In addition, 
many farms are already diversified regardless of risk aversion, since mixtures of activities make 
best use of available resources allowing more productive and sustainable crop rotations. 
Furthermore, the fact that returns from many different activities are positively correlated limits 
potential gains from crop diversification. Spatial diversification may solve the last problem by 
reducing positive correlations due to weather; however, this is only available to large business 
(Hardaker et al. 2004). 
Diversifying income sources through engagement in off-farm income generating activities may also 
be regarded as an effective tool for reducing the effects of positive correlation between farming 
activities, but their availability depends on the functioning of labour markets and the availability of 
jobs opportunities outside the agricultural sector, which is largely determined by the overall 
performance of the economy and its development level. However, investment in education may be 
a best strategy to help find employment outside the agricultural sector. A case study in Syria 
demonstrate that the education is the most correlated factor with the economic well-being (UNDP 
2005). 
Flexibility is another risk reducing strategy that is constrained by technological and environmental 
conditions. The extent to which valuable resources must be sunk before income can be created 
limits farmers’ willingness to risk such resources. That is maybe why flexibility is low in dry areas 
as short rainy seasons preclude crop diversification and the scope of crop intensification. This also 
is why farmers in such areas are reluctant to adopt new technologies and invest in high generating 
crops (tree crops e.g.), which lock them to the cultivation of very few products and causing them to 
lose profitable opportunities and limiting their capacity to adjust to shocks (Fafchamps 2003). 
Hardaker et al. (2004) show that reducing exposure to risk from one side may increase it from 
another. Cost flexibility may require leasing machinery rather than purchasing them, labour may 
be hired on a casual basis rather than in form of permanent workers in order to keep fixed costs as 
low as possible. However, this may increase the risk since machinery provision market may fail due 
to the seasonality of agricultural operations, as demand for rental machinery is very high when it is 
needed. The same applies to labour especially in the peak harvesting seasons. 
Some financial and institutional constraints limit also the benefit from pursuing less risky 
technologies. Irrigation is often regarded as a more reliable technology in areas characterised by 
high variability of rainfalls. However, access to irrigation may be costly and farmers may not afford 
to access it without substantial public support. Moreover, irrigation may be strictly regulated by 
public authorities that aim to protect water resources in areas where they are scarce. In Syria, e.g., 
there have been recently strict regulations for the issuing of wells digging licenses due to recent 
common fears that water underground resources are being depleted (Sadiddin 2009). 
Farm households’ efforts to accumulate assets and savings they can use to insulate themselves 
against risk are also constrained by the paucity of savings instruments available to them. However, 
many poor farmers save even if the return to liquid assets is negative. This is because they do not 
save to exploit financial opportunities but rather to accumulate a buffer stock to deal with 
emergencies even if the asset has a negative return due, for example, to high inflation rate. 
Furthermore, the ability to liquidate assets in order to deal with shocks is constrained by the 
property rights system. For this approach to be feasible, individuals must have well defined 
property rights on these assets (Fafchamps 2003). In Syria e.g., farmers who benefited from land 
reform, although have always had secure usufruct rights over land, were not permitted to sell it 
legally until recently (Wattenbach 2006). 
Sharecropping is the informal mechanism that is most recognised as a risk-sharing mechanism or a 
risk-spreading strategy. However, its usefulness as an effective risk management tool is doubted 
since its practice is motivated by other factors beyond managing risk. Sharecropping, the way it is 
practiced in most of the world, is obviously a response to failure of factor markets, as two parties 
 19 
enter into a contract according to which one provides land and credit (the landowner) and the 
other provides labour (the tenant), so it is an effective mechanism for the tenant to access land and 
capital while it is an effective strategy for the landowner to avoid the ill-functioning of labour 
market. The fact also that output is shared according to pre-agreed proportions means that it aims 
to motivate the tenant for hardworking and reduce the supervision costs of labour consequently 
which may be considerable in larger farms. A case study in Syria (Sadiddin 2004) shows that larger 
farms are more likely to engage in sharecropping activities than smaller ones. 
The implication of this argument is that if labour market functioning improves or if the landowner 
adopts a highly mechanised technology, sharecropping may become much less practiced. Sadiddin 
(2004) also shows that sharecropping is mostly practiced for less risky crops such as irrigated 
wheat and cotton that have minimum guaranteed prices by the government and enjoy relatively 
stable yields due to the availability of irrigation, a finding that supports the limited usefulness of 
sharecropping as a risk-sharing tool. 
Risk-sharing mechanisms that rely on pooling risks through sharing incomes of different 
individuals of a single household or of a group of households of a community can also be effective 
only if the pooled incomes are not positively correlated, which is not the case in many rural areas 
where most people rely on a limited number of activities. 
Market-based mechanisms are not without their limitations too. Concerning the use of forward 
contracts, futures market and options trading, although they may prove effective for the sake of risk 
management and smoothing income are still narrowly practiced even in developed countries, while 
they are still absent in developing countries. This is probably because using them effectively 
requires well-established financial markets that are, if they exist, far from being perfect in 
developing countries. In addition, using them effectively requires specific knowledge and skills that 
are not in the hands of farmers even in developed countries where farmers are still not motivated 
to acquire these skills due to the presence of many price stabilisation policies and subsidised 
insurance programmes. 
Insurance as a mechanism of risk sharing has been largely criticised in economic literature for a 
number of reasons. As it is an appropriate risk management solution only for independent risky 
events, insurance markets do not work at their best since agricultural production risks are 
generally not spatially independent. Positive spatial correlation in losses limits the risk reduction 
that can be gained by pooling risks from different geographical areas. The lack of statistical 
independence is not the only problem with insurance in agriculture. Asymmetric information 
causes two other problems: adverse selection and moral hazard (Hardaker et al. 2004). 
In the case of adverse selection, farmers have better knowledge than the insurer about the 
probability distribution of losses. Thus, the farmers have the privileged situation of being able to 
discern whether or not the insurance premium accurately reflects the risk they face. Consequently, 
only farmers that bear greater risks will purchase the insurance, generating an imbalance between 
indemnities paid and premiums collected. Moral hazard is another problem that lies within the 
incentive structure of the relationship between the insurer and the insured. After entering the 
contract, the farmer’s incentives to take proper care of the crop diminish, while the insurer has 
limited effective means to monitor the eventual hazardous behaviour of the farmer, resulting in 
greater losses for the insurer (Coble 2009). 
Furthermore, agricultural insurance is often characterized by high administrative costs. These 
costs are high, in part, due to the risk classification and monitoring systems that must be put in 
place to address asymmetric information problems. Other costs are associated with acquiring the 
data needed to establish accurate premium rates and conducting claims adjustment. Consequently, 
spatially correlated risk, moral hazard, adverse selection, and high administrative costs are all 
important reasons why agricultural insurance markets fail if they are not heavily supported by 
public policy (World Bank 2005). 
Cafiero et al. (2006), in their review of the existing and alternative emergency measures in the 
various member states of the European Union (EU), conclude that the establishment of a common 
programme of insurance premiums’ subsidies is highly unlikely due to the existing constraints on 
devoting more finance to agriculture in Europe. They instead propose an intervention based on 
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supporting farmers’ mutual funds and promoting access to credit, insurance and financial markets 
to make them easily accessible by farmers, a conclusion already reached by Cafiero (2005). 
Wright (2004) brings the criticism against crop insurance further, stating that many countries are 
still investing in crop insurance at increasing rate, when such investments could have gone to fund 
research since there is huge evidence that agricultural research has been the driving force of 
agricultural development, while no respectful evaluation shows that revenue insurance has ever 
sustained a positive rate of return. Wright (2004) believes that the problem of crop insurance 
exceeds moral hazard and adverse selection. He shows how early literature on crop insurance mis-
specified what farmers really seek to maximise by neglecting the role of diversification of income 
sources and that of consumption smoothing activities. Modern improvements, in turn, neglect the 
role of credit and savings that makes risk premium associated with normal changes in income 
negligible, and even less than the administrative costs of an insurance programme, explaining the 
reluctance of farmers to pay for unsubsidised conventional insurance programmes. 
With the deepening of the financial and insurance markets in the 1990s, the idea of weather index 
products, which was first published in the middle of last century, got renewed attention in 
economics research as an attempt to overcome the problem of asymmetric information that 
characterises insurance markets. The idea is that these index products are calculated from 
observations of rainfall or/and temperature that are beyond the control of both parties. If the index 
falls below a pre-agreed threshold value, indemnities are paid by the insurance agency. These index 
products are also cost efficient and easy to administer since they are easy to measure at low cost 
and easy to calculate the probability that indemnities are due, making them superior to traditional 
insurance programmes (Hardaker et al. 2004). 
In this respect, Cafiero and Cioffi (2004) believe that any future reform of the  Common 
Agricultural Policy of the EU must consider further reliance on credit and finance to help farmers 
manage risk and stabilise their incomes. They recommend that a major role that governments can 
play in this respect is to provide information on weather, area, yields, prices and other useful 
indexes on which weather index contracts can be written and enforced, since the calculation of 
weather index requires quite large amount of data. This, of course, limits their use especially in 
developing countries where if such data are available, their reliability is probably flawed. 
In conclusion, there are always some conditional factors that have to be present for many risk 
management mechanisms and strategies to be helpful, and public policy should be informed 
according to the specific conditions within which the targeted farmers operate. In order to be 
successful, public policy should depart from already existing mechanisms pursued by farmers. This 
is important to avoid that policy measures may replace farmers’ own strategies and make them 
‘policy-dependent’ exposing them to greater risk if policy proves to be unsustainable and need to be 
reformed. For example, policies that maintain macroeconomic stability would allow self-insurance 
mechanisms to work better through, e.g., reducing asset market risks. Another example would be 
policies that promote the integration of agricultural asset markets with wider economy since this 
prevents much of the covariance between asset prices and incomes. 
In addition, where the farming sector still dominates the economy as the case in many developing 
countries, the development of other economic sectors is a crucial element of any risk management 
policy, since it is the most effective course to provide farmers and rural households with more 
attractive and diversified sources of income that are not highly correlated. Furthermore, there is 
still a pressing need for large public involvement in biotechnological development if poor farmers 
are to benefit from agricultural innovations. More attention also must be made on investments in 
public goods that reduce risks such as irrigation drainage systems and development of high 
yielding and resistant varieties. 
Rao (2009) argues that public expenditure and policy actions in favour of agricultural research and 
development, improved water availability and control, integrated systems for training and 
extension services, access to rural credit, and the provision of market and physical infrastructure, 
played a historic role in getting agriculture moving ahead in countries as disparate as the United 
States and India, while they came to be emaciated in the very countries that had remained largely 
untouched by the “Green Revolution” of the previous quarter century. Therefore, there may be a 
need to find alternative policies and approaches to the currently prevailing ones, which may 
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require reversing some of them back to old-fashioned land reforms, mobilization of surplus labour 
and collective action for infrastructure building, cooperatives for credit and input supply, and 
bringing the main role of the state back to be again responsible of regulating markets, organising 
research and extension as public goods, providing irrigation and infrastructure, and coordinating 
actions that will be needed to adapt to climate change, all vital areas where market failures strongly 
justify public intervention especially in developing countries. 
Whether the role of the state can be still reversed to its “old fashion” remains an open question 
whose answer is more political than economic and anyhow it is beyond the objective of this review. 
1.2. Water use issues in agriculture 
The essence of water for socio-economic sustainable development is widely recognised. As 
population increases, development calls for increased allocations of water for various uses, 
intensifying the pressure on the limited water resources. The scarcity of water is maybe defined as 
the point at which the aggregate impact of all users impinges the supply or the quality of water to 
the extent that demands cannot be successfully satisfied. Water scarcity may include severe 
environmental deterioration such as river desiccation or pollution, declining underground water 
levels coupled usually with increased salinity, and increasing conflicts in water allocation where 
usually some people win at the expense of others. 
In most countries, especially the developing ones, agriculture uses the bulk of water resources. 
Historically, large-scale water projects have played a fundamental role in poverty reduction 
through providing food security, protection from flooding and drought and expanded employment. 
Irrigated agriculture has been, in many cases, the driving vehicle of development supporting 
economic growth in the rural sector. 
Globally, irrigated agriculture produces about 40% of food and agricultural commodities from only 
20% of the agricultural land, implying a higher reliance of food security on irrigation (Lipton et al. 
2003). 
1.2.1. Irrigation and development: rationales and limitations 
Irrigation can be broadly defined as the supplementation of precipitation by storage and/or 
transportation of water (Upton 2004), more precisely it is the process of supplying water as a 
variable input into crop production to even out the supply of water over time. Therefore, irrigated 
agriculture can be defined as agriculture where the water provision is augmented by the use of 
water command technology including the drainage of dispose of excess water (Hasnip et al. 1999). 
Irrigation increases agricultural productivity and human carrying capacities per unit of land and 
raises farm output growth due to a number of reasons. First, irrigation reduces risk aversion due to 
adverse impact of rainfall variability on yields, which increases incentives to use inputs at optimal 
levels. Irrigation raises also crop yields directly by mitigating the incidence of water stress in plants 
caused by uneven water supply, and indirectly by the increasing the productivity of other variable 
inputs such as fertilisers (Ellis 1992). 
Irrigation also permits the introduction of high yielding varieties and the intensification of 
agricultural production as it allows increasing the number of crops that can be grown sequentially 
in a certain land plot. It obviously allows uncultivated land, and sometimes uncultivable, to be 
brought to cultivation if the main constraint was water scarcity, and it allows the extension of 
cropping season. Irrigation also helps reduce year-to-year fluctuations in yields (Upton 2004). 
Data analysis from Asia demonstrates that yields of most crops increased by 100-400% due to 
irrigation, which contributed to a reduction in food prices that has had a positive impact on real 
incomes of urban and rural poor. Therefore, irrigation brings about a more stable flow of income 
due to increased intensity of cultivation, improved yields, and new cropping mixes that result in 
higher values. This may cause an appreciation of land prices, which may be in favour of poor 
farmers when they are also landowners. It can also offer evenly spread employment and improved 
wage rates, which may improve security, reduce out-migration, contribute to the creation of new 
social networks, and enhance urban-rural contact (Hasnip et al. 1999). 
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Lipton et al. (2003) examines various impacts that irrigation may have on rural development and 
poverty reduction. He claims the presence of direct effects through outputs, employment and food 
prices. Irrigation boosts farm output and raises, therefore, farm incomes as long as increases in 
outputs outweigh potential reduction in prices. Irrigation also generates employment in rural areas 
via two major mechanisms. First, irrigation projects require labour for building and maintaining 
canals, wells and pumps, which may generate employment opportunities for rural poor with excess 
labour. Second, increased farm output would stimulate demand for farm labour. Thus rural poverty 
may be reduced. In some cases, effects might be extended to reduce migration to urban centres 
relieving the downward pressure on urban wages and upward pressure on housing and other urban 
infrastructure thus contributing to urban poverty alleviation.  
Lipton et al. (2003) argues that the increased farm output may result in lowering prices of staples, 
especially in imperfectly open economies. Thus net purchasers of food will gain. Waged agricultural 
labourers will benefit from lower prices in addition to their benefit from increased employment. 
However, poor farmers outside the irrigation projects are usually harmed by reduced prices if they 
are net purchasers of food. But in total, irrigation is likely to contribute to rural development and 
poverty reduction through higher farm output, more employment opportunities and lower food 
prices. 
But irrigation may also have long-term effects on rural development through contributing to 
enhance non-farm rural output and employment. As farm income rises and food prices fall, 
expenditure on non-food products increases boosting the growth of non-agricultural goods and 
services such as transportation, construction and agro-food industry, further generating 
employment and enhancing development (Lipton et al. 2003). 
However, attention must be illustrated to the fact that these positive effects can be eroded or even 
reversed if irrigation services decline, or if schemes are expanded into unsuitable areas. Corruption 
can greatly increase uncertainty about the reliability of the service and can cause bad management 
and maintenance. Increasing the outreach of irrigation canals without the presence if enough 
irrigation water may cause conflicts between upstream and downstream farmers due to water 
shortage (Lipton et al. 2003). 
In addition, irrigation has some social, health, and environmental consequences that are worth 
mentioning. Forced population displacement caused by dam construction is a serious counter-
development consequence. Enough attention should be made, however, to the non-irrigation 
scenario so that the positive economic and social impacts of large-scale irrigation projects are not 
devaluated (IFAD 2001). Large-scale irrigation projects may also have some negative health 
consequences since they may encourage water-related diseases if inadequate drainage is in place. 
However, in dry areas, such projects may have contributed to the improvement of healthy 
conditions through enhancing green landscape and moderating high temperatures. But such 
projects, on the other hand, may cause losses in natural habitats that have an environmental value 
extremely difficult to assess (Cernea 1997). 
Furthermore, when groundwater is used for irrigation by extracting water using pump sets, 
uncontrolled extraction and unorganised digging of wells may cause serious environmental 
problems manifested by lowering underground water table and increases water salinity 
consequently, as the case in AKB in the north-east of Syria (Sadiddin 2009). 
The above-mentioned limitations raise the importance of the sustainability of irrigation policies 
pursued in many developing countries. Short-term benefits may be partially or totally offset by 
constraints and limitations in the long-term that may result from various political, institutional, 
environmental and social factors, some of which may limit an effective performance of irrigation, 
while others may be a consequence of weakly planned irrigation promotion policy. 
1.2.2. Irrigation water provision: institutions and policy 
Irrigation water represents a fundamental constraint on production especially in dry areas. Thus its 
allocation among individuals and communities is an essential matter that affects both production 
efficiency and social equity. Due to the public good characteristics of water, market forces cannot 
be relied upon to perform the function of its efficient allocation to various uses and users. In 
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addition, the fact that rain water is a gift of nature, there may be strong social, cultural and 
religious objections to the idea of paying for water. When market fails, some alternative institutions 
must be found to ration the use of this scarce resource efficiently and equitably (Upton 2004). 
The most widely institutional arrangements for the provision of irrigation water can be classified 
under individual acquisition, community allocation and bureaucratic allocation. The first is usually 
achieved directly by extracting water from a private well, but it can also be done by drawing water 
from a river or a dam located nearby, or through a contractual arrangement with a water supplier. 
Community allocation of water is currently rare and is performed by sharing the water of a 
communal source such as a village tank or well among the community users. Bureaucratic 
allocation is the most used method for large-scale irrigation projects, in which administrators are 
usually separate from users, and they mostly operate as public servants (Upton 2004). 
Large-scale irrigation projects are usually the result of huge public investments in the construction 
of dams and irrigation canals to store and transport water, while tube-well irrigation projects are 
primarily a private business although they can be heavily affected by public policy through credit 
provision and institutional facilities. Ellis (1992) emphasises further the links between irrigation 
policy and other agricultural policies. He states that irrigation policy is linked to credit and input 
policy through increased working capital requirements of irrigated crops especially for the 
purchase of physical inputs that are complimentary to increased water use. It is linked to 
mechanisation policy as it entails some of the same issues of irrigation technology choice. It is also 
linked to price and marketing policies as farmers become with irrigation more price responsive and 
the necessity of a market infrastructure increases to handle the increased marketable surplus. 
Research policy can also be affected by expanding irrigation since priority of research is likely to be 
on irrigated cropping. 
The objective of large-scale public irrigation projects and the promotion of private investments in 
tube-well irrigation has been to steer regional and national development via the participation of 
considerable proportion of people in direct and indirect benefits of such projects. This objective 
was behind justifying the construction of huge hydraulic infrastructures and, including dams and 
networks financed mostly by national governments at substantial costs. Such reasoning that can be 
called ‘supply management approach’ was, al least in part, caused by an optimistic view about the 
availability of water resources, and therefore the target was mainly to create investments that 
facilitate access to irrigation water by the largest portion of farming community (FAO & IFAD 
2006). 
However, performance of public irrigation problems started to emerge from the 1960s when it was 
observed that water was not enough to irrigate all irrigation areas and that increased crop yields 
were much below expectations. Later in the seventies, maintenance problems became substantial 
and rehabilitation was repeatedly necessary. Salination problems started to appear in some areas 
and returns became lower than before, and so benefits to the poor were lower than projected when 
calling for public funding and support. In some areas, total available resources started to decline 
and it was clearly manifested in hydraulic deficits in many water basins around the world due to 
excessive use especially from private tube-well irrigation projects. This has been further causing 
falling economic rate of return, which, in turn, has led to a decline in public irrigation investments 
(Lipton et al. 2003). 
However, Lipton et al. (2003) argue that the decline in economic rate of return of irrigation 
investment is caused also by other factors including decreasing agricultural prices and some 
technical reasons. He argues that higher return projects are built first leaving less suitable areas for 
later. Rising construction costs is maybe another reason, especially when coupled with difficulties 
in costs recovery as the case with most irrigation projects. Poorly targeted subsidies and incentives 
and inappropriate water charging may also have played a role. Increased concerns about potential 
environmental consequences of irrigation projects, from which excessive use of water is only one, 
may have has created some adverse publicity and weakened political support for such projects. 
The above-mentioned problems have caused over time a fundamental change in the way irrigation 
water resources had been organised and managed. The move from supply management approach 
to demand management strategies was caused by problems associated with finding the most 
efficient and equitable instruments and institutions to allocate the limited quantity of irrigation 
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water scarce resources. These problems range from the appropriate institutional set-up that entails 
the role of different stakeholders (farming communities, irrigation administration institutions, 
public agencies, etc) to the appropriate charging method that maintain the resource sustainability  
from one side and ensure fair allocation of the resource among potential users and sectors. 
Carces-Restrepo et al. (2007) discuss the possibility of irrigation management transfer as a 
possible tool for efficient management of water resources. It entails the transfer of responsibility 
and authority for management of irrigation systems from public agencies to private-sector 
organizations that are meant to represent the interests of water users. They define a number of 
rationales for this approach that can be summarised by: reduced burden of cost that governments 
usually face, expected improvements in the agricultural productivity and economic profitability of 
irrigation systems since this is the core concern of farmers (whereas it may not be an essential 
concern of bureaucracies), increased motivation of farmers to pay more for their irrigation system 
because they will be empowered to take over the authority, and improved accountability of 
irrigation system management to farmers producing more efficient and equitable water delivery 
and improved canal maintenance. However, at the beginning, such approach may increase the cost 
of irrigation for farmers, but the approach is expected to enable farmer’s organizations to impose 
more cost-effective measures and that over time the productivity of systems will increase more 
than their costs. 
However, Cornish et al. (2004) argue that irrigation management transfer does not inevitably 
guarantee recovery of full supply costs. Whilst turnover often results in an increase in levels of cost 
recovery, revenues are still generally insufficient to cover full supply costs, as tariffs are set too low 
mainly due to political pressure. Some irrigation management transfer policies reveal that recovery 
of water charges continues to be a problem after management transfer as many transferred 
schemes are struggling to enforce fee collection. This implies that governments’ support for 
transfer should not be terminated immediately following transfer. Institutional, rather than 
financial, support is likely to be needed for some time after the transfer has taken place. 
Cornish et al. (2004) primarily discuss the claims concerning irrigation water charging as a tool for 
achieving financial sustainability and water resource sustainability of irrigation systems.  They 
argue that appropriate water charging instruments should be defined according to the objectives to 
be achieved. In the literature, considerable attention is devoted to the theoretical role of economic 
instruments (pricing and markets) to encourage productive use and optimal allocation. Acceptance 
of the rationale for recovering ongoing costs is almost universal (even if implementation is not). 
Full or partial recovery of investment costs is more controversial because irrigation is often seen as 
development expenditure for backward areas, benefiting not only the poor farmers but also society 
more generally through lower food prices and food security. Where these costs are not recovered, 
governments pay the difference or the infrastructure deteriorates. 
Carruthers (1996), however, distinguishes between 'cost recovery' and 'irrigation financing'. Under 
the first, all funds collected go to the government treasury. Under the second, funds are retained 
within the irrigation agency to meet organisation and maintenance costs. This distinction is 
another way of underlining the need to go beyond the calculation of the level of cost to be recovered 
and making explicit the way in which funds raised are used to benefit the irrigation department or 
the individual scheme. Carruthers (1996) thus concludes that beneficiaries should pay the full 
ongoing costs of the irrigation system and that the payments should be clearly designated for use 
by the operating agency, and accounting procedures should be transparent and encourage 
efficiency in the operating agency. The extent and form of capital cost recovery for original 
investments is then a political matter that also should be open and transparent. 
Ray (2002), on the other hand, emphasizes that irrigation departments in many countries need to 
improve the organization and maintenance of the main canal system and that incentives for their 
staff to operate efficiently are necessary. Water charging can accelerate this process. 
Furthermore, it is argued widely that low water charges in a water-scarce situation send the wrong 
signal to farmers. Where charges are not linked directly to the volume of water used, e.g. where 
charges are fixed per hectare of crop, even if overall charges are high, there is no incentive to 
decrease consumption at the margin. However, the problem of setting the ‘right’ price remain a 
complicated issue since there may be a need to set the price at a too high level that many farmers 
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cannot afford. In such cases, a rising block tariff, where some water is available at a low unit price 
and additional water at progressively higher prices, may be a sound solution. However, monitoring 
and record keeping are inevitably complex and costly, and if the price is incorrectly set, the demand 
may still exceed supply. The solution to this is usually to set a volumetric quota, below which 
charging is volumetric or on a rising block basis. However, if then appropriate water allocation and 
demand management are being achieved without reference to prices, the expense and complexity 
of pursuing pricing should be questioned (Cornish et al. 2004). 
Available literature identifies a number of theoretical objectives of irrigation water pricing such as 
cost recovery, improving the service delivery, increasing efficiency, allocation to highest priority 
users, improving water quality, etc. However, in practice, just two objectives are dominant: 
achieving cost recovery and causing some reduction in irrigation consumption. The target level of 
cost recovery, or the magnitude of any reduction in consumption, varies between schemes and 
countries. Some commentators suggest that these two objectives may be combined and addressed 
through a single approach. However, it is unlikely that the two objectives will coincide precisely, so 
that additional measures may be required (Cornish et al. 2004). 
Under the commonly used area-based charging systems, farmers pay a fixed fee per unit of land, 
assessed either on the basis of their total holding, the irrigated part of it or the actual crops 
irrigated. The system is relatively easy to manage, but is open to misuse, particularly through 
collusion between farmers and assessors to reduce the scale of the charge. Assessment based on 
irrigated area would appear to be the fairer method, but it requires considerable resources and 
effort. However, due to its relative easiness in terms of implementation and monitoring, it is maybe 
superior to other charging systems if the objective is cost recovery or irrigation financing of large-
scale irrigation systems. The best way to implement remain an open question that should be 
answered according to the practical constraints and problems faced in different localities and 
countries (Cornish et al. 2004). 
Volumetric methods may be a good response if the objective is to reduce water use. However, the 
high costs associated with its implementation, coupled with complexity of installing large number 
of metering devices and the vulnerability of these devices to accidental and malicious damage, 
might make it infeasible in most developing countries. In some circumstances, as practised for 
example in China, measured volumes of water can be delivered to an intermediate point, e.g. a 
township or farmers’ organization, giving farmers responsibility for distributing and charging for 
water. Systems of bulk volumetric charging and area-based charging to group members can then 
co-exist. However, due to the complications associated with rising block tariff pricing that make it 
uncommon in irrigation, particularly in the developing world, the duration of delivery may be 
adopted as a proxy for the volume passed if the flow of water is reasonably constant (Cornish et al. 
2004). 
In areas where most farmers extract irrigation water from private wells, volumetric pricing, 
coupled with credit policy that favours the adoption of modern irrigation methods may be a 
solution if the objective is to reduce water use. Ward (2000) believes that pricing water is a viable 
option for reducing consumption when combined with the introduction of modern irrigation 
techniques. He stresses that if water pricing motivates farmers to increase water use efficiency, 
they will be more likely to adopt water-saving technologies, so investments and research in water 
conservation techniques would complement water pricing if they are supported from governments 
and donors. The emphasis of combining the adoption of improved irrigation techniques with water 
pricing is justified by the fact that, in many cases, modern irrigation was not enough to raise the 
awareness of farmers about the scarcity of water resource. Although, in many situations, these 
methods have caused increased yields, water saving was much below expectations (NAPC 2005a). 
Huppert and Urban (1999) also reports that the adoption of drip irrigation by many farmers in 
Jordan Valley has not caused significant reduction in water used since many farmers are aware of 
the unreliability of supply, and they tend to over-irrigated through their drip systems whenever 
water is available cancelling any potential for noticeable water savings. 
Varela-Ortega et al. (1998) finds that the adoption improved irrigation technologies in Spain does 
not depend significantly on water price level but on structural factors, agronomic conditions and 
financial constraints. The latter constraints emphasizes the role of credit policy which should be 
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favourable especially in developing countries where farmers have binding financial constraints as 
demonstrated by a case study in Syria (NAPC 2005a). Structural and agronomic constraints stress 
the importance of research to improving the current technology so it can overcome these 
constraints. 
Caswell and Zilberman (1986) demonstrate that the probability of adopting drip irrigation 
technologies increases with higher water prices, although land quality and environmental 
constraints seem to play a greater role in technology choice, which again stresses the importance of 
research to overcome such constraints. 
Therefore, appropriate measures to deal with sustainable use of water resources should be based 
on the specific conditions governing water availability and provision, which determine usually the 
objectives to be achieved. Different objectives require different measures, but water accessibility 
and water rights are also of high importance. We have seen that many of the measures prescribed 
to deal with large-scale irrigation systems do not simply apply if water is extracted from private 
tube-wells. In many cases, the institutional problems must be clarified before policy measures are 
introduced if they are to have any success. 
A final note is that reduction in water use can be achieved also by the introduction or the 
promotion of crops that have low irrigation requirements. Governments may promote such crops 
directly through output price policy aiming to stabilize their prices or indirectly through promoting 
their demand, for example, via promoting their exports. In some critical cases of hydraulic deficit, 
changing the cropping patterns seems inevitable if water deficit is to be restored. Varela-Ortega & 
Sagardoy (2001) find that in AKB in Syria, even if all farms convert to modern irrigation, there will 
still be a considerable water deficit. 
De Fraiture et al. (2004) states that trade may play a role in saving water. They refer to ‘virtual 
water’ as the volume of water used to produce traded crops, and so by importing food a Country 
saves the water it would have required to produce it. Therefore, water short countries should 
import food from water abundant countries. The concept of traded ‘virtual water, although far from 
being practical, is insightful since it refers to the concept of water productivity, which may be a 
better measure of productivity than land in countries where water is the most limited resource, a 
concept in line with the conventional Comparative Advantage Theory. 
1.3. Review of economics literature on decision making under uncertainty  
Due to complex economic and physical systems, explaining the processes that are relevant to us 
cannot be revealed with perfect accuracy. The direct implication of this uncertainty in economic 
analysis is that any selected economic decision may have several possible outcomes, which 
characterise economic decision making by risk since not all outcomes may have the same value. 
Although certainty and risk are embedded in all economic activities, they can be considered an 
essential characteristic of agriculture (Moschini & Hennessy 2001). 
One important concept embedded in economic modelling and analysis is that of optimization, 
which is usually coupled with a set of constraints when applied in modelling the behaviour of 
agricultural producers. The application of this concept raises a problematic question when risk and 
uncertainty are considered. This question involves the definition of what is really to be optimised. 
Although an answer acceptable to all is still far from being reached, there exists a wide consensus 
that economic agents subject to risk and uncertainty maximise expected utility (Moschini & 
Hennessy 2001). 
In this section, we review the most widely used methods in economic analysis that suite the 
objectives of this research. The aim of the review is to provide the justifications and rationales lying 
behind the choice of analytical method used in this thesis, which is the use of mathematical 
programming for modelling the behaviour of agricultural producers taking into account the 
presence of risk and uncertainty. The model as described below applies the Expected Utility Theory 
through the mean-variance approach. 
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1.3.1. Qualitative analysis versus quantitative models 
At the beginning of the study, we faced a fundamental problem regarding the methodology to be 
used to perform the analysis. Methods of research in economics, as in many other social sciences, 
can be basically classified under two general approaches: qualitative and quantitative. And the 
choice of one approach over the other depends on many factors, among which the most important 
is the objective of the analysis. While quantitative analysis requires mathematical or econometric 
models that need quite large amounts of data, qualitative research is generally done in the form of 
focus groups that enable the researcher to carry on group discussions. 
Qualitative research has several advantages over the quantitative one. It allows the researcher to 
interact with the respondents, so that she can ask questions based on previous answers, which 
allows her to deeply understand the issues and yield great detail in responses. It also allows for 
interaction between group members. Such interaction often stimulates discussion and uncovers 
issues unanticipated by the researcher. Therefore, qualitative research is very useful to generate 
ideas and concepts, to uncover the farmers’ reasoning process so it becomes possible to ask the 
right questions in the way they most accurately understand. It also allows the measurements of 
changes in policy and weather parameters on the group of farmers being interviewed, which may 
give some insights to the impact of such changes at some regional level and maybe at the national 
level. 
However, as the group of farmers interviewed is small and far from being statistically 
representative of the farming community in question, qualitative analysis fails to aggregate the 
results to any regional level with a reasonable degree of precision. Therefore, it cannot examine 
many pre-existing ideas about the performance of farming sector due to its limited ability to 
quantify the outputs and inputs embedded in the process of production, which is of vital relevance 
to the objectives of this thesis. 
1.3.2. Econometric models versus mathematical programming models 
Having decided to use a quantitative approach, two general methods were initially considered: an 
econometric model based on time-series data and a structural mathematical programming model 
based on cross-sectional data. The decision has been made to use the latter for a number of reasons 
that are summarised below. 
Econometric models can be usually used to estimate the supply and demand functions, which 
indicate the market equilibriums of quantities (supplied and demanded) and prices, which are then 
used to understand the way the sector tends to move. Supply functions of agricultural output 
estimated using econometric models can be quite useful in understanding the overall behaviour of 
the agricultural sector and sub-sectors. However, there are quite difficult problems to overcome 
when relying on such models, which can be generally categorised under the headings of data 
problems, economic structural changes (that may result from a policy change or external shock), or 
a combination of the two (Hazell & Norton 1986). 
One important aspect of data problems arise from the fact that, in many cases, many crops 
compete for the available fixed resources employed in the production activities. This competition 
results in cross effects among the supplies of the different crops, which must be considered as 
necessary elements of the estimated supply functions of the crops in question. This poses the 
question of the necessity of having sufficient degrees of freedom in the time-series data used to 
estimate both the own and cross-price elasticities, which is usually difficult to obtain (Hazell & 
Norton 1986). This is very much true for developing countries such Syria, where data of this type, if 
they exist, are either scarce or quite imprecise. 
Economic structural changes are usually caused by changes in the production technologies, market 
opportunities, and/or prices of both inputs and outputs. Government policies affect all of these. 
When using econometric models to analyse the current and alternative policy options, policy 
instruments may have to deal with values that are placed outside the values observed historically. 
In other words, it may be impossible to base policy analysis on extrapolations from parameters 
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drawn from historical data when the policy instruments considered are new (Hazell & Norton 
1986). 
Mathematical programming models can assist sufficiently to solve both problems, since they are 
based on cross-sectional farm budget data and other information obtained at the micro level to 
generate optimal cropping mixes and individual supply functions. In addition, they can be used to 
analyse the direct changes in economic structure whether related to change in technology, which 
usually affects yield and production costs, or related to prices and market opportunities, which 
change the profitability of various activities. This is due to the fact that cross-sectional data, 
because of their detail, allow for a relatively precise specification of farm technology and for the 
introduction of new crops in the analysis if the technical coefficients of such crops are available 
with an acceptable level of precision (Hazell & Norton 1986). 
Such changes and their effects are very difficult to capture through econometric models, which 
means that the resulting estimates of supply elasticities of such models are unreliable when such 
structural changes are introduced into the model. Furthermore, the supply functions of 
programming models provide plenty of information useful to estimate the derived demand 
functions of inputs, which allows tracing the impact of policy changes not only on the outputs, but 
also on the derived demands of agricultural inputs such as labour and water (which is of great 
relevance in our thesis). Moreover, the opportunity cost of limiting resources may be assessed from 
the shadow prices associated with each constraint (Hazell & Norton 1986). 
Moreover, the use of econometric models requires some assumptions that are difficult to be made 
for the main agricultural commodities in Syria. They are the assumptions of competitive markets, 
which do not hold for many crops in Syria especially the so-called strategic crops. This is because 
these crops have fixed prices (cotton, sugar beet and tobacco) or floor prices (wheat, barley, 
chickpea, and lentil). These prices are for many crops maintained at levels higher than their 
international counterparts (e.g. prices of cotton, wheat and sugar beet). In addition, the cultivation 
of some of these crops (cotton, sugar beet and tobacco) is organised through a licensing system that 
further violates the assumptions of competitive markets. 
Therefore, it seems that mathematical programming models may be a better approach for the 
analysing the impact of policy changes on the agricultural sector of a small region. Combining the 
mathematical programming with representative farm approach reduces significantly the amount of 
data needed and assists in representing the cross-effects that may be present in the agricultural 
sector of the region in question. Representative farm-level models are also useful because the 
outcomes of any policy depend on how individual farmers react to policy-influenced environment. 
Even if policy is designed at a national level, its outcomes differ according to the structure and 
localisation of farms. Thus farm representation allows measuring the impact of alternative policies 
on different farm types separately since representative farms’ classification may be performed 
according to their resource endowments, technology used, etc. If farms’ locations are considered, 
the power of this method is extended to measure the aggregate impact on specific regions, which is 
becoming an important issues as policy makers are increasingly interested in the regional or sub-
sectoral impacts of alternative policies (Buysse et al. 2007). 
This does not mean, of course, that mathematical programming is without problems. The choice of 
the objective function and the representation of relevant constraints may have great consequences 
on the results. While the choice of the objective function to be optimised will be discussed in the 
next section, we will leave the choice of relevant constraints to Chapter 3, which is basically 
concerned with the empirical model used in this thesis. 
1.3.3. From profit maximization to expected utility maximization 
Farmers’ decisions are usually made subject to their physical and financial constraints and in the 
face of considerable uncertainty, which may arise from variations in yields and/or prices and from 
policy changes as well. Mathematical programming models have been repeatedly used by policy 
analysts in order to model farmers’ decisions, so that they can then be used to predict what farmers 
may do if a policy parameter is changed. They also can assist in predicting the impact of a policy 
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change on the sector performance when they are coupled with farm representative approach 
(Hazell & Norton 1986). 
In much applied research, the simplest form of programming models has been repeatedly used, 
mainly for its simplicity as a method of determining a profit maximising combination of feasible 
farm activities (i.e. a linear objective function) subject to a set of resource and technology 
constraints. Such models assume profit maximisation behaviour in a certain environment, which 
means that farmers do maximise profits and they perfectly know the input-output relationships 
and prices of inputs and outputs, which are assumed to be fixed in such models (Hazell & Norton 
1986). 
The use of programming models in policy analysis entails that such models in their reference run 
must replicate the observed reference situation as much as possible, which is usually taken to be 
the observed cropping mixes. In other words, the cropping mixes produced by the model must be 
close enough to those observed ones in the reference year or period. This is important since policy 
makers are interested in the comparison between the current policy impact and the impact of 
alternative policy actions (Buysse et al. 2007). However, the need to simplify such model to keep 
them analytically tractable has always contributed to the fact that when the model solutions are 
confronted with the observed cropping mixes, the former are usually characterised by a high degree 
of specialisation with respect to the latter. This matter prevents the use of such models in the 
simulation of alternative policies, since there is no guarantee that their predictions are reliable 
when their first run solutions are very different from the observed behaviour (Cafiero 2004). 
Buysse et al. (2007) present in details, using graphical analysis, the implications and consequences 
of the models’ simplification. They demonstrate that the main disadvantages of such models are 
their ‘rigidity’ and ‘jumpy behaviour’. By the first, they mean that, in standard linear programming 
models, small changes in the model parameters do not change the optimal solutions, while only 
large changes do. However, these large changes in the model parameters result in large changes in 
the optimal solutions too, and this is what is meant by ‘jumpy behaviour’. This is the most 
challenging issue for the modeller, since, in many case it is impossible to validate the model on the 
observed behaviour without adding more information or assumptions, whether they are technical 
or behavioural. 
To overcome this shortcoming, several calibration procedures have been developed that resort to 
modify the model structure so that the model solution coincide with observed behaviour. The most 
widely applied calibration procedure is the so-called Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP), 
which was first presented in its standard form by Howitt (1995). He argues that, at a regional level, 
data on production levels and farm land uses are more precise than the estimates of marginal costs 
of the farms’ crop production. Therefore, PMP uses the observed land allocation and production 
levels to infer the marginal costs for each crop allocation of land observed in the official data. He 
further argues that if the model does not correspond to observed cropping patterns with a set of 
linear constraints that can be empirically justified, a necessary condition is that the objective 
function is nonlinear in at least some of the activities. Then an exact calibration depends on the 
number of nonlinear terms that can be independently calibrated. 
That is why Howitt (1995) argues that adjusting some nonlinear parameters, such as the risk 
aversion coefficient, although improves model calibration, cannot calibrate exactly. Therefore, 
there is the need of ‘sufficient’ independent nonlinear terms to calibrate precisely, in the sense that 
the number of nonlinear terms need to span the number of activities that must be calibrated. 
The PMP is then based on two main assumptions: first, the observed situation represents the 
optimal solution for the modelled farms in the base year; second, there are hidden costs associated 
with each activity that cannot be directly observed by the modeller. Then the PMP calibration 
approach introduces the concept of decreasing marginal returns through incorporating nonlinear 
cost term in the objective function (Müller & Djannibekov 2009). 
The standard PMP calibration procedure consists of two sequential stages. In the first stage, the 
model is solved as a linear programming model that maximises a linear profit function with 
additional ‘observation’ constraints that bind the model solution to replicate the observed cropping 
mixes.  The dual values of the additional constraints are considered as the difference between price 
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and marginal costs for the preferable activities are interpreted as the values that capture model’s 
false specification, data measurements errors, aggregation bias, risk aversion behaviour, and price 
expectations. In the second stage, these dual values are used to construct a non-linear cost term, 
which forces the optimal solution to exactly replicate the observed behaviour without additional 
unrealistic and empirically unjustified constraints, meaning that the calibration constraints are 
omitted from the model in the second stage (Howitt 1995). 
Following the above-described procedure, the PMP approach solves the jumpy behaviour and over-
specialisation problems, while maintaining the model’s flexibility and producing the exact observed 
behaviour. 
However, as Cafiero (2004), argues this flexibility comes at the cost of imposing some assumptions 
that have weak scientific justifications. The PMP is based on the assumption of profit maximisation 
objective function, coupled with an assumed cost function such that, for each activity, the marginal 
cost equals the marginal revenue at the optimal solution. But the parameters of this cost function 
are determined thanks to the imposition of other two assumptions, which are: the marginal 
revenues of all activities are observed with certainty; and the marginal cost equals marginal 
revenue for all activities. Therefore, there is the risk that the mathematical model loses its 
structural characteristic since it is always possible to find a combination of parameters for the 
assumed cost function that allows the model to reproduce the observed behaviour, given sufficient 
flexibility in the functional form chosen for the cost function. Therefore, the PMP model is maybe 
correct if the profit maximisation assumption is reasonable, as been observed by Zilberman (1989) 
for the so-called dual models. 
Given the above, it is may be complicated to interpret the dual values of the additional constraints. 
The interpretation provided by Howitt (1995) that they capture model’s false specification, data 
measurements errors, aggregation bias, risk aversion behaviour, and price expectations does not 
seem to have a strong scientific basis as the effects of different issues are mixed together. 
Therefore, these values are really complicated to interpret. 
In addition, and in line with Cafiero (2004), the PMP may be good when aggregate data of 
production and cropping areas are of high reliability. The first assumption that Howitt (1995) 
makes is that, at a regional level, data on production levels and farmland uses are more precise 
than the estimates of marginal costs of the farms’ crop production. While this is maybe true in 
developed countries such the United States and the European Union, it is not necessarily the case 
in developing countries where data when exist experience considerable degree of flaw and 
inconsistency. Then when this approach is applied in a developing Country, the risk increases that 
modellers may, instead of looking for more reliable data to validate the model, rely on the 
‘automatic’ calibration procedure that PMP approach provides. 
Furthermore, Müller & Djannibekov (2009), who apply the PMP approach in calibrating the 
analytical model for the analysis of the agricultural sector of Khorezm (Uzbekistan), find that the 
additional cost terms are in many cases large and some very large that cannot be justified by any 
provided information whether from survey or from experts. As a response, they propose another 
calibration approach, which, although appears to be different from the standard PMP, has similar 
shortcomings. They instead modified the technical coefficients using a range derived from the 
available information in which they can assume any value; therefore, the calibration outcome is 
sensitive to any change in the selected values for the technical coefficients. 
On final note about the calibration procedures discussed above is that the choice of the functional 
form of the objective function in the initial model affects all the subsequent stages of the calibration 
process. As Müller & Djannibekov (2009) admit, the calibration proposed is ad hoc, as it has been 
tested only for the specific case of a quadratic function. In the case of a linear function, the 
proposed approach would create different base solutions that would require different modifications 
in the technical coefficients to achieve exact calibration. A similar shortcoming can be said about 
the standard PMP as explained below. 
Other potential shortcomings of the PMP are also reported in De Frahan et al. (2007) and are 
discussed together with the further developments in the PMP that are progressed to overcome the 
shortcomings. The development that is of interest to the aim of this review is the attempt of Paris  
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to use a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function instead of a linear profit function as 
in the standard PMP model. The objective is to integrate risk into the model structure explicitly 
through a combination of income variance and risk aversion coefficient (De Frahan et al. 2007). 
However, if the effect of risk, which usually implies price expectations, is captured already by the 
initial objective function, then following Howitt (1995) the dual values of the calibration 
constraints will represent data errors, aggregation bias and false specification of the model. But 
once again, there is no clear scientific basis to justify calibrating for all of them using a non-linear 
cost function based on the assumptions that there are costs unobserved by the modellers but are 
relevant for the farmers. 
In addition, the choice of the functional form of the initial objective function changes the dual 
values of the calibration constraints which means that the non-linear cost function will be different 
too. In many cases, false specification of the model may be because many technical aspects of farm 
practices are ignored by the modellers due, e.g., to their weak agronomic backgrounds (Cafiero 
2004). If this is the case, the modellers must instead look for more relevant information, which in 
turn, may solve the problem of data errors, while the problem of aggregation bias should be 
irrelevant if data on cropping areas and outputs are reliable as Howitt (1995) assumes, in the sense 
that its effects should be minimal. 
For all of the above-discussed reasons and arguments, a different approach is adopted in this thesis 
to set up solve and validate the mathematical programming models used for the purpose of policy 
analysis in this thesis, to which we turn now the discussion. 
As hinted above, the absence of uncertainty is too stringent of an assumption if we consider that 
risk is embedded in every economic activity, and that agricultural production is characterized by an 
unusually high degree of risk. This is due especially to its reliance on biological processes and its 
susceptibility to the vagaries of climate and weather. Added to this is the inelasticity in the supply 
of and demand for agricultural commodities, which can lead to large price fluctuations in 
agricultural markets when harvests are exceptionally bad or good. As a consequence, farmers 
exposed to uncertainty will usually fail to maximize profits since they are uncertain about the 
outcomes of their decisions at the moment they make them. This leads us to believe that a better 
modelling assumption is that farmers do not maximise profits, but rather they attempt to do so, 
given the available information, technology and states of nature, by balancing the possibility of 
negative outcomes due to the presence of various sources of risk. 
Many studies have demonstrated that farmers typically behave in risk-averse ways. They show that 
farmers generally prefer farm plans that provide a certain level of security even if this implies 
scarifying income on average. Such plans involve that riskier activities produced less, compared to 
how they would be if there were no uncertainty. Farmers also tend to reduce risk by diversifying 
into a larger number of activities. Therefore, ignoring risk and uncertainty in farm modelling leads 
often to results that are far different from the plans that farmers follow in reality (Hazel & Norton 
1986). 
In the presence of risk and uncertainty, a farm plan does not generate a known income every year; 
it rather may generates several possible levels of income depending on the materialised values of 
yields, prices, and resource availabilities. In this context, one can think of the farm plan as having a 
probability distribution for income, and if the number of possible outcomes is finite, we can 
arrange the decision problem in a form of payoff matrix, where every alternative farm plan will 
have different outcomes for different states of nature that reflect variation in yields, prices and 
resource availabilities. 
Many alternative methods have been developed in economic literature to present ways of ranking 
incomes distribution. Most of them try to measure income variability to give a measurement of 
risk, although some are more quantifiable than others. The most established decision theory in 
economics is the Expected Utility Theory (Bernoulli Principle). The theory that was developed by 
Von Neuman & Morgenstern (1944) is based on a set of reasonable axioms about how an individual 
ought to order risky prospects, these axioms can be summarised as follows: 
1. Ordering: any decision maker when faced with two risky prospects,  and, he will either 
prefer one to another or will be indifferent between them. 
 32 
2. Transitivity: if the decision maker prefers  to  (or is indifferent between them), and she 
prefers  to   (or is indifferent between them), she will then prefer  to    (or will be 
indifferent between them). 
3. Continuity: if a decision maker prefers  to  and  to  , then there exists a subjective 
probability (), which is not zero or one, that makes the decision maker indifferent to   and 
a lottery yielding   with probability () and   with probability 1 - (). 
4. Independence: if a decision maker prefers   to  and   is any other risky prospect, she will 
prefer a lottery yielding   and    as outcomes to a lottery yielding   and   when () =
() (Hardaker et al. 2004). 
The fulfilment of the behavioural axioms of the theory does not restrict the utility function of the 
decision maker to any particular functional form, and so a functional form can be chosen that best 
describe the decision maker’s behaviour. In addition, since the theory predicts that risky prospects 
will be ranked by their expected utility, the choice of the functional form of the utility will have 
consequences on the determination of the risk preferences of the decision maker. Therefore, the 
fundamental problem facing the analyst is to choose the functional form that best describes 
farmers’ behaviour. In some cases, the utility function can be measured by playing a series of 
carefully designed gambles with a farmer, and then a regression can be used to find the fitting 
functional form. However, such elicitation of utility functions is not always practical especially 
when dealing with a large number of farmers. So many analysts simply assume a functional form 
that is computationally convenient. Then when some of the function’s parameters are unknown, 
the farm model can be solved several times for alternative parameter values and the ones that give 
the closest solution to the farm actual plan are selected (Hazell & Norton 1986). 
The most widely used method for the employment of expected utility principle in applied economic 
research is the Mean-Variance Analysis. The mean-variance rule presumes that the preferences of a 
farmer among various possible plans are based on expected income and its associated variance. 
This decision rule results from the expected utility theory if the decision maker has a quadratic 
utility function for income. However, quadratic functions are characterised by increasing absolute 
risk aversion violating an important element of risk aversion theory which states that absolute risk 
aversion declines as income level goes up. An alternative derivation of the mean-variance rule 
comes out if the utility function is of the exponential form: 
	(
) = 1 −          [1.1] 
Where the income () is normally distributed. 
Under such circumstances the objective function to be maximised is the one proposed by Freund 
(1956) which is: 
(	()) = () − 0.5()      [1.2] 
Where  is the absolute risk aversion coefficient. 
The evidence of equation [1.2] to be a good approximate of equation (1.1) is investigated by Pulley 
(1983) who shows that, given the data used, approximations are very good and in many cases the 
optimal solutions were identical. 
In line with equation [1.2], Hardaker et al. (2004) propose using certainty equivalents of the 
alternative risky prospects instead of expected utility values, since they are more easily understood 
and interpreted, as the magnitudes of their differences between alternatives can be quantitatively 
assessed, while the arbitrary nature of utility scales means that it is impossible to weigh one utility 
value against the other. Consequently, equation [1.2] is replaced by the following equation: 
  = () − 0.5()       [1:3] 
Where CE is the certainty equivalent which is the quantitative measure proposed to quantify 
expected utility of income. In this case, the second term of the equation’s left-hand side represents 
the risk premium. 
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However, our choice of the functional form of the objective function, although has some scientific 
basis in economic theory, does not by itself guarantee that the model is accurate. The optimal 
solution in our model depends on the average income, the income variance, and the value of the 
risk aversion coefficient (RAC). While the first two terms are calculated from the matrixes of 
technical coefficients and of that of prices, the third is assumed as an exogenous parameter that 
measures the degrees of risk aversion of different farmers. These different degrees of risk aversion 
are maybe due to differences in the initial endowments, the level of wealth, and other entitlements 
that they enjoy when they face various risky choices. In our case, RAC is assumed to take the value 
for which the optimal solution gives cropping mixes as close as possible to the observed ones. 
However, due to reasons well explained by Howitt (1995), adjusting RAC improves model 
representation of the observed reality, but cannot calibrate exactly. 
However, the interest of this thesis is to measure the impact of alternative policies on water on an 
aggregate level, which is what is relevant to policy-makers. Then what is necessary is that the 
cropping patterns and agricultural water consumption produced by the model are close enough to 
those observed at the relevant aggregate level. The impact on incomes is also measured at an 
aggregate level which is a weakness of this thesis, since policy makers may be interested in knowing 
the distributional effects and not only the aggregate one on farmers’ incomes, which is maybe a 
shortcoming of our model. However, in order to overcome this shortcoming, we use some 
statistical measures, namely the coefficient of variation, to have some insight on the distributional 
effects within each governorate. 
To improve the model flexibility, a very necessary property when making policy simulations, we set 
up the models using as much data as possible. All available data are considered, whether they are 
given at higher or lower levels of aggregation. In addition, many of this data are crosschecked using 
data collected at the farm levels, some of which were collected for other studies while others were 
gathered for the sake of this research. Due to time constraints, several assumptions were adopted 
on the basis of interviews with key informants and experts, all of them were also crosschecked with 
each other and with opinions of farmers to gain insights about their plausibility. The model 
detailed characteristics and the data used are extensively described in Chapter 3 and no need to 
repeat everything here. 
1.3.4. Limitations of the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
The aim of this section is to discuss the limitations of the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) in light of 
the most important economic literature on decision-making and choice under risk and uncertainty. 
This is a vital issue to define the degree of reliability of the mathematical programming models 
based on EUT, as the one used in this thesis. 
Empirical research that dates back to the fifties has revealed a number of choice behaviours that 
appear to violate some of the EUT’s axioms listed in the previous section. Starmber (2000) 
classifies these violations under two broad headings: those that have some explanations in the 
conventional theory of preferences, which primarily violate the independence axiom; and those 
that do not, which usually violate one or more of the other three axioms; that is to say they 
challenge the assumption of well-defined preferences. 
In response to these findings, many other models, which all have a common aim of providing some 
improvements on the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model particularly, try 
to model the abnormalities that seem to violate one or more of the axioms of the EUT. Starmer 
(2000) demonstrates that people may violate the EUT maximisation for two broad reasons: failure 
of preferences due to the dependence of the utility of outcomes on the particular risky prospects 
faced by the decision maker and failure of perception i.e. to make well-defined preferences. Models 
that modify the outcome weightings departing from a standard utility function have been used to 
address failure of preferences, while models that modify the probability weighting are developed to 
address the failure of perception. 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) present one of the most important critiques to the EUT when used as 
a descriptive model of decision-making under uncertainty. They argue that choices among risky 
prospects reveal several effects that are inconsistent with of the EUT. For example, people 
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underweight outcomes merely probable in comparison with outcomes obtained with certainty. This 
tendency contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices 
involving sure losses. They argue, in addition, that people generally disregard components shared 
by all prospects considered, leading to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented 
in different forms. Therefore, they develop another theory of choice and they call it prospect 
theory, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets, and probabilities 
are replaced by decision weights. 
Quiggin (1982) design a new model and call it anticipated utility (it was later called the rank-
dependent expected utility model) to explain the observation that many people purchase lottery 
tickets, which is an action implying risk-seeking, but they also buy insurance, which implies risk-
aversion. He argues that people overweight low-probability events such as winning the lottery or 
suffering disastrous loss. The basic idea of the rank-dependent model is to overweight the unlikely 
extreme outcomes rather than all unlikely events, which was then incorporated by Kahneman & 
Tversky (1992) to yield their new cumulative prospect theory. 
Chambers & Quiggin (2000), who first presented the state-contingent approach to production 
under uncertainty, claim that aforementioned approach provides the best way to think about 
problems in the economics of uncertainty, including consumer’s problems, producer’s problems 
and principal-agent relationships. The theory provides a new basis for deriving optimality criteria 
under uncertainty, using the concept of stochastic production function in which output is derived 
from the interaction of inputs with natural phenomena and then it depends not only on the level of 
inputs used but also on the ‘state of nature’ that prevails. 
Rasmussen (2003) extends the state-contingent approach and applies it for risk-averse producers. 
He finds that it is not possible to derive criteria of optimality for strictly risk-averse producers, but 
useful criteria are derived for risk-neutral producers. In this respect, he finds that, given the state 
of nature, risk-averse producers may use more or less inputs than risk-averse producers do, a 
finding that contradicts the expected utility predictions, which state that risk-aversion causes 
suboptimal use of physical inputs. 
However, Rasmussen (2006) states that applications of the criteria derived from the state-
contingent approach require that production functions are known. Since most empirical work 
concerning optimizing production under uncertainty is historically based on the standard  EUT, the 
approach based on the state-contingent approach carries new challenges with respect to both 
modelling utility and the choice of functional forms and procedures for estimating state-contingent 
production functions. He also states that it is unrealistic to expect that production functions can be 
estimated for all possible states of nature, and indeed state-contingent production functions may 
be estimated for only a few states of nature. The main conclusion concerning empirics is that when 
this is the case, each of the state-contingent production functions available should be considered a 
stochastic production function. 
Rabin (2000) extends the critique to the standard EUT by demonstrating that the latter is unable 
to provide a plausible account of risk aversion over modest stakes, even though it provides a 
reasonable explanation to risk behaviour regarding relatively large-scale financial risks. The latter 
is justified by the fact that the marginal value of an additional dollar to a poor person is more 
worthy than for a wealthy person. Rabin (2000) uses the concept of loss aversion, first introduced 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their prospect theory, to explain risk aversion over modest 
stakes. Loss aversion means that people define their utilities by changes in wealth rather than by 
their obsolete levels. 
Just and Pope (2003), on the other hand, argue that risk aversion has been overestimated in most 
economic literature, in which many practices and procedures pursued by farmers and individuals 
are interpreted as consequences of risk aversion while it is not necessarily the case. They argue that 
risk attitudes may rather be the consequence of other phenomena and constraints such as fixed 
allocated inputs, asset fixity, imperfect capital markets, inter-temporal financial management, 
possible bankruptcy, etc. 
To sum up this discussion, it is clear that the EUT does not fully explain decision-making under 
risk and uncertainty. However, it is reasonable to accept that people seek to comply with the EUT’s 
 35 
axioms, given the information they have. People fail to keep in line with axioms due to perceptions 
failure and preference failure, but people try to approach them and that is why Hardaker et. al 
(2004) propose to use the EUT as a perspective tool rather a descriptive tool. 
In addition, the alternative models, although they have better theoretical predictability of decision-
making, their applicability in research is very limited due to their huge data requirements as hinted 
by Rasmussen (2006). This is especially true when the purpose is to trace the policy impact of a 
large number of farmers. Therefore, our choice of selecting the mean-variance principle as an 
approximation of the EUT is constrained by the types of data available, since data to apply, e.g., the 
state-contingent approach are huge and impossible to obtain. In addition, Just & Just (2009) 
demonstrate that the EUT hypothesis cannot be rejected because perceptions and preferences, 
which both affect behaviour under risk, cannot be measured separately. Therefore, all alternative 
models cannot achieve empirical superiority to the EUT since they do not admit errors in 
perception and probability. They instead propose a practical approach that combines both 
perceptions and preferences through a mean-variance (they call it also a mean-risk premium) 
criterion which is almost what we apply in this thesis. 
Furthermore, one of the critiques against the standard EUT makes the latter more applicable. The 
observation of Rabin (2003) that people utilities are determined by changes in their wealth rather 
than their absolute wealth is helpful in policy analysis, since it is always easier to measure changes 
in wealth rather than to measure the net wealth as data on initial wealth are more difficult to 
obtain. 
1.4. Critical review of past studies on water use in Syrian agriculture 
Although policy makers and analysts recognise water scarcity in Syria as a priority, the research 
literature is still relatively poor on how to guide the formation of effective alternative water policy.  
Safi (2006) and Somi & Alshayeb (2002), focus on improving water use in Syria through 
converting the flood-irrigation to modern methods. Both reports present updated estimates of the 
existing water balance (a subtraction of water use from water availability) commenting to the 
possible effects of adopting the modern irrigation techniques. 
However, Somi & Alshayeb (2002) performed some irrigation experiments on certain crops and 
use their results to compare the differences in terms of costs, profits, and water use between flood 
irrigation and modern methods. The study proves the superiority of modern techniques, not just in 
terms water saving, but also in terms of profits driven by increased yields. The data presented in 
the study, however, have been obtained in ideal experimental conditions that are very different 
from those under which actual Syrian farmers operate, which casts some doubt on their reliability 
as predictors of the actual impact of the diffusion of modern irrigation, a point made even stronger 
by the failure to present considerations related to aggregation of the results at any regional level in 
the Country.  
Other relevant studies are Varela-Ortega & Sagardoy (2001) and NAPC (2005). These are different 
from the above-mentioned ones insomuch as their focus is on agricultural policy and its possible 
impact on water use. 
Varela-Ortega & Sagardoy (2001) provides a detailed summary of available water resources in the 
Country, differentiated by source (rainfall, underground water, rivers, etc) and use (agricultural, 
industrial, domestic, etc). Then, water balance is calculated by observing the difference between 
water availability and uses. The data used in these calculations refers to the period 1999-2000, and 
they show that Syria experiences a high water deficit that accounted to 3,104 millions of CM in the 
period 1999-2000. An interesting point of the study is that the AKB had in that period a deficit of 
3,105 millions of CMs, which is slightly higher than the national one (Varela-Ortega & Sagardoy 
2001, p. 18). This emphasises the importance of the water problem in the region of the AKB. 
The study simulates four scenarios to estimate the projected water demand with respect to 
different policy alternatives as follows: 
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- Irrigation expansion of a total area equal to 414,395 ha, 136,545 ha of which is in AKB, 
coupled with modernising irrigation over five years at a pace of 319,017 ha/year for 
entire Syria and 101,019 ha/year for AKB. 
- A gradual modernisation where the total irrigated area (1,149,349 ha) is modernised 
over a period of 15 years at the rate of 80,000 ha/year, without any expansion of 
irrigated area. 
- Same as the first scenario but the modernisation process is undertaken over the entire 
irrigated area at the rate of 80,000 ha/year, which is in line with some international 
experiences. 
- The last scenario simulates different irrigation policies for the most critical basins. For 
AKB, all the irrigated area is modernised in 5 years and no new irrigation is developed. 
The results of these scenarios regarding AKB suggests that the expansion of irrigation to new areas 
should be halted in order to achieve equilibrium between water demand and supply within the 
basin (the first scenario). The third scenario results in reducing the deficit in the first 11 years 
because the annual balance between the new modernised areas and the added ones is positive. 
However, the trend reverses after the eleventh year as all the existing irrigated areas are then 
modernised and only new areas are added. 
The second and the forth scenarios suggest that even if the whole irrigated area is modernised 
either over a relatively long period (15 years as in the second scenario) or over a relatively short 
period (5 years as in the forth scenario), AKB will continue to experience a high deficit that will 
eventually lead to the depletion of water aquifers. Therefore, the study concludes that the irrigation 
modernisation is insufficient to restore the water balance in AKB, and there is a need for 
alternative measures, which may be: 
- reducing the consumption per well 
- closing some wells 
- reducing the irrigated area 
- limiting the cropping pattern to crops with relative small water requirements 
- any combination of these measures 
The study then proposes that the most suitable measures or the proper combination of them 
should be based on a deep investigation of the hydrological and water use characteristics that 
should be studied in details in order to assess different water policy alternatives. (Varela-Ortega 
and Sagardoy 2001, p. 20). The main strength of this study, as opposed to the previously 
mentioned ones, is its ability to aggregate the results to the regional and national levels, which 
allows making policy scenarios assessing the impact on water use of some alternative irrigation 
policies. 
However, the study, as hinted by its authors, is limited to make scenarios concerning irrigation 
water policy only (that is modernising and expanding irrigated areas). It concludes that the 
adoption of modern irrigation schemes is not sufficient to restore the water balance in AKB and, 
therefore, suggests some other measures. Nevertheless, some of these measures must be taken into 
consideration with high degree of care even if they may be effective in solving the water deficit 
problem in the region. Closing wells may cause tension between farmers and the governmental 
agencies, and can impede further cooperation from the farmers’ side to implement other policy 
measures such as reducing the consumption per well, which is, in turn, difficult to perform and 
monitor as it requires metering the wells. The same difficulty applies to limiting the irrigated areas 
and/or limiting the cropping patterns to crops that require less water unless these measures are 
implemented through providing economic incentives to farmers. 
NAPC (2005), on the other hand, has the objectives of providing an updated picture of the current 
situation of the Syrian water sector in Syria, with emphasis on agriculture, to assess the impacts of 
the current and alternative economic incentives for farmers on water use. Namely, it aims at 
assessing profitability under different irrigation technologies (traditional flood versus modern 
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ones: drip and sprinkler), to enable suggesting some policy options to cope with water scarcity and 
to achieve a sustainable water use, namely in agriculture. The study takes AKB case as considered 
the most critical basin in terms of water deficit. 
The study findings demonstrate that the growing water deficit in Syria mainly results from the 
evolution of water supply, which has been almost constant since the early eighties, and of 
increasing demand in the last decades.  Unsurprisingly, agriculture is the sector that demands the 
largest share of water, at national (79% of total uses) as well as at basin level (e.g. in AKB, 
agricultural use accounts for almost 95% of total use). This is obviously because agriculture is the 
largest economic sector in the Country but also because  flood irrigation, characterised by low 
efficiency, is the dominant method. Furthermore, the difficulties in monitoring groundwater 
extraction cause a vicious circle of random wells’ digging, leading to an overexploitation of 
underground water, reducing water tables, which, in turn motivates more random digging (NAPC 
2005a, p. 75). 
The study hints at possible technological, financial, and institutional problems that constrain 
farmers’ decision to convert to modern irrigation. Technological problems are summarised in the 
low quality of plastic pipes available for adoption of modern irrigation schemes, which makes them 
rather short-lived, and thus less cost effective. Financial problems are caused by farmers’ inability 
to access sufficient credit required to invest in modern irrigation techniques. The institutional 
problems are summarised by the fact that the Agricultural Cooperative Bank (ACB), which is the 
main governmental provider of credit to farmers in Syria, does not possess the required efficiency 
to timely and cost effectively provide the required funds to finance the conversion process as 
envisaged by the government plan. One of the problems with the ACB lending procedures is that it 
does not accept lands located within the perimeter of the public irrigation schemes as collaterals for 
irrigation loans, further limiting the ability of some farmers to access credit (NAPC 2005a, p. 76). 
The study recommends some policies that favour the adoption of modern irrigation techniques by 
farmers by providing economic incentives on investments. The most important is the reduction of 
the interest rate on the loans offered by the ACB to fund the purchase of pumps and irrigation 
equipments (drips, sprinklers, pipes, etc.). It also proposes a direct subsidy on the cost of pump 
investment and on the cost of irrigation equipment investment. It recommends, as well, the 
provision of economic incentives on operation and maintenance in the form of a subsidy on the 
price of fuel to operate pump-sets (NAPC 2005a, P. 78). These recommendations were taken into 
high consideration by the Government of Syria (GOS) (refer to section 2.2.1) 
The strength of this study is that it uses data collected at the farm level, reflecting the actual 
technical conditions under which farmers operate. This makes the results of the research in terms 
of water-saving coefficients and profitability more reliable than those of Somi & Alshayeb (2002), 
which uses data generated in experimental conditions, as noted before. However, the study only 
focuses on comparing the water use and profitability between different irrigation techniques at the 
farm level, and so it shares Somi et al. (2002) weakness of failure to aggregate the results to any 
regional level in the Country. 
1.5. Critical review of past studies related to farm income risks in Syria 
So far, risk and uncertainty have not been taken broadly into consideration in most researches and 
studies performed on Syrian agriculture. This has been the consequence of the prevailing economic 
system in the Country that has been based, for a long time, on central planning, in which 
Government involvement in the economy was intense. Such economic system, although proved 
expensive and inefficient to achieve the national objectives declared by the GOS, was able to isolate 
farmers from unfavourable conditions such as price shocks and fluctuations. However, as the 
Government started in the early nineties a programme of economic reform by giving more space to 
the private sector and moving to ‘indicative’ planning in agriculture, increased attention started to 
be given to risk and uncertainty and their impact on the stability of agricultural incomes. 
Several studies have been recently performed in Syria to inform the policy decision-making at this 
crossroads of Syria's agricultural history. These studies cover the analysis of risks, opportunities 
and policies in meeting these challenges while preserving the social achievements inherited from 
 38 
the past.  Some of them cover some subsectors of Syrian agriculture while others focus on policy 
issues and constraints that obstacle the promotion of agricultural development in the Country. 
Westlake (2001) provides an analysis to the economics of the strategic crops’ subsector with focus 
on efficiency and public losses, while the growth potentials of olive oil and citrus subsectors are 
explored by Malevolti (1999) and Westlake (2000) respectively. The livestock and dairy sub-sectors 
are also analysed along with their marketing arrangements by Cummins (2000) and Rama (2000). 
Other interesting studies have covered the implications of credit (Parthasarathy 2000: 2001) and 
taxation (Wehrheim 2001) policies on agricultural investments and developments, while Lançon 
(2005) analyses the potential comparative advantages of the most important crops and reveals that 
wheat and cotton, the most important strategic crops, do not have comparative advantage in many 
areas of the Country. 
The focus and emphasis of all the above mentioned studies have been mostly on improving the 
efficiency of resource allocation and use when designing and implementing policies to achieve the 
national objectives declared by the Government. These objectives have been recently modified to 
reflect the changing environment and meet emerging challenges that are mostly the increased 
exposure to risks and uncertainty and exacerbated depletion of natural resources especially land 
and water. This has been reflected in the new National Agricultural Strategy by emphasising the 
role of preserving the scarce natural resources for sustainable development and the importance of 
protecting farms’ incomes (NAPC 2006). 
The only study, done so far, that explicitly attempts to discuss and analyse the various types of risks 
to which Syrian farmers are exposed is the Farming Systems Study conducted by the National 
Agricultural Policy Center (NAPC) and summarised in an impressive comprehensive report by 
Wattenbach (2006). The study considers the potential impacts of agricultural policy change at the 
household, regional and national levels. The study declares its specific objective as to divide the 
entire Country into relatively homogeneous zones of agricultural production, based on appropriate 
agro-ecological and socio-economic characteristics. The characterisation of each farming zone in 
the national context has allowed reviewing the possible aggregated effect of policy change as well as 
the dependence of each farming zone on major crops, which could be subject to policy adjustments. 
Wattenbach (2006) relies on extensive fieldwork that permitted the classification of households in 
each farming zone into categories based on socio-economic characteristics. Past developments of 
each household category are recorded to define the resource endowments and the different income 
sources that shape the capacity of households to adjust to future challenges. In addition, the 
various types of risk, to which all household typologies are exposed, are defined in each zone, 
discussing in a detailed manner the relative magnitude of each type of risk for different zones and 
households. He also provides extensive information on the characteristics of the farming zones and 
the activities carried out by farmers in each of them. He demonstrates comprehensively the natural 
conditions, the market integration and the historic influences resulting in differentiation and 
specialization among them, observing the dynamics of farmers’ interactions with their natural 
environment, socio-economic settings and the public policy, and highlighting in details the 
strategies pursued by farmers to deal with their continuously changing conditions. 
Nevertheless, Wattenbach (2006) relies principally on qualitative analysis, fails to indicate 
precisely the relative magnitudes of problems faced by the farmers. The approach, though was 
successful in identifying the main constraints confronting rural development in the Country and 
their relative significance in different farming zones and for different household typologies, is 
unable to quantify these constraints, and therefore, could not prescribe specific and detailed 
solutions to deal with the materialistic problems. In the region targeted by this thesis, Wattenbach 
(2006) defines the liquidity constraints and the lack of access to crop finance as a serious 
constraint to many farming households. He then recommends offering a functioning credit market 
in order to revive the rural economy and to increase the profitability of production for the 
producers who pay very high capital costs to finance their farming operations. However, due to the 
lack of detailed quantitative analysis, it fails to specify the activities that such credit market should 
target, as it fails to identify the ways in which farmers may respond to changes in any of the key 
policy parameters, which may motivate farmers to adjust significantly their resources allocation. 
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Chapter 2. Farmers’ Environment 
Many factors contribute to the way the agricultural sector is shaped in Syria today. Despite 
problems and various difficulties that have characterized Syrian farming in the past decades, 
agriculture is still one of the predominant sectors in the economy and one which the Country has to 
count on in the future for its social and economic development. At the level of the zone of interest 
in this study, agriculture is considered to be the dominant economic activity, and the bulk of its 
population is either directly involved in agriculture or involved in other economic activities very 
much linked to the agricultural sector such as the commerce of agricultural outputs and the 
provision of agricultural inputs. 
This chapter aims to describe the overall framework under which the targeted farmers operate and 
make their production decisions. Therefore, after a general description of the study area, the 
conditioning factors that shape agricultural sector in the study area will be presented. These 
conditioning factors can be classified under two other categories: the social and economic 
conditions of rural areas, and the wide spectrum of public policies affecting the sector. 
2.1. General description of the study zone 
The study covers the large zone of the North-East of Syria, which is composed of three 
governorates: Deir-Ezzour (DEG), Al-Rakka (RAG), and Al-Hassakeh (HAG). The overall zone will 
be later referred to in this report as DERAHA. Each of these governorates consists of three or four 
administrative mantikas, with the mantikas of Al-Hassakeh Centre, Kameshli, Al-Malkiya, and 
Ras-Elein falling in HAG, Al-Rakka Center, Al-Thawra, and Tal-Abiad falling in RAG, and Deir-
Ezzour Centre, Al-Mayadeen, and Bokmal falling in DEG. 
The Mediterranean climate prevails in DERAHA, which is characterized by rainy winters and dry-
hot summer, with short autumns and springs. Climatically, DERAHA extends over the five agro-
climatic zones of the Country (see box 1) although the area of the Agro-Climatic Zone I is relatively 
small. Humidity rate is high in winter (60-75%) and very low in the summer (20-50%). The daily 
temperature gap between day and night (the highest 47.7 at day and the lowest is -3.4) might reach 
23 degrees (SOFA 2002). 
The two largest rivers of Syria run through the area of DERAHA which are Euphrates and Al-
Khabour. Euphrates sources in Turkey and enters into Syria where it runs for 680 km, and it has an 
average flow of 1037 CM per second. Al-Khabour sources from the north-east of DERAHA in HAG 
and it runs for 552 km with an average flow of 22.5 CM per second. DERAHA is also endowed with 
a third river, Al-Balikh, which extends for 100 km with an average flow of 25 CM per second. 
DERAHA also includes the largest dam in the Country (Euphrates Dam) that has a storage capacity 
of 14.1 billion CM, it includes as well several other dams from which the most important are Al-
Khatounieh Dam (in HAG) and Al-Ba’ath Dam (in RAG). Moreover, many dams were built on the 
other rivers; for example, ten small dams were built on the Al-Khabour river with a total storage 
capacity of 409 million CM. 
With reference to Table 2.1, the population of DERAHA accounts to about three million 
inhabitants forming only about 17% of the national population. The Table also reflects the relative 
importance of rural population in the area showing that the region has a higher share of rural 
population with respect to the national figure. This indirectly reflects the high reliance of the area 
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population on agriculture as the major income source as it was highlighted by other sources 
(Wattenbach 2006). 
 Box 1  
The concept of agro-climatic zones 
Due to the diversity and the importance that agro-climatic conditions have on agriculture and other human activities, 
from a planning point of view Syria has been traditionally divided up in five major agro - climatic zones often referred 
to as settlement zones. These agro-climatic zones are the Syrian approach to defining land use suitability classes, with 
implications for the legal position of crop farming, support services and delineation of intervention areas of Government 
supported projects. The definition of the five zones given below is adopted from the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian 
Reform (MAAR) annual statistics. The mapping of the zones and hence delineation of land in the different classes is 
subject to revisions by Government committees. 
Syria is divided into five agro- climatic zones according to annual precipitation and rainfall probability:  
Zone 1: With annual rainfall over 350 mm, its area is 2,701,000 ha and forms 14.6% of the Country’s area.  
The zone is divided into two areas:  
a) This with annual rainfall over 600 mm where winter rainfed crops can be successfully planted.  
b) This with annual rainfall between 350- 600 mm and not less than 300 mm during two thirds of the relevant years i.e. 
it is possible to get two seasons every three years and the main crops are wheat, legumes and summer crops.  
Zone 2: It has an annual rainfall between 250 - 350 mm and not less than 300 mm during two thirds of the relevant years 
i.e. it is possible to get two barley seasons every three years and in addition could be planted with wheat, pulses and 
summer crops. The common rotation in this zone is:  
- On deep soil: wheat-pulses and forage legumes – a summer crop is planted if winter rain is sufficient, otherwise fallow 
will take the place of summer crop.  
- On shallow soil: mainly barley, but part of the land is planted to cumin. Fallow is rare.  
The area of this zone is 2,470,000 ha and it forms 13.3% of the Country’s area.  
Zone 3: It has an annual rainfall of 250 mm with not less than this amount during half of the relevant years i.e. it is 
possible to get one to two seasons every three years and the main crop is barley, although legumes could be planted. 
Fallow is practiced in case of capital shortage. The area of this zone is 1,306,000 ha and it forms 7.1% of the Country’s 
area. 
Zone 4: It has an annual rainfall of between 200- 250 mm with not less than 200 mm during half of the relevant years i.e. 
it is good just for barley, which in some years is grazed since the plants do not grow enough to be harvested. Fallow is 
practiced in case of capital shortage. The area of this zone is 1,833,000 ha and forms 9.9% of the Country’s area.  
Zone 5: (Desert and steppe) this area covers the rest of the Country’s land. It is not suitable for rainfed planting. The area 
of this zone is 10,208,000 ha which forms 55.1% of the Country’s area. It is natural grazing for sheep and camels. 
Source: adapted from MAAR Statistical Abstracts. 
About 25% of the total cultivated area of DERAHA is irrigated while the rest is cultivated without 
irrigation, relying only on rainfall that fluctuates according to time and space. Irrigation is usually 
tuned according to the availability of irrigation water, but in many cases according to the type of 
crops being grown. In the areas where irrigation water is available, farmers tend to use water for all 
crops even for winter crops such as wheat and barley unless rainfalls are sufficient and in time, 
which happens only in some years in the Agro-Climatic Zone I. The scarcity of rainfall and its 
misdistribution in most agro-climatic zones makes it unreliable for agriculture even in most winter 
seasons. Summer crops such as cotton, maize and sugar beet are always grown as irrigated crops. 
There are three irrigation sources in DERAHA: private wells, public networks and rivers. Major 
irrigation source in DERAHA is the private wells which irrigate about 62% of the total irrigated 
area. However, the importance of private wells for irrigation differs across the three governorates 
of DERAHA. While it is the dominant source in HAG where it irrigates about 85% of the total 
irrigated area, it only irrigates some 26% in DEG where the dominant source is the Euphrates 
rivers (58%). In RAG instead, public networks are the most important and they irrigate about 40% 
of the irrigated area (Table 2.3). Public networks generally in Syria are the results of the large 
Government investments and the beneficiaries of these networks are subject to annual fee (refer to 
section 2.2.1). 
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Although modern irrigation techniques are present in the area but their importance is negligible. 
The area irrigated by them did not exceed 2% in 2004 (MAAR 2005). Hence, the dominant 
irrigation mode is the traditional flood irrigation which is considered highly inefficient. 
Table 2. 1. The importance of DERAHA in the national context 
Element Syria DERAHA Share (%) 
Total population (thousand inhabitant) 17,921 3,073 17 
Rural population1 (thousand inhabitant) 8,333 1,863 22 
Total area (thousand ha) 18,518 7,601 41 
Cultivated area (thousand ha) 5,682 2,576 45 
Irrigated area (thousand ha) 1,396 764 55 
Rainfed area (thousand ha) 4,286 1,812 42 
Wheat area (thousand ha) 1,668 923 55 
Wheat production (thousand ton) 4,041 1,472 58 
Cotton area (thousand ha) 193 142 73 
Cotton production (thousand ton) 711 537 76 
Sugar beet area (thousand ha) 28.2 8.6 31 
Sugar beet production (thousand tom) 1,366 320 23 
Barley area (thousand ha) 1,363 747 55 
Barley production (thousand ton) 784 302 39 
Yellow maize area (thousand ha) 50 319 63 
Yellow maize production (thousand ton) 177 117 66 
Source: elaborated from NAPC database, 2007 (www.napcsyr.org), and the CBS (2006) 
The other most important income sources in DERAHA are the public sector employment and 
agricultural casual labour. The importance of such activities for income generation is different for 
different farm households. Their importance decreases as the well-being status of the farming 
family increases, and they become irrelevant for many farming households who have relatively 
quite large farms. On the other hand, Government employment is not available for all people, but it 
is noticeable that the education level of well-off farmers is higher so they are more likely to get 
stable jobs outside the agricultural sector. Casual agricultural employment is only available at 
specific times of the year which causes the income of the households depending on it to be highly 
unstable. It reaches its peak during the cotton harvesting season in which many casual agricultural 
labourers come from other parts of the Country seeking employment in DERAHA as the domestic 
labour does not usually suffice the demand for it. 
Table 2. 2. Land use in DERAHA (2007) 
Governorate 
Total area 
(thousand ha) 
Cultivated and 
Irrigated 
Cultivated 
(rainfed and 
fallow) 
Un-cultivated, 
(forests and 
steppes) 
Building & 
Public Utilities 
Swamps, lakes, 
rocky and 
sandy lands 
 HAG 2,333 18% 49% 27% 4% 3% 
  RAG 1,962 10% 31% 50% 3% 5% 
  DEG 3,306 5% 2% 58% 1% 36% 
Source: elaborated from NAPC database (www.napcsyr.org)  
The DERAHA is a specialised region in the production of the so-called strategic crops especially 
wheat and cotton which are the main sources of farm incomes nowadays. The area produces some 
58% and 76% of their national outputs respectively although the cultivated area of DERAHA does 
                                                 
1
 Population is considered rural in Syrian statistics when the population centre has less than 20 thousand inhabitants. 
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not exceed 45% of the national figure, reflecting a kind of concentration of the productions of these 
two crops in the region. Other important crops are yellow maize, barley and sugar beet presenting 
some 66%, 39% and 23% from their corresponding national figures respectively. 
Table 2. 3. Irrigated land use by irrigation source and technique in DERAHA (2005) 
governorate Total 
irrigated 
area (000 
ha) 
Irrigation water source Irrigation  techniques 
% irrigated 
from wells 
% irrigated 
from public 
networks 
% irrigated 
from rivers 
%irrigated b 
y flood 
% irrigated 
by sprinkler 
% irrigated 
by drip 
HAG 476 37.95 40.12 21.93 97.53 2.13 0.34 
RAG 196 26.72 15.12 58.16 99.29 0.21 0.50 
DER 145 83.84 8.81 7.35 97.09 2.63 0.28 
total 817 62.71 17.44 19.85 97.58 2.08 0.34 
Source: MAAR (2005) 
Livestock production has some importance in DERAHA especially for the poor who rely on it as a 
secondary source of income or for home consumption. However, livestock production is almost 
always an activity not integrated with the cropping activities since farmers use commercial 
concentrates to feed their livestock in case they have cows. In case they have sheep, they usually 
send them too to graze in the neighbouring pastures or they join larger flocks that go to graze in the 
Syrian Steppe (Wattenbach 2006). 
2.2. Government policies and interventions 
While a detailed description of the overall government agricultural policy is available in other 
sources (Westlake 2001, Wattenbach 2006 & SOFA 2007), this chapter is devoted only to describe 
and discuss mainly the policy instruments that affect the decisions making processes of Syrian 
farmers, which need to be modelled. 
2.2.1. Irrigation-related policy 
Speaking about irrigation policy means in general policies related to the provision of irrigation 
water at the farm level. However, the purpose of this section extends beyond that. It also aims at 
describing other kinds of policies that affect all kinds of water accessibility by farmers and 
determine the costs’ type of water incurred (whether fixed or variable) as well as the magnitude of 
these costs. In this respect, one can categorise irrigation water sources available to farmers 
DERAHA into three types: public nets, rivers and springs, and private wells as explained in the 
previous section. 
The Government has constructed over the last three decades a large number of irrigation canals 
that drain water from dams and make it available at the farm level. Most maintenance costs of 
these projects are borne by the Government. Farmers who have access to public nets usually pay an 
irrigation fee per hectare of land on an annual basis, which are expected to contribute only slightly 
to the maintenance costs, since the fees are very low. Such fees are paid annually regardless of the 
amount of water used. 
Farmers using rivers and springs for irrigation do not usually pay fees. They either draw water 
directly from the source using a private engine, or they organise themselves in consortiums and 
purchase one large engine that serves all members. The choice usually depends on their location 
(far from or close to the water source) and on their financial capacity. The cooperation mode is very 
common formally in DEG. In such a case, pumping costs are borne by all members each according 
to his total land area. 
Pumping costs become very significant when farmers use private wells as the main source of 
irrigation. Such costs increase as the depth of wells increase, but they also depend on the capacity 
and age of the pump-set used. Most pump-sets in DERAHA work on diesel, while the rest uses 
electricity but the percentage of the latter is negligible. The price of diesel in Syria has been 
controlled by the Government for a long period of time, and it used to be until recently very 
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subsidised (refer to section 4.1.1). 
2.2.2. Licensing policy 
Despite the fact that planning has recently become indicative in Syria, the annual agricultural plan 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform (MAAR) is still a central element of the 
agricultural policy in the Country. It aims at directing farmers towards a particular pattern of land 
use perceived by policy makers as best able to achieve the national objectives.  The plan, besides, 
serves as a framework at the beginning of each cropping year to guide the provision of credit, 
inputs and other services to farmers directly through the ACB or indirectly through the agricultural 
cooperatives. In addition, it is used as a guide to plan the subsidy services. While a detailed 
description of the planning and licensing systems is available in other sources (Westlake 2001 & 
Wattenbach 2006), the relevant part to this study is the one related to the licensing systems of 
certain crops that are grown in DERAHA. For sugar beet and cotton, farmers are not allowed 
cultivating these crops in excess to the areas permitted in the licensing systems if they are to get the 
official supported price for their produce. 
These licensing systems are set according to a specific mechanism based on the shares of strategic 
crops set in the central plan. These shares are determined in light of the estimated needs of the 
national economy as well as the estimated availability of irrigation water. Then committees from 
the directorates of agriculture of each governorate discuss the previous production plan and 
identify the new irrigated areas in coordination with the extension units of the relevant villages. 
Then the directorates of agriculture propose a new production plan and send the figures of the 
irrigated areas with the expected production and yield to the MAAR to be discussed in the 
Presidency of the Ministers Council which gives the final approval to the plan. Then the MAAR 
sends the plan to the directorates of agriculture in the different governorates, which distribute it to 
the agricultural extension units and the farmers’ cooperatives to be finally performed. 
Each farmer has a fixed percentage to plant any of these two crops (cotton and sugar beet) 
according to the land area and the irrigation water resources to which he has access. Any farmer 
that has at least one hectare can get a license, provided the existence of a formal document stating 
that he has access to the land. However, if irrigation water source is a well (underground water), a 
farmer should also provide a document stating the well is licensed, otherwise, a special committee 
from the MAAR has to ensure that the well is appropriate, so the farmer may obtain the license 
even if the well is unlicensed (NAPC 2005b). 
2.2.3. Pricing and delivery policy 
From a policy viewpoint, crops in Syria can be classified into strategic crops and other crops. 
Strategic crops are those whose prices are affected directly by Government pricing policy, either 
through administering fixed prices or through setting floor prices. Crops considered strategic in 
Syria are seven: wheat, barley, cotton, sugar beet, tobacco, lentil, and chickpea. All of these crops 
are grown in DERAHA but tobacco whose total production takes place in the western part of the 
Country. The Government annually sets prices for all strategic crops at which public agencies and 
establishments will buy the crops’ outputs. These prices are applicable at the same level throughout 
the entire Country. In addition, they are all determined based on unit costs of production, aiming 
to ensure that farmers can cover the production costs and make some profits. Such a way of price 
setting explicitly has the aim of isolating farmers from market forces and motivating farmers to 
produce specific crops in line with policy preferences. 
For cotton and sugar beet, the officially administered prices are the only ones at which farmers can 
sell, as the state-owned establishments are the sole buyers of these crops. However, this is not the 
case for wheat, barley, lentil and chickpea, since farmers can also sell to private buyers. Under such 
a case, the official price is in effect a floor price, and farmers do occasionally sell to traders at less 
than the official price because the trader is able to offer a purchase package that the farmer finds 
more attractive than the alternative offered by the Government, due for example, to more attractive 
payment terms. In addition, the official prices of lentil and chickpea have been, for several years, 
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much lower than those prevailing in the market, implying that farmers do not usually sell them to 
governmental agencies, where the latter plays the role of the last resort. 
Based on the above, strategic crops can be also distinct in two categories according to differences in 
the delivery policy. Cotton and sugar beet are those whose output must be totally submitted by 
farmers to the relevant State establishments since they are processed by state-owned factories. 
However, for wheat, barley, lentil and chickpea, farmers are not obliged to sell to the state 
establishments. In fact, this categorization is in line with price policy, in the sense that crops that 
must be submitted totally to the relevant government establishments are those which have fixed 
prices, while the rest are those who have floor prices. 
The General Establishment for Cereal Processing and Trade (GECPT) operates 140 collection 
canters for the purchase of wheat from farmers. As Barley is used principally for animal feed, 
producers can retain it for their own livestock, sell it to neighbouring farmers, traders and private 
feed millers, or sell it to the General Establishment for Feed (GEF), which continues to act as a 
buyer of last resort. The relative throughput of the public and private sectors varies markedly from 
year-to-year, with the GEF buying substantial part of the crop when its buying price is above export 
parity, but buying very little when world prices are strong and private traders bid up the domestic 
buying price. For lentils and chickpeas, the GECPT and the General Company for Mill (GCM) own 
a total of seven lentil processing and splitting plants. Many private factories process lentils and 
chickpeas for a fee, whose market is highly competitive.   
Cotton, instead, must be delivered to the Cotton Marketing Organization (CMO), which has 16 saw 
ginneries. The CMO purchases from farmers immediately after harvest and then processes its 
resulting stock of seed cotton over a period of some ten months. Farmers must also sell their entire 
sugar beet crop to the General Establishment for Sugar Industry (GESI), which has seven sugar 
factories, six of which process beet. 
The prices of other crops (non-strategic) are determined through the interactions of market forces 
without any direct intervention from the Government, and farmers sell the output of these crops in 
the free markets (refer to section 2.3.4). 
2.2.4. Input distribution policy 
The ACB is still the major distributor of physical inputs in the Country although the private sector 
has been actively involved in that recently. Most Syrian farmers still get the major part of their 
inputs requirements directly from the ACB or  indirectly through the agricultural cooperatives. The 
ACB sells to farmers mainly fertilisers, seeds of major crops as wells as some inputs related to 
specific crops at prices fixed by the Government that are usually lower than their market 
counterparts. The ownership of an agricultural license is essential to buy inputs from the ACB, in 
which inputs are sold according specific figures that reflect crops requirements of each input per 
hectare (Parthasarathy, 2000). 
Prices of fertilisers had been fixed from the early nineties until two years ago when the Government 
raised them slightly although they remained heavily subsidized. In 2009, the Government raised 
their prices significantly to make them very close their international market counterparts. 
The ACB is also the only responsible of distributing to farmers the seeds of the some strategic 
crops, namely these of wheat, cotton, and sugar beet. The principle of this activity is very similar  to 
that of fertilizers; however, the source of strategic crops’ seeds is mainly domestic where the 
General Establishment for Seeds Multiplication (GESM) plays the central role on providing the 
ACB with the required seeds. The Government objective from controlling the distribution of seeds 
is to motivate farmers to grow the high-yielding varieties developed by the GESM in the 
ecologically suitable areas where they can express their yield potentials in the best way. 
The ACB, in addition, provides farmers with other minor inputs that are related to particular crops. 
Examples are the jute bags to which farmers use to collect cotton when they prepare it for delivery 
to the CMO, and hemp bags used to collect wheat. In addition, the ACB distributes some types of 
plant protection chemicals, although the major part of these items are sold by the private sector, 
mainly through the so-called “agricultural pharmacies”, which are specialized stores run by 
 45 
agronomists, who besides selling chemicals, improved seeds, medicines for livestock, etc, give 
farmers advice on technical issues. Prices of such items are not controlled by the Government and 
they are determined by the market forces. 
2.2.5. Credit policy 
The ACB is perhaps the most important institutional instrument of the Government to promote 
agricultural production and productivity and raising the standard of living of the rural population. 
It is, above all, the main credit provider to farmers, in which it offers Syrian farmers cash and in-
kind loans to fund farming and animal husbandry activities. The ACB is in a position to provide 
farmers with the following services: loans, current account facility to be drawn according to need, 
discounting of bills of purchase presented by the borrower, and extending guarantees for payment 
on the due date versus supplier credit. Loans offered by the ACB can be classified into three 
categories (short-term, medium term, and long term), each of them cover specific types of activities 
and investments with different interest rates and different duration for repayment (Parthasarathy 
2001). 
Short –term loans aim to cover farm expenses such as ploughing, harvesting, irrigation and fuel, 
fertilisers, seeds, small tools and animal feeds and veterinary medicines. In addition, they cover the 
costs of maintaining agricultural machinery and pumping-sets as well as the costs of agricultural 
products’ storage. Such loans have to be repaid in a period of one year maximum, and it is offered 
in cash and in kind (usually in form of fertilizers and seeds). Loans provided to fund the farms 
expenses are subject to the seasonality of agricultural activities in which it is not possible to obtain 
any credit before the dates specified in “requirements’ tables” special for this purpose. These tables 
include also the inputs required by one hectare for each cropping activity, and the dates of loan 
repayments. 
Medium and long term loans relate to investments at the farm level. The medium-term loans are 
given for periods more than one year but not exceeding five years. They cover purchasing 
machinery and tools required for agricultural production, land reclamation and other activities that 
require similar costs. The long-term loans are given for periods of more than five years but not 
exceeding ten years and they are aimed at financing the construction of stores, land improvement, 
forestry projects, fruit tree planting programs and cold storage facilities, in addition to modern 
irrigation schemes and the processing of both plant and animal products. 
Each farm household must have a crop license as a prerequisite to obtain credit and/or to purchase 
inputs from the ACB. The crop license is issued every year and contains details of farm size, agro-
ecological zone, whether the crops are irrigated or rainfed, which are the crops “allowed” to be 
grown in the following agricultural year, and the recommended requirements of fertilizers, seeds 
and chemicals. However, for farmers who are members of cooperatives, the latter perform all the 
procedures needed to access credit on behalf of their members. 
For medium and long-term loans, the access procedure is more protracted. Many farmers complain 
about the dissatisfaction over long procedural delays in processing applications for such loans. 
Many others have the impression that the bank does not give long-term loans, which poses the 
importance of diffusing information within the farming community so farmers can make full use of 
available credit opportunities. Property collateral is essential for eligibility to medium and long-
term loans. Authorized appraises along with the other documents connected to the short-term 
loans must be submitted. It is also necessary to submit documents of technical design about the 
project prepared by specialist technicians and approved by the relevant public institutions, in 
addition to submitting a report of economic feasibility studies. Some other conditions exist for 
some specific projects. However, the loan is taken up for consideration only after receiving the 
report of the inspection committee (special for this purpose). Farmers find it difficult to obtain 
loans for machinery like harvesters and tractors. They have the impression that lower priority is 
given by the ACB to medium and long term loans. This precludes important activities like land 
reclamation and fruit tree replanting (Parthasarathy 2001). 
In addition to what is mentioned above, the ACB plays an intermediating role between several 
public projects and commissions from one side and farmers and rural people from the other side. 
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Such projects usually aim at supporting rural and agricultural development through the provision 
of loans and banking services to their beneficiaries such as the loans of Unemployment Combating 
Commission. Another example is the National Project for Conversion to Modern Irrigation 
(NPCMI) which belongs to the MAAR and aims to convert all irrigated areas in the Country to 
modern irrigation. 
2.3. Socio-economic environment of the farming community 
This section is devoted to describe the socio-economic environment surrounding farmers in 
DERAHA, and to discuss in some details the social factors that are likely to have an impact on 
farmers’ decisions and choices. We start by discussing the land tenure systems that exist in the 
region, then labour, credit and product markets are discussed individually, the section is ended by 
some comments about interlocked markets that exist in the region and their relevance to the 
argument of the thesis. 
2.3.1. Land tenure system 
The importance of land markets varies considerably among different areas of the Country, and 
sometimes within on area. The long-term effects of land reform are a critical issue in some parts of 
Syria since the population growth led over time to increased pressure on agricultural land resulting 
in considerable land fragmentation. The sale of agrarian reform land was until recently illegal, but 
became recently legal under certain conditions. 
In some cases, the law of agrarian relations has led to the effective transfer of land to former 
sharecroppers, which obtained continuous usufruct rights, after sharecropping it for many 
sequential years. However, they are nevertheless obliged to pay a proportion from the total output 
to the original owner. This proportion differs according to the sharecropping arrangements agreed 
upon between the two parties, in which the share of the owner does not exceed 20% in case she 
only provides the land. This is very common in DEG and it also exists to some extent in RAG, but it 
has no relevance in HAG. In the latter, however, seasonal sharecropping is relatively common in 
the larger farms, whereby sharecropping is linked to a specific crop (cotton or wheat) and 
sharecroppers take care of all operations while owners visit the farm for important operations 
(Hamza 2004). 
The lack of updated title deeds generally presents for many farmers a constraint to access credit 
through the formal channels and hence reduces investment. Slow administrative procedures 
related to the land registration affects tenure arrangements. Lawful and practical restrictions on 
changing ownership of agrarian reform land aggravate the situation. An increasing number of 
holders operate on land with title deeds issued in the name of deceased parents. The resulting 
restricted credit access will affect production and farm income. The regulations governing the 
transfer of registered land and issuing updated title deeds require for that reason urgent attention. 
The development of parallel arrangements is otherwise the only viable solution for farmers, but 
these will tend to favour the stronger negotiation partner at the detriment of the weaker one, i.e. 
the poor (Wattenbach 2006). 
2.3.2. Labour market 
Syrian population is currently estimated at slightly less than 20 million, with a labour force of 5.5 
million, 19,2% of which is employed in agriculture. If we add the agricultural based industry and 
service, the relevance of agriculture for employment becomes evident. 
Most of the farms are operated by the owners and their families. The intensity of farm labour 
depends on the crop and the relative degree of mechanization of farm operations. Cereal 
production is almost fully mechanized (with exception in small areas of wheat cultivation for home 
consumption on steep slopes). Cereal cultivation is therefore irrelevant for the rural employment. 
In contrast, beets and oilseeds provide small employment opportunities on larger farms, while 
most small farmers will not engage higher labour for these crops (Wattenbach 2006).  
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In DERAHA, industrial crops are the largest providers of agricultural casual employment, and 
among them the large cotton producing areas attract during the picking season large flows of 
casual labour across the Country. Given the labour intensity of picking, which is mostly carried out 
by female labourers, even medium and small sized farms often employ additional labour to 
complement available family labour especially at the harvest seasons (Hamza 2004). 
The survey findings of this study found out that in several areas of DERAHA, many poor families 
(landless in particular) engage in sharecropping arrangements with “landowners”. This applies in 
particular the two main crops in the area, namely cotton and wheat. Given the lack of cash from the 
side of the sharecropper, the contractual arrangements tend to be very simple with all inputs being 
provided by the investor, while the sharecropper guarantees high quality supervision of the crops, 
as he lives in a tent next to the field for one season. The quality of irrigation and prevention of theft 
are important additional duties. Sharecropping arrangements are more prevalent in the irrigated 
parts, since labour requirements per hectare are higher for irrigated crops and the relative saving 
on supervision cost is larger compared to rainfed crops (Wattenbach 2006). 
Mobilization and organization of labour force 
The source of labour engaged in agricultural production differs from one region to the other in the 
Country. This applies very much to DERAHA. In DEG, agriculture depends mainly on family 
labour, and when hired casual labour is needed, it is very likely that they come from the same or 
the neighbouring villages. Labour from other regions of the Country may come only during the 
harvesting seasons of cotton and sugar beet. The same observation can be said about the RAG 
although it may be safe to say that the latter absorbs more migrant labour during the harvesting 
seasons of cotton and sugar beet, which is very true in the mantika of Tal Abiad where farms are 
relatively large and productive and the area has a relatively low population density (Wattenbach 
2006). 
Poor farmers and landless rural people are the basic providers of the casual agricultural labour, 
whose organization and mobilization function in accordance with the local demand in one area or 
another. Traditional contractors, the chaweshes, perform these functions. They organize labour 
system whereby labour demand and supply meet. They pool labour from areas of excess supply and 
make it available in different areas according to the market demand, which increases significantly 
in autumn, when the harvest seasons of several major crops in the Country (Forni 2001). 
Each Chawesh organizes 25 to 30 workers, mainly women. He assumes all risks connected to 
labour identification and employment. Therefore, he organizes travel and residence when away 
from home usually in tent (Forni 2001). He is also responsible for paying the workers who have no 
direct dealings with the employing farmers. This makes the effective wage that the labourers 
receive less than the real wage paid by farmers, since the Chawesh takes a commission of 20% from 
each employee in addition to a daily wage paid to him directly from farmers as a remuneration for 
supervising work. The commission he receives from employees should be in theory equivalent to 
the cost of housing and transportation he guarantees for them (Wattenbach 2006). 
The role of women 
Agrarian relations from a gender perspective indicate that, on the field, women usually take the 
responsibility of weeding and harvesting and men do other activities such as irrigation, tillage, etc. 
Increasing feminisation of agriculture has recently become a general phenomenon because men 
usually enter non-agricultural activities. This may from the one side increase the burden on 
women, but on the other side, it increases their participation in decision-making inside household 
(Forni 2001). 
2.3.3. Credit market 
Liquidity is among the primary constraints of poor and medium household and influences the 
production decisions in most farming systems. Constrained access to crop finance has a serious 
impact on their possibilities to improve agricultural incomes. Frequent failure to repay earlier 
credit leaves many poor household excluded from formal credit trough the ACB. At present, their 
possibilities to invest in agricultural production depend on informal credit access. These informal 
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credits are expensive and the high figures suggest cases of abuse by traders and input providers. 
However, such credit necessarily contains a risk premium, as the enforcement possibilities of the 
credit given outside the formal legal framework are low and risks for the creditor are high as not 
guaranteed though a collateral (Wattenbach 2006). 
Many farmers borrow from friends or relatives living outside the Country, mostly other Arab 
countries (Lebanon and Gulf States). Furthermore, machinery suppliers are a common source of 
finance for purchase of equipment. The procedures are short and simple; although interest rates 
are high (they vary from about 20% up to 40%). Interest on such deals is generally made a part of 
the price. Farmers are aware of the higher cost incurred by this route of financing but do not mind 
such additional cost for the sake of saving time and avoiding inconvenience (Wattenbach 2006). 
For production expenses, the alternative sources of credit are the input suppliers, output dealers, 
exporters and cold storage units’ owners. Input suppliers are generally small traders and do not 
have the capacity to extend credit covering the whole crop duration. They usually provide 
fertilizers, seeds, and plant protection chemicals. Farmers are generally anxious to apply chemicals 
to protect the crop and the expenses they have already incurred on the land and for this reason 
consider agro-chemicals to be of higher priority over other inputs. Consequently, they are well 
motivated to keep good relations with agro-chemical dealers by repaying loans relatively more 
punctually (Wattenbach 2006). 
The main sources of informal credit for cotton and wheat producers are the “informal” traders of 
wheat and cotton. Farmers who depend on such credit are exclusively those who have accumulated 
debt with the ACB and lost access to its credit. This usually occurs after farmers have suffered from 
a significant production loss caused by drought or epidemic, or in cases of affording additional 
expenses to deal with personal problems. Therefore, these farmers are usually from the poorest. In 
such cases, a trader buys the production of wheat or/and cotton (which are state-controlled crops) 
in advance at prices much lower than the official prices (about 30% lower). The trader gives cash to 
the farmer when needed according to agreed arrangements (usually half of the amount at the 
beginning of the winter season and the rest as instalments). After the production is delivered to the 
trader, the latter manages to sell it to the relevant governmental institution. Sometimes, the 
production is sold through the cooperative of the village for the trader using the name of other 
farmers. Such activity is usually protected by the social norms and traditions although it is illegal. 
Given the above, it seems that the current credit system favours to some extent the so-called 
strategic crops particularly wheat, cotton, and sugar-beet. Farmers who cultivate these crops have 
relatively easier access to credit provided in kind by the ACB in form of seeds and fertilizers. This 
encourages farmers facing a liquidity problem to cultivate these crops. The possibility to access 
these informal sources of credit depends also on cultivating the crops that have stable prices and 
are easy to trade, which are, once again, wheat and cotton. 
2.3.4. Product markets 
Farmers face serious problems in marketing crops for which the Government intervention is 
minimal. Crops such as fruits and vegetables as well as a large group of legume, cereals (other than 
wheat and barley), oilseed, and other crops are marketed through the private sector channels and 
their prices are determined through the interactions of market forces. The absence of stabilization 
policies leaves the determination of prices to be very much affected by seasonality of outputs, 
resulting in fluctuating prices that expose farmers to a high level of price risk. 
Farmers’ attitudes towards risk influence the way they prefer to market their output. Aiming to 
cope with risk, many farmers prefer to sell their crops on the field at the fixed price pre-agreed 
upon with the buyer, who is a kind of traditional guarantor, called damman in Arabic. In this way, 
farmers express their willingness to sacrifice, on average some margin for securing a minimum 
level of revenues and, and at the same time to avoid the complications associated with transporting 
the outputs to the main wholesale markets. Not surprisingly, this practice is very common for crops 
that suffer the most from price fluctuations as they are perishable and do not have long-term 
storage facilities, such as onion, and garlic (Wattenbach 2006). 
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Some crops that are easy to store in the open field, such as cumin, anis, and black seeds are 
marketed on the field. Farmers harvest the produce and then sell it to traders specialized in such 
activities and usually involved in export activities or at least linked to some exporters. The nature of 
such crops assist farmers in coping with the price risk; however, they usually sell their output 
under unfavourable conditions due to their lack of liquidity needed for other production activities 
or for consumption purposes (Sadiddin 2004). 
Most fruits and vegetables are marketed in wholesale markets existing in each governorate main 
centre. In Damascus’s wholesale market, there are around 400 traders, half of which act as 
commissioners and the other half as wholesalers. The absolute bulk of the trade is for wholesale, 
although there is some retail. The market lacks a system to monitor the access of products on the 
market. 
Officially, the commission to be paid for the sale of the output on behalf of farmers is 5% 
(maximum fixed by the former Ministry of Economy and Trade), although real commissions are 
reported to be between 20% and 30%. Sometimes, commissioners anticipate loans to farmers, in 
cash or in kind (fertilizers, seeds, etc). This fact, and the personal connections and trust, have the 
consequence that normally one farmer is linked to a specific commissioner, or eventually to a few 
commissioners, one in each destination markets. The commissioner can sell to small wholesalers or 
to retailers either in cash or on credit, with payment occurring usually from one week up to one 
month later, depending on the market condition (sale on credit is more common when there is a 
product surplus). Wholesalers and commissioners are not specialized by product, due to the 
seasonal pattern and the need to operate continuously. However they are often, more or less, 
specialized by region, which determines also a partial product specialization (Sadiddin 2004). 
Between the agricultural producers and the final consumers there is often a long chain of 
intermediate operators. In a not well integrated agricultural sector, these operators represent the 
only way to ensure an adjustment between demand and supply. The government, which in other 
cases exerts a very strict control over the economy, is in this case almost absent. 
2.3.5. Interlocked markets 
Interlocked markets occur as one possible response to market failures, whether these failures 
characterise produce or factor markets. In Syria, there are many examples of interlocked markets. 
Sharecropping is clear example of interlocking the markets of land, labour and credit. Such 
practices are very common in DERAHA where state-manipulated (strategic) crops are grown in 
large quantities. The sharecropping arrangements differ slightly according to the crops’ 
characteristics and their requirements in terms of labour and credit, but the principles are very 
similar. The landowner provides usually the major part of the credit in addition to the land, while 
the tenant (sharecropper) provides the labour, and they share the output at the end. These 
practices are only common for the so-called strategic crops because they are the only ones that have 
stable prices and therefore can guarantee relatively stable incomes for both parties. 
Another interesting example of interlocked markets can be categorised under forward contracting. 
The arrangements differ according the type of the produce and the extent to which the industry 
with which the produce is integrated is developed. If the industry is enough developed as the 
situation of orange and tomato commodity chains, a contract is written, at the planting time or 
maybe later during the season, between the farmer and the purchaser who might be a 
manufacturer or a trader. They both agree in the contract on the delivery price and quantity, which 
might be subject to some amendments in some conditions. Agreeing on quality may be also 
important element of the contract, especially for fresh produce for exports. Such arrangements are 
important for farmers to achieve two different objectives: reducing price risk (however, the agreed 
price is probably lower than the market expected price) and easing liquidity constraints since 
farmers can ask to have some payments before the delivery of the output. 
Moreover, there exists another type of interlocked markets that have been developed primarily due 
to governmental failure in implementing price and the delivery policy of some strategic crops, 
namely wheat and cotton. The traditional name of this phenomenon is salaf, which means “selling 
in advance”. This phenomenon is much diffused among farmers who accumulated debt with the 
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ACB and lost the right to its credit. Therefore, they are usually from the poorest. Consequently, 
they started depending on some traders to have credit at very high interest rate reaching 40%. In 
such cases, a trader buys the production of wheat or/and cotton (which are state-controlled crops) 
in advance at prices much lower than the official prices. The trader gives the money to the farmer 
when needed according to agreed arrangements between them (usually half of the money at the 
beginning of the winter season and the rest as instalments). After the production is delivered to the 
trader, he manages to sell it to the relevant governmental institution as explained in section 
2.3.3. 
Despite of some similarities between forward contracting and selling in advance, they are deeply 
different. These differences lie in the core function that each of them plays in serving the objective 
of both parties. In forward contracting, the main objective of both parties is risk reduction. Farmers 
would like to reduce price risk while the purchaser wants to reduce risks associated with price, 
timing of delivery, and quality. Obviously, such arrangements exist for produces whose prices are 
determined by the interaction of market forces and are not directly affected by the government 
price policy, and therefore, they are very exposed to price uncertainty. Credit in this context is an 
additional component, which is usually offered to the farmers to help him comply with the terms of 
the contract, or to attract him to renew the contract for further seasons, so it is mainly an incentive 
measure used by the purchaser to keep her suppliers of raw materials. This is true although there 
exists features of advantageous behaviour from the purchaser side due to asymmetric information 
about prices and market conditions, on which the government role must be essentially focused on 
easing the diffusion of information. 
However, in the case of selling in advance, the fundamental problem that confronts farmers is the 
lack of cash capital. As explained above, the problem starts when farmers experience a significant 
output loss caused by drought or epidemic, or in cases of having to afford additional expenses for 
personal problems. This causes them to fail to repay the debt to the ACB resulting in their exclusion 
from access to further credit. Farmers then become ready to accept very exploitive terms in order 
to obtain the needed cash whether to cover variable costs of production or survival expenses. Risk 
management or reduction has nothing to do with these practices since the latter are linked to crops 
that have fixed or floor prices and consequently are far from being price risky. Farmers accept them 
only to ease the liquidity constraints, while traders make huge profits without taking any risk, by 
appropriating the major part of farmers’ surpluses.  
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Chapter 3. The analytical model 
This chapter aims at describing the mathematical programming model used in the analysis. We 
start by discussing the basic assumptions of the model, followed by a mathematical description of 
the model equations. Then the model setting-up and data description will be presented. The 
chapter will end with a section on solving and validating the model. 
3.1. Basic assumptions 
The model consists of a set of quadratic programming models, one for each farming typology. The 
representative farming models are solved with common vectors of prices to represent the common 
economic features of the region in question (DERAHA). However, matrices of technical coefficients 
are in many cases differentiated to reflect agro-climatic differentiations in DERAHA. At the end, 
each single model has its own parameters and constraints that define the structure of each 
representative farm. 
Many assumptions are maintained for each representative farming model. Each farming system is 
presumed to maximise the expected utility of its agricultural income given a set of constraints 
imposed by the availability of land, water, family labour and capital. Other constrains are also 
imposed by technical conditions (agrarian rotation) or policy intervention (licensing systems of 
strategic crops). To put the expected utility theory in practice, we adopt the mean-variance 
approach, which assumes that the expected utility of farming income can be measured by the 
certainty equivalent which is, in turn, equal to the expected farming income minus a term that 
measures income variation as shown in equation 1.1 (section 1.3.3). 
Risks faced by Syrian farmers can be classified under two types: risks associated with markets and 
those associated with weather and climate. While the latter causes fluctuations in output, the 
former cause fluctuations in prices, both of which may cause large fluctuations in the farms’ net 
revenue. Nevertheless, only price risk is considered in this thesis, and this is due to the fact that 
risk associated with natural hazard in Syria is caused by rainfall scarcity and/or fluctuations, such 
effects are likely to be minimal in our case since the farms considered are all wholly irrigated2. The 
availability of irrigation can help farmers coping with risk associated with rainfall fluctuation 
directly by enabling them to avail water into the fields in appropriate quantity at the right time, and 
indirectly by allowing the plants to optimise the use of some physical inputs such as chemical 
fertilisers. 
Expected income is calculated as the farm average gross margin, which is simply the average total 
revenue minus the explicit costs only. Thus it contains the reward to land, family labour, and 
capital in addition to farm net profits. The costs of land, family labour and capital are considered 
sunk costs and so they do not affect the decision making process of farmers. This assumption 
would be restrictive if there were active markets for trading these resources. If an active market for 
land and employment existed, any farmer could rent part of his land and decide to spend part of 
her time engaging in off-farm employment. Then this would be considered in calculating the 
expected income of the farm by considering the explicit opportunity costs of land and family 
labour. 
                                                 
2
 - although the availability of local rainfall usually affects the irrigation costs, this is not true in our case since the 
availability of irrigation water does not rely on local rainfall. 
 52 
In the long term, the objective of a farmer might be to utilize her family labour on the farm as long 
as the returns from work on the farm are greater than the opportunity cost. When such return 
becomes lower than the opportunity cost, the farmer is supposed to leave farming and seek 
employment elsewhere. However, this is only true under the conditions of perfect markets for 
labour which is never true in reality. Employment opportunities are always partially or totally 
precluded to farm family members, and so there will be always a difference between returns to 
labour and the corresponding opportunity cost, and farmers might be ready to accept 
remuneration to their labour less than the opportunity costs. This proposition is supported by 
several facts about DERAHA. First, part-time farming is very limited; second, the area is still 
considered the main provider of seasonal agricultural employment in the Country; third, 
sharecropping is very common in the region which is considered an effective response to market 
failures, especially failures related to factors’ markets. 
All farming activities included in the model are described by their requirements of land, labour, 
irrigation water, rental machinery costs and physical inputs. Fixed coefficients are assumed and so 
no economy to scale is considered. Although some farms have also some livestock activities, we 
ignored them in this model since their relevance for income generation for the farm family is very 
small and can be neglected as they are mostly raised for home consumption. Moreover, when 
livestock activities are relevant for income generation, they are not connected to other farm 
activities and can be considered off-farm activities3. 
The model distinguishes between a cropping activity and a product although in our case each 
cropping activity produces only one product. However, there is a case in which two cropping 
activities produce one same product (autumn and winter sugar beet crops produce the same 
product of sugar beet). Therefore, coefficients of yields are related to both cropping activities and 
products. 
The model maintains the possibility to hire labour at a given rate wage when family labour is not 
enough to pursue all faming activities during some periods. Farms are also described by their 
monthly availability of land, family labour, and irrigation water. In addition, irrigation water 
sources and irrigation techniques pursued on the farms are essential characteristics of their 
structures. 
The availability of machinery could be an essential feature of a farm structure since its availability 
may have consequences on the costs’ structure. Then it may be one criterion that should be used in 
farms’ classification into representative farming systems. However, due to lack of data at the 
individual farm level, we assume that all farms rent machinery to perform agricultural operations. 
This assumption is justified by the fact that the number of farms having tractors is very small. The 
secondary data sources show that the share of the number of tractors in DERAHA relative to the 
number of farms did not exceed 4% in 2007, and it was less than 3.5% in 2005, the reference year 
of the research (MAAR statistical abstracts). In addition, the study survey has uncovered the 
presence of an active market that provides machinery services at competitive prices though 
specialised agents. 
3.1.1. Extensive assumptions on the definition of resource constraints 
Fixed resources are land, irrigation water, family labour, and all other private factors that cannot 
be acquired in the time span analysed in addition to the public factors such as roads and extension 
services and other exogenous features such as weather and distance from markets. The possibility 
of these resources to be constraining in the agricultural sector depends very much on their total 
availability in the economy and the functioning of their markets. 
In the context of Syrian economy, the market of casual agricultural labour is said to be well 
functioning according to the findings of a previous study. It is stated that labour organization and 
mobilisation functions according to local and non-local demands. This function is performed by 
                                                 
3
 - some farmers have relatively large sheep flocks, but the sheep are not integrated with the other farm activities 
because these farmers rely on concentrates to feed the sheep or they send them to join big flocks going to graze in the 
large pastures. 
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traditional contractors, the Chaweshes, who pool agricultural labour (mainly female) in areas 
where there is excess supply of labour and make it available in different governorates according to 
market demand (Forni 2001). This suggests that labour is not a constraining resource in the 
context of Syrian agriculture. In case family labour is not sufficient to perform a specific operation, 
the possibility to hire labour is quite high. 
However, the possibility that irrigation water is a scarce resource in the Syrian agriculture seems to 
be quite high. This has been proved by previous studies and working papers, stating that most 
water basins in Syria experience water deficit mainly due to intensive water use in agriculture that 
uses up to 80% of the total water use of the Country (Ortega & Sagardoy, 2001) (NAPC 2005a). In 
addition, the study survey findings have uncovered the importance of the available irrigation water 
on farmers’ decision making. This is very true for the cultivation of summer crops which cannot be 
grown under the Syrian climatic conditions without irrigation, but it is also true for the cultivation 
of winter crops in many parts of the Country (almost all parts of DERAHA) if reasonable yields are 
to be obtained. 
Some other studies highlight the importance of cash capital as an important constraining resource 
(Wattenbach 2006). This point is also supported by the findings of the study survey which 
investigated two main reasons for this constraint. The first one is related to the credit policy which 
favours the so-called strategic crops particularly wheat, cotton and sugar beet. Farmers who 
cultivate these crops have relatively easy access to credit provided by the Agricultural Cooperative 
Bank (ACB). This encourages farmers facing a cash constraint to cultivate these crops. The other 
reason results from market failure for agricultural credit when farmers fail to repay earlier credit to 
the ACB, making them excluded from formal credit trough the ACB, leading them to depend on 
informal sources of credits, which are quite expensive suggesting cases of abuse by traders and 
input providers (refer to sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.5). 
The above discussion leads us to deduce that many poor farmers continue to grow the so-called 
strategic crops not only due to their profitability, but also because credit policy and credit market 
favour these crops. Then farmers who can grow other crops (such as fruits or vegetables) in 
relatively large quantities should be those who do not face any cash constraints, or those who face 
prohibitive constraints to the production of some or all strategic crops. It is then the aim of this 
research to test for this assumption (the presence of cash constraint) and its consequences on 
farmers’ behaviour and their decision-making process. 
3.1.2. Extensions on technical and policy-imposed constraints 
Other technical constraints are these imposed by the agrarian rotations required for the cultivated 
crops, and they are different from one area to the other due to differences in prevailing cropping 
patterns in the Country, which is due to differences in the availability of resources; in government 
policies, and in climatic conditions. In DERAHA, however, agrarian rotations are simple. 
According to the survey findings, farmers follow rotations advised by the technical experts of the 
local agricultural departments. They divide the crops into cereals (wheat and barley) and non-
cereals. The scientific basis of the rotation states that it is not advisable to grow any of the non-
cereal crop two sequent times in the same land plot. Otherwise, some pests and diseases may 
develop causing damage to the relevant crop, or reducing its yield significantly. Therefore, the 
rotation constraint is that the combined area of the non-cereal crops is equal to or less than the 
combined area of the cereal crops. 
One might think of the cash constraint discussed above to be a policy-imposed as it is very much 
affected by the government credit system. However, in this section, we only consider the 
constraints that are directly caused by government policy, which does not apply to the cash capital 
case. In this context, ‘directly caused’ means government actions that directly affects the decision 
making of farmers on ‘what to produce’ and so the types of crops that can be grown and on ‘how 
much’ and so the area cultivated under each crop. This is caused by the licensing system of the 
annual agricultural plan set and approved by the MAAR (section 2.2.2). This licensing system is 
imposed in DERAHA on cotton and sugar beet. It imposes a limit to the maximum area a farmer 
can cultivate under a particular crop in order to receive the official price for all of his/her output, 
which is said to be much higher than its international counterpart if free market conditions were 
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prevailing. The way this licensing policy is implemented in reality is different according to the crop 
and the institutions involved in the implementation (section 2.2.3). 
3.2. Description of the basic elements of the model 
The mathematical programming model for each representative farming system can be described by 
the following equations: 
Max  =  − 0.5 ∗  ∗         [3.1] 
Where: 
 =  −            [3.2] 
 = ∑ ∑  ! "#!""!   4         [3.3] 
 ! = ∑ ∑ ∑ %&,(,) ∗ 
&,(,!)(&          [3.4] 
 = ∑  ! ∗ !!           [3.5] 
! = ∑ *+!, ∗ -.,,          [3.6] 
#!," = ∑ /*+!, − !0 ∗ /*+", − "0 ∗ *-.,,       [3.7] 
 = 11 + 12 + 4 + 1 + 2 + 5 + 67 ∗ 5 ∗ *8     [3.8] 
11 = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ %9,(,) ∗ 48:,9,( ∗ *:,9 ∗ (1 + 4))(:9       [3.9] 
12 = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ %;,(,) ∗ 48:,;,( ∗ *:,;)(:;        [3.10] 
4 = ∑ ∑ ∑ %&,(,)) ∗ <=&,(,) ∗ <(&         [3.11] 
1 = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ %9,(,) ∗ 9,(,> ∗ (1 + 4))(9>        [3.12] 
2 = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ %;,(,) ∗ ;,(,>)(;>         [3.13] 
5 = ∑ ?@.> ∗ 6ℎ>           [3.14] 
                                                 
4
 - if X and Y are random variables, then the variance of their sum Var[X+Y] = Var[X] + Var[Y]+2Cov[X,Y]. Equation 
[3.3] is a generalization of this basic rule (Hazell & Norton 1986). 
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Subject to: 
∑ ∑ ∑ %&,(,) ∗ 5&,> ≤ 5)(&          [3.15] 
∑ ∑ ∑ %CD,(,) ∗ 5CD,> ≤ 0.5 ∗ 5)(CD         [3.16] 
∑ ∑ ∑ %&,(,) ∗ 5.&,(,> ≤ 1@.> + ?@.>)(&        [3.17] 
∑ ∑ ∑ %&,(,) ∗ 6E&,(,> ≤ 6E>)(&         [3.18] 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ F& ∗ %&,(,) ∗ 48:,&,( ∗ *:,& + ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ F& ∗ %&,(,) ∗ &,(,> + ∑ ∑ ∑ & ∗ %&,(,) ∗ <=&,(,) ∗)(&)(&>)(:&
<+E?@.E∗6ℎ≤         [3.19] 
∑ ∑ %&,9GH(,",) ∗ 5&,> ≤ I ∗ 5)&         [3.20] 
∑ ∑ %&,JH(G,) ∗ 5&,> ≤ < ∗ 5)&         [3.21] 
∑ ∑ %&,(,)CKK ∗ 5&,> ≤ *L ∗ 5(&          [3.22] 
∑ ∑ %&,(, C> ∗ 5&,> ≤ *8 ∗ 5(&          [3.23] 
∑ ∑ %&,(,H(MCH ∗ 5&,> ≤ N ∗ 5(&          [3.24] 
∑ ∑ %&;>>;,,(,) ∗ 5&,> ≤ -E@+)(         [3.25] 
∑ ∑ %OP>9PQOH,(,) ∗ 5&,> ≤ +RS@+)(         [3.26] 
∑ ∑ %)(,9PQOH,(,) ∗ 5&,> ≤ L+RS@+)(         [3.27] 
∑ ∑ %TOHKC,(,) ∗ 5&,> ≥ .=)(         [3.28] 
6R+ = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ %&,(,)6E&,(,>)(&>         [3.29] 
V5R+ = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ %&,(,)5.&,(,>)(&>         [3.30] 
?5R+ =  ∑ ?@.>>            [3.31] 
15R+ = V5R+ − ?5R+             [3.32] 
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Where the definitions of the notation used in the previous model are given as follows: 
Terms related to the objective function 
: is the measure adopted for the expected utility of farm income and it is assumed to be the 
certainty equivalent of the corresponding expected farm income (SP). 
: is the gross margin (net revenue) which is the measure of the expected farm income (SP). 
: is the variance of farm income (SP) 
: is the total farm revenue (SP) 
!: is the expected price of j-th product (SP) 
 !: is the total output of the j-th product (kg) 
 ": is the total output of the k-th product (kg) 
#!": is the covariance of prices of the j-th and k-th products (SP) 
: is total variable costs (SP) 
11: is the cost of seeds, fertilisers and other chemicals for strategic crops (SP) 
12: is the costs of seeds, fertilisers and other chemicals for other crops (SP) 
4: is the costs of pumping water calculated as the costs of diesel (SP) 
1: is the costs of renting machinery for strategic crops (SP) 
2: is the costs of renting machinery for other crops (SP) 
5: is the costs of hired labour (SP) 
%&,(,): is the level of cropping activity to be chosen in the optimal solution, it represents the area of 
c-th crop irrigated by the i-th irrigation technique and the w-th irrigation source (ha). 
%9,(,): is the level of cropping activity for strategic crops, it is equivalent to %&,(,) when the c 
represents only the subset of strategic crops (ha). 
%;,(,): is the level of cropping activity for other (non-strategic) crops, it is equivalent to %&,(,) when c 
represents the subset of the other (non-strategic) crops (ha). 
?@.t: is the amount of labour hired in the t-th month (hour) 
Parameters applied to all farming systems 
5c,t: the unit requirements of land for the c-th cropping activity in the t-th month (ha/month) 
67: irrigation fee (SP/ha) 
4: is the interest rate for credit obtained by the ACB (%) 
<: is the price of diesel input which unique and set centrally by the GOS (SP/litre). 
*+j,n: is the price of the j-th product when the n-th state of nature takes place (SP/kg) 
*-.n: is the probability that the n-th state of nature takes place (%) 
*f,c: are the input prices, they define the price of f-th input used for c-th cropping activity (SP/kg) 
6ℎ: is the wage rate for hired labour (SP/hour). 
1@.t : is family labour availability in the t-th month (hour/month) 
6E>: is irrigation water availability in the t-th month (cubic meter/month) 
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F&: is the coefficient of cash anticipation for the c-th cropping activity applied for inputs whose 
costs are covered by the official credit system (%). 
&: is the coefficient of cash anticipation for the c-th cropping activity applied for inputs whose 
costs are not covered by the official credit system (%). 
*f,c: is the price of the f-th input of the c-th cropping activity (SP/kg) 
Parameters differentiated according to different mantikas and agro-climatic zones 

c,i,j: is the unit yield coefficient, it defines the amount of j-th product that can be obtained from one 
unit c-th activity when the latter is irrigated by the i-th irrigation technique (kg/ha). 
6Ec,i,t: are the unit requirements of irrigation water for the c-th cropping activity and the i-th 
irrigation technique in the t-th month (cubic meter/ha/month). 
5.&,(,>: are the unit requirements of labour for the c-th cropping activity and the i-th irrigation 
technique in the t-th month (hour/ha/month). 
48f,c,i: are the unit requirements of physical inputs namely seeds, fertilisers and other chemicals for 
the f-th input, c-th cropping activity and i-th irrigation technique (kg/ha) 
c,i,w: are the unit costs of rented machinery for the c-th cropping activity, the i-th irrigation 
technique and the w-th irrigation water source (SP/ha). 
<=c,i,w: are the unit requirements of diesel necessary for pumping irrigation water for c-th cropping 
activity, i-th irrigation technique and w-th irrigation souce (litre/ha). 
parameters given at the farm level 
5: is the farm size (ha) 
: is cash availability at the beginning of the agricultural year (SP) 
*L: is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the farm is irrigated from private wells, and 
zero otherwise. 
 *8: is a dummy variable that takes the value of one, if the farm is irrigate from public nets, zero 
otherwise. 
N: is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the farm is irrigated from a river, zero 
otherwise. 
I: is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the farm has sprinkler irrigation technique, 
zero otherwise. 
<: is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the farm has drip irrigation technique, zero 
otherwise. 
-E@+: defines the maximum area that can be cultivated with cotton for each farm according the 
licensing system (ha). 
^+RS@+: defines the maximum area that can be cultivated with autumn sugar beet for each farm 
according the licensing system (ha). 
6+RS@+: defines the maximum area that can be cultivated with winter sugar beet for each farm 
according the licensing system (ha). 
_=: defines the minimum area that must be cultivated with barley to have enough feed for 
livestock activities (ha). 
: is the absolute risk aversion coefficient 
Variables calculated from the solution 
6R+: the amount of water used at the farm level (CM) 
V5R+: the amount of total labour used at the farm level (hour) 
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?5R+: the amount of hired labour used at the farm level (hour) 
15R+: the amount of family labour used at the farm level (hour) 
Equation [3.1] represents the objective function to be maximised. Equations from [3.2] to [3.14] 
represent the calculations of the terms of the objective function. The gross margin (net revenue) of 
the representative farm is calculated in equation [3.2]. Equation [3.3] calculates the total variance 
of the farm income, while equation [3.4] calculates the total output produced for each product. 
Since the farm’s net revenue is the total revenue minus variable costs, the total revenue of the farm 
is calculated by equation [3.5] while the total variable costs are calculated through equation [3.8]. 
Equation [3.6] calculates the expected price for each product to be used in calculating the revenue, 
while equation [3.7] calculates the variance-covariance matrix of the products’ prices, which is used 
in the calculation of the variance of the total farm’s income.  
Equations from [3.9] to [3.14] represent the components of the variable costs of equation [3.8]. 
Equation [3.9] calculates the costs of seeds, fertilisers and the chemicals for the crops for which 
such inputs are covered by the credit of the ACB, while equation [3.10] calculates the costs of the 
same inputs but for crops for which such inputs are not covered by the credit system. Equation 
[3.11] calculates the costs of pumping the irrigation water, which is simply the quantity of diesel 
used for each cropping activity times the price of diesel. Equation [3.12] and [3.13] repeat the same 
calculations of [3.9] and [3.10] having the costs of the physical inputs replaced by the costs of 
rented machinery. 
Inequalities from [3.15] to [3.28] describe the technical constraints of the model. Some of these 
constraints are related to the limited availability of a resource, while others are related to the 
technical and structural aspects of the representative farming system. Inequality [3.15] describe the 
land constraint, it states that the total area occupied by all cropping activities in a certain month 
must not exceed the total farm size. Inequality [3.16] describes the constraint imposed by 
agronomic rotation pursued by farmers, there is a group of crops that should not be cultivated in 
the same land plot two subsequent times; otherwise pests and diseases will grow and output will 
fall. This group is denoted by the subset (ex) as above. Therefore, the total area occupied by these 
crops in each month must not exceed 50% of the total farm size. 
Inequality [3.17] represents the constraint related to labour, it states that the total labour use in 
each month must not exceed the total availability of family labour in that month plus a term 
(?@.>) that allows the hiring of additional labour if needed. Inequality [3.18] describes the 
constraint related to the availability of irrigation water, so that total water use in a month must not 
exceed water availability in that month. 
Inequality [3.19], on the other hand, describes the constraint of cash availability which is more 
complex than the other constraints. The inequality makes use of two parameters that we call 
coefficients of cash anticipation. These coefficients are calculated based on the length of the 
biological cycle of the cropping activities considered. The coefficient associates a numerical value to 
each cropping activity, which reflects the length of its biological cycle. Therefore, as the latter gets 
longer the value gets bigger. The values are calculated by dividing the length of the biological cycle 
for each cropping activity in months over the total number of the months in the year. However, the 
coefficients are classified in two groups F& and &, in which the values of the coefficients for most 
crops are identical. The only difference regards the coefficients’ values associated with some 
strategic crops for which the costs of physical inputs and rented machinery are covered by the 
credit system, and so farmers do not have to worry about cash to cover these costs. In this case, the 
values of F& associated with cotton, wheat, sugar beet and barley are all equal to zero. As a result, 
the inequality states that the total amount of cash capital needed to finance the purchases of inputs 
and the agricultural operations must not exceed the amount of cash capital available at the 
beginning of the agricultural year. 
It could be argued that a better way to model the cash capital constraint would be through an 
equation stating that the total amount of cash capital used in a month must not exceed the cash 
capital available in that month, taking into account all cash flows of the farm. However, such way of 
modelling requires a very detailed data on farms’ cash flows that are not available and are too 
expensive to collect given the limited resources available to this research. Nevertheless, the way 
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cash capital constraint is modelled enables us to evaluate the possible impact that the current 
credit policy has on the decision making of farmers as we will see in the next chapter. 
Inequalities from [3.20] to [3.24] aim at describing some technical aspects of the representative 
farms. Inequality [3.20] is activated only when the representative farm has a sprinkler irrigation 
net (when the dummy Sp takes the value of one), while inequality [3.21] is activated when 
representative farm has a drip irrigation net (when the dummy Dr takes the value of one). 
Inequalities [3.22], [3.23] and [3.24] are activated when the representative farms are irrigated 
from a private well, public network and river respectively. 
Inequalities [3.25], [3.26] and [3.27] describe constraints imposed by policy interventions. 
Inequality [3.25] states the maximum area that can be cultivated with cotton while the other two 
describe the maximum area that can be cultivated with sugar beet (autumn and winter 
respectively) in each representative farm. 
Inequality, [3.28], states the minimum area that must be cultivated with barley. This inequality is 
justified by the fact that wheat and barley are very similar in terms of technical requirements, cost 
structure, and some aspects of policy intervention. The only difference is in their pricing policy in 
which the price of wheat is about 20% higher than that of barley. The secondary data sources 
suggest that only some farms produce barley in limited quantities. The survey findings prove that 
these farms do not grow barley for sale; they rather use it to feed their livestock (mainly sheep). 
The best way of considering this fact in our mathematical programming model is to include the 
sheep flocks in the analysis. However, this is beyond the scope of this research due to time and 
resource constraint. Including sheep flocks in the analysis is not expected to add significant value 
to our model concerning the measurement of the agricultural policy impact on water use and 
farms’ incomes. This is because sheep herds consume negligible amounts of water in comparison to 
the consumption of the other crops, and their output are mostly used for home consumption. To 
solve this problem, we assume that farms producing barley do so for the market. However, if we 
solve the model without this constraint, no barley will appear in the optimal solution and its area 
will be occupied by wheat instead. Therefore, we set a minimum area to be planted with barley, 
which is translated in our model by setting a constraint stating that the area planted with barley to 
be equal to or greater than the observed area of barley. 
Finally, equations from [3.29] to [3.32] are not part of the model, they are rather used to calculate 
water and labour use at the representative farm level. Equation [3.29] calculates water use, while 
equations [3.30], [3.31], and [3.32] calculate total labour use, hired labour and family labour use 
respectively. 
 3.3. Farming systems’ classification 
Applying the analytical method described in the previous section for the sake of policy analysis 
requires combining it with farms’ representation. Therefore, the irrigated farms of DERAHA must 
be classified in a relatively small number of representative farm types. Such a classification should 
take the following criteria into consideration: 
1. the boundaries that separate different administrative governorates and districts 
(mantikas5). This is useful because data collection by governmental agencies is mainly 
based on these boundaries. Such data (yields) reflect in many cases significant differences 
among different mantikas or governorates, making grouping of farms located in different 
governorates or mantikas in one farm type not meaningful  without getting data on the 
individual farms’ level. 
2. the boundaries that separate agro-ecological zones. This is necessary as many data collected 
by governmental agencies are also based on these boundaries. In addition, different agro-
ecological zones have important effects on irrigation requirements (i.e. water use) of the 
cultivated crops in different areas since these zones are determined according to the 
                                                 
5
 - mantika is the second administrative level in Syria after governorate which is the highest administrative level. They 
correspond to ‘provincia’ and ‘regione’ respectively in Italy. 
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average level of rainfalls. In general, the higher the rainfall the lower the irrigation 
requirements, especially for winter crops that can make use of rainfall water. 
3. the sources of irrigation water, which can be classified in three main types in Syria: private 
wells, public nets, and rivers. Water source usually affects water cost, which, in turn, affects 
the level water use and the level of farms’ incomes. 
4. the farm size (e.g. small, medium, or large), which may have an impact on the economy of 
scale, affecting, in turn, the overall profitability of the farm as well as its capability to 
innovate and adopt new technologies. 
5. the cropping patterns, as different farms might grow different crops reflecting 
specialisation. This affects irrigation water use and farms’ incomes as different crops have 
different irrigation requirements and generate different gross margins. 
6. the irrigation techniques, which can be generally categorised into flood, drip, or sprinkler 
techniques. They clearly have an impact on water use, since modern techniques tend to save 
water in comparison with the flood traditional technique. In addition, modern irrigation 
schemes affect the composition of production costs which influence the decision making of 
farmers. They are also considered more income generating since they give higher yields 
coupled with lower variable costs. 
Hence, we aim to construct a model that represents the aggregate behaviour of the irrigated farms’ 
sector in DERAHA through a bottom-top approach, that is to start modelling the behaviour of 
individual farming systems that allows us estimating the cropping areas and the derived demand 
for water of each individual farming system. Then we obtain the aggregate cropping areas and 
water demand of the farming sector in the region by calculating a weighted sum of cropping areas 
and water demand of all individual farming systems, in which weights are chosen to represent the 
relative contribution of each representative farming system to the region’s total. These aggregate 
water demand functions will be used in assessing the incidence of possible alternative policies on 
water use. In addition, by assuming that incomes of the farming households generated outside the 
agricultural sector holds unchanged, farms’ gross margins and certainty equivalents will be used as 
an indicator of income level and stability by simulating the impact of some expected policy reforms 
on them. 
Due to the lack of data at the individual farm level, we performed the classification through the 
following process of disaggregation: 
• The entire irrigated area of each governorate in DERAHA is divided according the 
administrative boundaries. 
• The irrigated area in each mantika is divided according to the agro-ecological zones. 
• The irrigated area in each agro-ecological zones is divided according to irrigation sources 
• The irrigated area from different irrigation sources is divided according to irrigation 
techniques. 
Therefore, farm types are distinct according to their location (mantika), agro-ecological zone (1-5), 
irrigation source (private wells, public networks, or rivers), and irrigation technique (flood, 
sprinkler, and drip). The lack of data also did not allow us to take into account farm sizes and 
cropping patterns during the classification. Therefore, we assume that these two criteria do not 
affect farms’ structure, which is an assumption supported by several observations. First of all, 
cropping patterns and areas of farms in DEHARA are very similar at the mantika level. So taking 
the location of farms at the mantika level into consideration in the classification is enough to 
consider the two criteria. Moreover, farm size has a small impact on technology at the farm level in 
DERAHA as it is shown in a previous study (Wattenbach 2006). 
3.4. Description of data 
The data used in the farms’ classification are available in the database of the National Agricultural 
Policy Center (NAPC: www.napcsyr.org) and the Statistical Abstracts of the Ministry of Agricultural 
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and Agrarian Reform (MAAR 2005). These data represent the total irrigated area of DERAHA, but 
then divided according to mantikas, agro-climatic zones, irrigation water sources, and irrigation 
techniques. Now we move to describe the data we used to construct the mathematical 
programming model for each farm type. 
3.4.1. Farm fixed resources 
Farm size and cropping patterns 
The definition of the average farm size for each farming typology is determined by dividing the 
total cultivated area at the last level of disaggregation (the irrigation technique level) by the 
number of farms. Due to the absence of official data about the number of farms at this level, the 
estimates of the local experts (the heads of agricultural departments at the mantika level) are used. 
Then the total areas of the cultivated crops is divided by the number of farms to obtain the average 
cropping pattern of each farm type. The crops’ areas are taken from NAPC database. 
Water availability 
Water availability at the farm type level is fully determined through the findings of the study 
survey. Its determination depends on irrigation water sources. When the source of water is private 
wells, water availability is estimated based on the maximum capacity of the pump-sets that the 
farmers have. So water availability in each month is the same across the year assuming that 
farmers have deep wells that are reliable along the year. Of course, there are many farmers who 
have shallow wells that are unreliable in bad rainfall years. These farms are not considered to be 
using wells as the main source of irrigation. They are categorised under other types because they 
are assumed to use wells as supplementary irrigation source. 
When irrigation source is public nets, farmers’ access to irrigation water is manipulated by 
governmental agencies. In this case, water availability in each farm is estimated according to a pre-
determined schedule set by the Ministry of Irrigation (MOI) in which every farmer has access to 
water for some time per week during certain months of the year. In cases where a river is the main 
source of irrigation, water availability is estimated in a similar way to that of public networks, since 
farmers using river water for irrigation are organised in consortiums which work under the 
supervision of the MOI who sets a schedules for each consortium. 
Family labour availability 
Due to the absence of detailed data at the level of individual farms, family labour availability is 
assumed differently according to the local conditions observed during the study survey. In HAG 
where almost all farms are managed directly by sharecroppers, we treat labour of the 
sharecroppers’ households as family labour since it has all of its characteristics. Then the numbers 
of family labour available are calculated by dividing the total farm size by 3, assuming that each 3 
hectares requires one full-time labourer, then the resulting number is multiplied by 150 which is 
the number of working hours per month. In Al-RAG, where all farms are managed directly by the 
owners, we assume that each family devotes 2 members full time and one part-time (50% of its 
time). The only exception is the mantikas of Tal-Abiad, where farms are mostly managed by 
investors from outside the region, here we assume only one family labourer full time. In DEG, 
where farms are also managed by owners, we assume that each family dedicates two members full 
time only6. Although some may argue that in RAG and DEG, families may be able to dedicate more 
family labour, we have observed from the survey that in general other family members, due to the 
limited size of their farms, are already involved in other activities: e.g. livestock (mainly sheep), 
public employment, working abroad, etc. 
Irrigation methods 
The observed irrigation schemes are flood, sprinkler, and drip. These techniques are presented in 
the model using dummy variables taking values of zero or one. These dummies represent an 
‘investment switch’ so they allow making simulations of switching farms from the flood scheme to 
                                                 
6
 - these numbers are assumed based on the estimates of local experts working at the Departments of Agriculture in the 
relevant governorates. 
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drip or sprinkler techniques by the changing the value of the variable from zero to one. In this 
regard, the model recognises that some irrigation techniques are not suitable for some crops, for 
example, drip scheme is not suited for irrigating wheat and barley. In addition, the model 
recognises the possibility of switching wheat and barley (but not cotton) to the rainfed mode. This 
is because wheat and barley can be grown without irrigation, but resulting lower yields, but it is 
impossible to grow cotton in Syria without irrigation. However, the model does not include the 
fixed costs associated with the investment switch since only variable costs are considered. 
3.4.2. Technical requirements and coefficients 
Irrigation water requirements 
The irrigation requirements of the various crops are determined at the agro-ecological zone level in 
each governorate by month (GCASR 2006). However, these data are adjusted in light of the survey 
findings because farmers use more water for irrigation than indicated in the secondary source. The 
numbers indicated in the official source are calculated using some equations reflecting the ‘optimal’ 
irrigation requirements rather than the real ones7, and they are only used as a reference point. 
Irrigation requirements are different by governorate, agro-ecological zone, crop, irrigation 
techniques and month. The differences in terms of different irrigation techniques are based on 
assumptions drawn from the discussions with the local experts of agricultural departments in 
DERAHA. It is assumed that sprinkler and drip techniques save 10% and 20% with respect to flood 
traditional one, although the water saved using these two modern techniques are much higher in 
the ‘optimal’ situations. The lower saving percentages result from the technical difficulties that 
farmers face in using the modern techniques. This has implications for policy actions and is 
discussed later in the report in more detail. Of course, irrigation requirements of rainfed crops are 
zero. 
Labour requirements 
Labour requirements for each crop are mainly obtained from a secondary source at a monthly level 
(MAAR 1994). However, the labour requirements for labour demanding operations (such as cotton 
and sugar beet harvesting) are modified in light of the survey findings to reflect the differences in 
yield among different farm types, since the numbers of the secondary source are averages at the 
national level. This is important because harvesting forms the main labour requirements for cotton 
and sugar beet and is heavily affected by yield. The adjustment is based on a simplifying 
assumption that the labour required for harvesting is a linear function of yield. 
Physical inputs  
These data include the crops’ requirements of chemical fertilisers and seeds. They are three kinds 
of chemical fertilisers used for all crops: nitrogen, phosphate, and potash. Their required quantities 
differ depending on the crop only for irrigated cultivation. If the crops are rainfed, they are then 
different according to the agro-ecological zones too, due to the differences in average rainfall and 
crops’ responses to fertilisation. 
Crops’ yields 
Crops’ yields differ according to mantikas, agro-ecological zones, and irrigation methods for 
irrigated crops. The numbers are obtained as averages from the database of the NAPC. Due to the 
absence of data on the yields of crops irrigated by drip and sprinkler schemes, their yields are 
estimated based on the discussion with the local experts. It is assumed that sprinkler and drip 
techniques increase the yields by 10% and 15% respectively with regard to flood technique. This 
takes into consideration that some techniques are not suited for some crops; for example, drip 
technique does not suite the irrigation of wheat and barley. In this case, yield is assumed equal to 
zero. 
For rainfed crops, yields are calculated from the NAPC database as the average yields for the last 
                                                 
7
- this information is obtained from Mr Mamoun Kanafani, the officer who is officially responsible about delivering the 
abstract of water requirements in GCASR. 
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seven years only at the level of agro-ecological zones. This averaging is just an attempt to minimise 
the effects of fluctuations from year to year as a result of rainfall fluctuations. 
3.4.3. Prices of inputs and outputs 
Prices of outputs 
It is mentioned above that some crops have fixed prices, which are cotton and sugar beet whose 
prices are used in the model taking into account that the prices received by farmers are slightly 
different from the official ones reflecting differences in quality. Therefore, the average prices 
calculated at the national level and reported in the annual agricultural abstract of the MAAR are 
used. For crops that have floor prices, which are wheat, barley, lentil, and chickpea, we assume that 
their floor prices are the effective ones in the decision making process of farmers. 
Generally speaking, the choice of prices is not an easy task to perform for crops whose prices are 
determined by the interactions of supply and demand without a direct intervention from the 
Government. This is very much true since these prices may change from year to year according to 
market conditions. Such variability in the prices is the only cause of variability of farms’ incomes in 
our model, and caution is necessary in choosing the method to model them. In our case, we make 
an assumption on their statistical distribution. The assumption we adopt in this thesis is that of 
lognormal distribution which has several advantages for our case. First, such distribution can be 
represented by its first and second moments as the case of normal distribution; however, it has an 
advantage over the latter since variables of lognormal distribution do not take negative values, 
which is important in our case since negative prices have no sense. Second, lognormal distribution 
is very consistent with price variability. On one hand, the values of the variable cannot take values 
less than zero as mentioned right above, and it is very reasonable that prices may go very high if a 
sudden supply shock is materialised on the other hand. 
In line with this assumption, we generate a matrix of prices in which prices are specified by product 
and state of nature. We use the method of Gauss-Hermite quadrature as described in Judd (1998) 
to create a price series for each product assuming the presence of ten states of nature, to which a 
specific probability is attached. To achieve this, a time series for each product price is selected and 
deflated using domestic wholesale price index, then they are detrended when a time trend is 
observed. After that, their logarithm is calculated to create series of logarithm values, from which 
we calculate the mean and variance for each series. Then we use MATLAB software to calculate the 
price distributions using the following command: 
[x, w] = qnwlogn(n, mu, var) 
Where: 
x: represents the series of the variable values 
w: represents the series of probabilities attached the variable values 
n: is the number of states of nature (it is equal to ten in our case) 
mu: is the mean of the logarithm values of the series 
var: is the variance of the logarithm values of the series. 
qnwlogn: is the expression used by MATLAB to calculate the series of variable values (x) assuming 
that the latter has a lognormal distribution. 
This formula generates a series of ten prices for each product with their associated probabilities 
assuming ten states of nature. Table 3.1 shows the price matrix used in the model with the 
associated probabilities for each state of nature. It is of interest to notice that prices of strategic 
crops are constant regardless of the state of nature since their variance is equal to zero. 
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Table 3. 1. Price matrix of the model products with the associated probabilities 
 State of nature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
wheat 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 
barley 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 
maize 6.83 7.54 8.22 8.90 9.60 10.36 11.18 12.11 13.19 14.57 
lentil 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 
chickpea 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 
Broad bean 18.30 20.18 21.95 23.73 25.58 27.55 29.69 32.10 34.91 38.49 
soybean 14.24 15.57 16.81 18.05 19.33 20.69 22.16 23.79 25.69 28.09 
Sugar beet 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 
sesame 18.77 22.11 25.45 29.00 32.89 37.25 42.24 48.13 55.40 65.26 
peanut 14.22 16.50 18.74 21.09 23.63 26.45 29.64 33.36 37.89 43.94 
cumin 25.08 30.00 35.00 40.37 46.33 53.08 60.91 70.27 81.97 98.06 
cotton 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 
Sum. watermelon 1.44 1.74 2.04 2.37 2.74 3.17 3.66 4.26 5.01 6.05 
Aut. watermelon8 1.59 1.95 2.33 2.75 3.22 3.76 4.41 5.19 6.20 7.61 
potato 1.84 2.49 3.23 4.12 5.20 6.55 8.27 10.54 13.69 18.55 
tomato 1.46 1.92 2.42 3.00 3.69 4.54 5.58 6.93 8.74 11.46 
eggplant 2.18 2.71 3.27 3.89 4.59 5.42 6.41 7.63 9.20 11.44 
probability 0.000 0.001 0.019 0.135 0.345 0.345 0.135 0.019 0.001 0.000 
Source: author elaboration 
Prices of inputs 
The prices of all kinds of chemical fertilisers and seeds of cotton, wheat, sugar beet and barley, are 
set administratively by the GOS through the ACB. For the seeds’ prices of other crops, we use data 
collected at the farm level after cross-checking them with the local experts. 
3.4.4. Labour wage 
Labour wage in Syria is paid in a non-standardised way. It might be paid on a daily basis as in the 
case of weeding where the wage used to be 150 SP/day in 2005 (for a working day of six hours), or 
it might be paid according to the amount of work done as in the case of cotton harvesting (4.5 
SP/kg). In addition, the labour wage might be different according to the task whether it easy or 
hard. To simplify the model, we use one standard labour wage per hour. This matter was discussed 
with the local experts as well as with the interviewed farmers. Based on that, we assume that labour 
wage was 25 SP/hour in the reference year, since it is the effective wage that farmers pay for hired 
labour in 95% of the situations according to the local experts. 
3.4.5. Water costs and interest rate 
Water costs are different according to water sources. Farms that depend on the public nets for 
irrigation pay an annual irrigation fee per hectare regardless of the amount of water used, this fee 
has been fixed at 600 SP/ha for winter irrigation only and it goes up to 3500 SP/ha when summer 
irrigation is also present as the situation in all irrigated farms of DERAHA. Some of the farms using 
public networks do not incur any operational costs to bring the irrigation water into the fields since 
it is driven by gravity, but others do incur such operational costs since the public canals may be far 
from the farms or because the irrigation networks are not constructed in a mode that supports 
gravity irrigation. On the other hand, farms who depend on private wells and rivers do not pay any 
fee, but they incur pumping costs which might be considerable. 
Pumping costs are calculated by the model by multiplying the diesel requirements per crop per 
hectare by diesel price, which is set centrally by the GOS, the price was set at 7.4 SP/litre in the 
reference year, but in the model we use the effective price paid by farmers which is equal to 8 
SP/litre to include the cost of transporting the diesel to the farm gate level. The diesel requirements 
are assumed to be different by crop, mantika, and agro-climatic zone, irrigation source and 
irrigation technique, and they are calculated based on the survey findings. However, since most 
                                                 
8
 - sum. Stands for summer while aut. Stands for autumn.  
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interviewed farms use only flood irrigation method, the costs of pumping using drip and sprinkler 
methods are calculated in light of some differences in irrigation requirements among different 
techniques (section 3.4.2). 
Concerning the interest rate, we consider only credit that covers the costs of variable inputs and 
agricultural operations, which lies under the short-term credit according to the loan categories of 
the ACB, since our model takes into we consideration only variable (explicit) costs,. The ACB’s 
interest rate for such credit differs according to whether the borrowers act individually or 
collectively. In 2005, the interest rate for the former was 5.5% while it was 4% for the latter, added 
to it in both cases 1% as a commission for the ACB making the effective interest rates 6.6% and 5% 
respectively. Due to lack of data at the individual farm level, it is impossible to distinguish 
individual farmers from collective ones, and so we assume a unique interest rate for all which is a 
weighted average of both previous ones. However, the weight used in the study is based on the 
author judgement from the fieldwork and is not based on an official figure. 
3.4.6.  Coefficients of cash anticipation 
The coefficients of cash anticipation are defined in section 3.2 above, here we just present them in 
the following table. 
Table 3. 1. Matrix of coefficients of cash anticipation of cropping activities 
 Cropping activity 
Coefficient of cash 
anticipation `a 
Coefficient of cash 
anticipation  ba 
wheat 0.00 0.67 
barley 0.00 0.63 
Intercalary maize 0.38 0.38 
Lentil 0.54 0.54 
Chick 0.54 0.54 
Broad bean 0.54 0.54 
Soybean 0.33 0.33 
Autumn sugar beat 0.00 0.83 
Winter  sugar beet 0.00 0.63 
Sesame 0.29 0.29 
Peanut 0.46 0.46 
Cumin 0.54 0.54 
Cotton 0.00 0.71 
Autumn watermelon 0.33 0.33 
Summer watermelon 0.29 0.29 
Spring potato 0.50 0.50 
Summer tomato 0.29 0.29 
Summer eggplant 0.29 0.29 
Source: author elaboration 
As mentioned in section 3.2, these coefficients are calculated based on the length of the biological 
cycle of the cropping activities considered, by dividing the length of the biological cycle for each 
cropping activity in moths over the total number of the months in the year. However, values 
associated with some strategic crops (cotton, wheat, sugar beet and barley) are all equal to zero for 
coefficients’ group `a. 
3.4.7. Other costs 
Rental machinery costs 
Many crops in DERAHA are highly mechanised. Wheat and barley are almost totally mechanised, 
where irrigation is the only manually performed operation. The situation is similar for cumin, 
chickpea, maize and lentil with the only exception that harvesting is performed both manually and 
mechanically. For cotton, machinery is used only for ploughing and tillage. 
Almost all farmers in DERAHA rent machinery to perform these operations due to the active 
market for these services caused by the presence of specialised agents providing them. During 
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wheat harvesting season, harvesters from Turkey are allowed to enter Syria to assist meeting the 
demand for this service. 
Harvesting cost in DERAHA is paid on an output-percentage basis which is 5-6% of the  production 
value. For rainfed crops, the costs of all machinery services are linked to yields, which are very 
much affected by rainfalls i.e. agro-ecological zones. However, only the harvesting cost is directly 
linked to yields (10% of the output value for wheat and barley and about 5-6% for lentil, 2-3% for 
cumin and 9-10% for chickpea), while the costs of other machinery services are paid on a per-
hectare basis. 
Transportation and other costs 
These include the costs of transportation of the output (to the market or governmental delivery 
centres), costs of liquid chemicals, packing materials, cost of oil and repairs for the pumping sets, 
etc. These costs form a small proportion of the total variable costs, and they differ only according to 
the crop for irrigated farming, but also according to yields for rainfed farming. Since yields of 
rainfed crops are considered only different at the agro-ecological zone level, they are differentiated 
only by agro-ecological zone. 
3.5. Solving and validating the model 
Using mathematical programming as a predictive tool requires validating and calibrating the 
model. Predicting how the optimal solution would change due to a change in any parameter is only 
possible after verifying that the model is able to replicate the observed data that demonstrate 
farmers’ choices and decisions.  
The software used in setting up, solving, calibrating and simulating our mathematical 
programming model is the General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS). All data are entered into 
GAMS and organised in four separate sheets. The first one (model) includes the basic elements of 
the model, the second (region) includes all data that apply to all farm types which are the prices of 
outputs and physical inputs, coefficients of cash anticipation, land requirements for all crops as 
well as scalar parameters such as labour wage rate, interest rate, and irrigation fee. The third 
(mantikas) includes all data that are different at the mantika level. These are crops’ yields, physical 
inputs requirements, rental machinery costs and diesel requirements for pumping irrigation water. 
The forth and last sheet (farms) includes all farm fixed factors, plus data on farms’ typologies 
according to their locations in mantikas and agro-climatic zones, and according to their source of 
irrigation and irrigation techniques pursued. In addition, data on maximum (or minimum) areas of 
certain crops due to policy constraints or to assumptions are included in the last sheet. At the end 
of the sheet, a table of the observed cropping patterns at the farming system level is inserted to help 
performing the calibration process. The GAMS model and data used in the analysis are available in 
Appendix I. 
Two kinds of observed data are used as references to validate the model, which are cropping 
patterns at the individual farming system level and water use at the governorate and the hydraulic 
basin level. The validation aims to get the results of the optimal solutions on cropping patterns and 
water use as close as possible to their observed counterparts. The parameter used to achieve this 
purpose is the risk aversion coefficient whose choice will be discussed now in detail. 
With reference to the objective function of our model (equation [3.1]), it has been already said that 
this function represent maximising expected utility trough maximising certainty equivalent. All 
data needed to calculate the objective function are available except data on the risk aversion 
coefficients. In our model we assume that utility functions of farmers are characterised by constant 
absolute risk aversion. Therefore, these coefficients are assumed to reflect farmers’ attitudes 
towards risk, the higher is the coefficient the more risk averse the farmer is. 
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Table 3. 2. Comparison between observed data and model results for key variables 
  Observed data Solution % change 
Water use (million CM) 
HAG 3440 3595 +4.51 
RAG 3119 3146 +0.87 
DEG 2374 2369 -0.21 
Wheat area (ha) 
HAG 344500 341408 -0.90 
RAG 132627 135729 +2.34 
DEG 101648 106822 +5.09 
Cotton area (ha) 
HAG 85412 87447 +2.38 
RAG 58959 60147 +2.01 
DEG 25943 25106 -3.23 
Sugar beet area (ha) 
RAG 4750 4958 +4.38 
DEG 4338 4132 -4.75 
Area of intercalary crops (ha) 
HAG 3332 3441 +3.27 
RAG 15919 15664 -1.60 
DEG 39318 41448 +5.42 
Area of other winter crops (ha) 
HAG 13414 13396 -0.13 
RAG 4001 3848 -3.82 
DEG 6260 6515 +4.07 
Total cropped area (ha) 
HAG 445094 445693 +0.01 
RAG 219951 220347 +0.18 
DEG 183954 184024 +0.04 
Range of calibrated risk aversion coefficients 
HAG 0.001 – 0.005 
RAG 0.002 – 0.007 
DEG 0.001 – 0.004 
Coefficient of correlation (CC) between risk aversion coefficient and farm size in all DERAHA -0.60 
CC between risk aversion coefficient and farm size in all DERAHA except DEG -0.80 
Source: the study results, NAPC database, and GCASR (2006) 
Several ways of estimating risk aversion coefficients have been so far proposed in literature. Here 
we adopt the method proposed by McCarl (2003) and by Hazell & Norton (1986), since it is 
consistent with basic assumption of the model and it is easy to perform. It is based on estimating 
the risk aversion coefficient such that the difference between the observed behaviour and the 
optimal solution is minimised. This requires solving the model for each farm for several values of 
risk aversion coefficient, and then we pick the value that gives the cropping mix closest to the 
observed one. By doing so, we generated a set of risk aversion coefficients; one for each farming 
system. 
The second step of validating the model is to check if cropping areas and water use produced by 
model are consistent with their observed counterparts at the level of each individual governorate 
and then at DERAHA levels. Here some slight modifications are made on irrigation requirements 
to guarantee that the amount of water use produced by the model is close enough to that of the 
observed data. Table 3.3 summarises the differences between observed data and the solution 
results at the governorate level for water use and the most important crops. To make the 
comparison easier, we assemble crops that occupy small areas in two groups. The group of 
intercalary crops, which include maize, sesame, watermelon, soybean, eggplant and tomato; they 
are all summer crops that are grown in the short season after wheat harvest in the same land plot , 
so they are grown in the period July-October. The group of other winter crops, on the other hand, 
includes all other crops which are: barley, peanut, lentil, chickpea, cumin, and spring potato, which 
are all winter crops that are grown usually in the period January-June. 
Table 3.3 shows that differences in water use and cropping patterns are very small and they can 
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be neglected given the classification adopted above. Although such classification may hide 
differences in terms of single crops that might be relatively large; however, this is not important 
when the areas of these crops singularly are very small as in our case. The total area of the group of 
other winter crops accounts only to about 3%, 2%, and 4% of the total cropped area in HAG, RAG, 
and DEG respectively. On the other hand, the area of the group of intercalary crops in HAG and 
RAG accounts to less than 1% and 7% of the total cropped area respectively. 
DEG is the only governorate where the group of intercalary crops accounts a high share of the 
cropped area (22%). Maize accounts for the major part of this group (about 50%), while the other 
crops occupy all very small areas and most of them have not been considered in our model due to 
their minor importance such as haricot beans, garlic, cucumber, pepper, squash, etc. The 
magnitude of these crops is grown by farmers for purposes of home consumption. Tomato and 
eggplant, on the other hand, are two intercalary crops included in our model, but they do not 
appear in the solution’s cropping mix, reflecting their low commercial value due to the low yields 
confirming that they are also grown for home consumption. The model solution gives an area (not 
shown in Table 3.2) for maize in the optimal solution to be double of the observed one, but this is 
due to the fact that so many crops are not included in the model due to their importance as clarified 
above. Therefore, since maize is the most profitable intercalary crops in DEG, it occupies the area 
of these crops in the solution. 
The lowest part of Table 3.3 represents the ranges of values that the absolute risk aversion 
coefficients take in the three governorates. According to the Expected Utility Theory, the value of 
an absolute risk aversion coefficient increases as risk aversion increases. In addition, the Theory 
predicts that risk aversion decreases as wealth increases. Here we test for this by calculating the 
coefficient of correlation between the values of risk aversion coefficient and the farm size which is 
considered to be an indicator of wealth. The corresponding coefficient of correlation for all 
DERAHA zone is equal -60% as shown in the table, which already illustrates a negative and high 
correlation between the two parameters along with the prediction of the Expected Utility Theory. 
However, the findings of the study survey, enhanced by the findings of other studies (Wattenbach 
2006) emphasises the high importance of off-farm and non-agricultural income sources for 
farmers of DEG where average farm size is relatively very small. Calculating the coefficient of 
correlation after excluding the values associated with the DEG farm types gives the value of -80%, 
which illustrates a very high correlation. In DEG instead, farm holding size cannot be used an 
indicator of wellbeing since it generates only about 35-40% of the total households’ income (Hamza 
2004). This may explain the relatively low values of risk aversion coefficient found for farming 
systems of this governorate as illustrated in Table 3.3. 
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Chapter 4. Foreseen impact of policy 
change 
This chapter is devoted to the discussion of some policy simulations and scenarios and their 
impacts on average income level, income stability, total and hired employment, and changes in 
cropping patterns and water use at the governorate level. In addition, returns to factors of 
production will be used to indicate the impacts on efficiency of resource utilisation.  
Due to very large number of farming systems in our model, which amounts to 69, the discussion 
will be kept at the governorate level. Therefore, we will use the sum of GMs and CEs to indicate 
changes in income level and income stability at the governorate level. For total and hired 
agricultural labour use, it makes more sense to discuss them at the governorate level, which applies 
also to changes in cropping patterns and water use. However, due to the importance of water 
problem in AKB, we will mostly demonstrate the impact of any simulated policy on water deficit in 
this basin. The same cannot be done for Euphrates basin since a significant part of it is located in 
the governorate of Aleppo, which is not covered in this study, while the almost the entire area of 
AKB is located in HAG. Although some area of AKB is located in DEG, we neglect this part in the 
analysis for simplicity since we lack information on the location of farming systems at the basin 
level. Therefore, we will consider AKB to be identical to HAG. 
Returns to factors of production are frequently used to indicate the efficiency of resource 
utilisation. We calculate them to demonstrate changes of resource use efficiency for the most 
important factors of production in DERAHA, namely land, labour and water. 
The first and most relevant scenario is the measurement of the possible impact of the policy 
reforms that took place after the reference year of the study (2005), which is demonstrated and 
discussed in the following section in comparison with the baseline results that reflect the situation 
in 2005. The other scenarios are then performed on the new baseline, which reflects the situation 
in 2009 after the policy reforms and will be called below the reform baseline. 
4.1. Impact of the recent policy reforms 
This section is devoted to demonstrate and discuss the impact of the recent policy reforms on the 
performance of the agricultural sector of DERAHA; therefore, it is important to first describe these 
reforms. 
4.1.1. The recent policy reform 
Starting from 2005, the GOS undertook a series of reforms regarding many aspects of the 
agricultural policy, namely credit policy, pricing policy of inputs and outputs as well as the subsidy 
system of certain crops. 
Concerning credit policy, the reform had an effect on all of its elements: interest rates, credit terms 
and the range of eligible activities. For a long time, the ACB used to offer credit only for pure 
agricultural activities, but now it can provide credit for various development projects (agricultural, 
industrial and constructional), on the condition that they will serve the process of rural 
development through employment creation and strengthening the linkages among the various 
economic sectors in the rural areas. It is believed according to this viewpoint that strengthening 
such linkages whether they are of production or consumption types would enhance the flows of 
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labour and capital from the agricultural sector to the other sectors (or vice versa), which in turn, is 
expected to assist in achieving a comprehensive development in the Syrian countryside. However, 
changes in the interest rates for short-term credit form the only relevant reform to our analytical 
model. Table 4.1 compares the old with the new types of loans offered by the ACB with their 
corresponding interest rates with respect to agricultural activities. Only short-term loans are 
relevant in our case as they are to fund the variable inputs and agricultural operations. 
Table 4. 1. Interest rates adopted by the ACB according to loan term and activity 
Term  sector Old interest rate New interest rate 
Short term 
Public and collectively cooperative 4% 6% 
Cooperative on behalf of members 4% 7% 
Private and co-joint sector 6% 8% 
Medium term 
Public and collectively cooperative 6% 7% 
Cooperative on behalf of members 6% 8% 
Private and co-joint sector 7.5% 9% 
Long term  
Public and collectively cooperative 7% 8% 
Cooperative on behalf of members 7% 9% 
Private and co-joint sector 8% 10% 
Interest rate for the delay in repayment 10% 12% 
Source: Source: Parthasarathy (2001), http://www.agrobank.org  
The choice of a new interest rate is somehow problematic since the official one differs according to 
the type of borrowers (Table 4.1). However, since we lack data at the farming system level, we 
assume a unique interest rate for all farmers, based on a weighted average of the three ones 
reported in Table 4.1 after adding the 1% commission for the benefit of the ACB (refer to section 
3.4.5). The new selected interest rate is equal to 8.5%. 
Diesel, in Syria, had been highly supported until recently. For example, the consumer price of 
diesel in the neighbouring countries (Lebanon e.g.) used to fluctuate between 25 and 35 SP/litre 
according to the world price movements, while it was fixed in Syria at 7.40 SP/litre. This old price 
policy of diesel had two reasons. The first one aimed at supporting consumers as Syrian people use 
mainly diesel for heating in winter. The second aimed to stimulate economic development, 
agricultural and industrial, through providing cheap source of energy. However, this policy had 
caused a drain on the public budget after the increase in international prices causing the smuggling 
of huge quantities of diesel from Syria (where prices were very low) to the neighbouring countries 
especially Lebanon (where prices were in line with the international ones). This problem recently 
urged the GOS to revise the policy and amend it by increasing the price of diesel from 7.4 SP/litre 
to 25 SP/litre in 2008 before being reduced to 20 SP/litre in 2009. 
Following the increase of diesel price, the GOS undertook a series of actions aiming at 
compensating the farmers for the increased costs of production resulting mainly from the increase 
of diesel price. Consequently, the prices of strategic crops were raised as follows. 
• Wheat (durum): 20 SP/kg, 
• Wheat (soft): 19.5 SP/kg, 
• Barley: 16 SP/kg 
• Cotton: 41 SP/kg 
• Sugar beet: 3.75 SP/kg 
• Lentils: 23 SP/kg (no change occurred) 
• Chickpeas: 25 SP/kg (no change occurred) 
In addition, a subsidy of 30 thousand SP/ha is given to producers of cotton irrigated from private 
wells. In addition, the new reforms joined maize to the group of strategic crops and determined for 
it a floor price equal to 16 SP/kg. 
Furthermore, prices of chemical fertilisers have been recently subject to noticeable increase as a 
result of one further step towards the liberalisation of the agricultural sector in Syria. The new 
prices became as follows: 
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• Nitrogen fertiliser: 18 SP/kg 
• Phosphate fertiliser: 23.9 SP/kg 
• Potash fertiliser: 57.2 SP/kg 
4.1.2. The 2005 baseline results versus reform baseline results 
In order to estimate the impact of the aforementioned policy reforms, we have to run the 
mathematical programming model after adjusting the relevant policy parameters to be in line with 
the reforms. As explained in section 3.2, official prices need to be adjusted to reflect the effective 
prices that farmers receive, this implies adding the transaction costs to prices of inputs and 
subtracting them from the prices of outputs. 
Having selected new effective prices, we deflated them using the wholesale price index calculated 
by the Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), taking 2005 as a base year since it is the reference 
year of our data. 
The new prices became: 
• Wheat: 14.77 SP/kg for durum and 19.5 SP/kg for soft 
• Barley: 11.74 SP/kg 
• Cotton:  28.00 SP/kg (the decisions do not state and price differentiation according to 
delivery dates as before) 
• Sugar beet: 2.54 SP/kg 
• Lentils: 23 SP/kg (no change occurred) 
• Chickpeas: 25 SP/kg (no change occurred) 
• Maize: 12.12 SP/kg 
• Nitrogen fertiliser: 13.64 SP/kg 
• Phosphate fertiliser: 18.11 SP/kg 
• Potash fertiliser: 43.33 SP/kg 
• Subsidy for cotton irrigated from private wells: 23,000 SP/ha 
The objective function of the our model needs to be adjusted as well to consider the subsidy given 
for cotton irrigated from private wells. The new objective function is: 
 = ∑ *! ∗ ! + ∑ ∑ %&;>>;,,(,) ∗ *L ∗ -E+()!       [4.1] 
Where: 
-E+: is the subsidy that is given to cotton irrigated from private wells (SP/ha). 
*L: is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the farm is irrigated from well, zero 
otherwise. 
Table 4.2 compares the 2005 baseline results with the reform baseline results for cropping 
patterns and water use at the governorate level. Note that we separated here maize from other 
intercalary crops in order to see the impact of stabilising its price in the recent reform. 
Noticeable changes are observed for areas of maize and intercalary crops. Maize area increases in 
all governorates, while intercalary crops’ area decreases in HAG and RAG but it increases 
significantly in DEG. Stabilising maize price has a positive impact on its cultivated area as 
expected, but the importance of this impact differs according to the pre-reform situation. It is 
noticeable that, in DEG, the small increase in the area of maize is coupled with a large increase in 
the area of other intercalary crops, reflecting that the increased costs (due to increased in input 
prices) significantly offset the increased revenue from maize due to stabilising and supporting its 
price. Changes in areas of wheat, cotton, sugar beet and other winter crops are not that large. 
Noticeable only is the decrease of cotton area in DEG which is maybe due to the same reason 
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proposed for the small increase in maize, this is supported by the fact that cotton is very 
demanding in terms of variable inputs especially diesel whose price was subject to a big increase. 
Table 4. 2. the 2005 baseline results versus reform results for cropping mixes and water use 
 2005 baseline results 
Reform baseline 
results 
% change 
Water use (million CM) 
In HAG  3595 3575 -0,56 
In RAG  3146 3391 7.79 
In DEG  2369 2473 4.39 
Wheat area (ha) 
In HAG 341408 341933 0.15 
In RAG 135729 134983 -0.55 
In DEG 106822 109578 2.58 
Cotton area (ha) 
In HAG 87447 87447 0.00 
In RAG 60147 60148 0.00 
In DEG 25106 22906 -8.76 
Sugar beet area (ha) 
In RAG 4958 4958 0.00 
In DEG 4132 3701 -10.43 
Maize area (ha) 
In HAG 0 398 Undefined 
In RAG 12067 30092 149.37 
In DEG 36213 39498 9.07 
Intercalary crops area (ha) 
In HAG 3441 2871 -16.56 
In RAG 3597 1963 -45.43 
In DEG 5234 13987 167.23 
Other winter crops area (ha) 
In HAG 13396 12872 -3.91 
In RAG 3848 4594 19.39 
In DEG 6515 6189 -5.00 
Total cropped area (ha) 
In HAG 445693 445521 -0.04 
In RAG 220347 236738 7.44 
In DEG 184024 195859 6.43 
Source: study results  
Concerning water use, noticeable is the increase of water use in RAG and DEG reflecting the overall 
increase of the cropping area of these two governorates, while the it remains somehow stable in 
HAG (Table 4.2). 
Concerning water use, availability and balance at AKB level, Table 4.3 shows that although water 
balance improves slightly after the reforms, a large deficit is still witnessed and water saved 
accounts only to 20 million CM less than 1% of the water used. 
Table 4. 3. Foreseen impact of policy reforms on water use and balance in AKB 
Water availability (million CM) 2388 
Water use before reform (million CM)  3595 
Water use after reform (million CM) 3575 
Water balance before reform (million CM) -1207 
Water balance after reform (million CM) -1187 
Water saved (million CM) 20 
Source: study results, GCASR (2006) 
The impact of the policy reforms on income and employment is generally positive although obvious 
differences exist among governorates. Impact on total and hired employment is negligible in HAG 
which is consistent with the minor changes in cropping patterns as mentioned above. The same 
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elucidation applies to changes in average income and income stability although the latter witnesses 
improvement while the former witnesses reduction (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4 also reveals improvement in employment, average income and income stability in both 
RAG and DEG. The increase in hired employment is conspicuous in DEG (30%) which is mainly 
due to low use of hired labour in the 2005 baseline results since farms in DEG are generally small 
and are characterised by high level of family labour use. However, the overall improvements in 
income and employment variables is mainly due to the expansion of intercalary crops cultivation, 
namely maize, since they require a proportionately high labour requirements added to the impact 
of stabilising the price of maize which is evidently behind the increase in income level and stability. 
Table 4. 4. Foreseen impact of policy reform on employment and income in DERAHA 
Governorate HAG RAG DEG total DERAHA 
Total agricultural employment (thousand hour) 
2005 baseline results 145489.88 90092.58 56316.13 291898.59 
reform baseline results 144765.20 95787.41 58644.86 299197.47 
% change -0.50% +6.32% +4.14% +2.50% 
Hired agricultural employment (thousand hour) 
2005 baseline results 36696.74 31614.67 50.86 68362.27 
reform baseline results 36428.96 33456.17 66.28 69951.41 
% change -0.73% +5.82% +30.32% +2.32% 
Sum of Gross Margins (million SP) 
2005 baseline results 12975.57 8793.99 5993.6 27763.16 
reform baseline results 13402.42 9780.33 6915.52 30098.26 
% change +3.29% +11.22% +15.38% +8.41% 
Coefficient of variation of Gross margins at farms’ level 
2005 baseline results 0.53 0.41 0.18 0.67 
reform baseline results 0.55 0.39 0.20 0.67 
% change +2.85% -4.02% +15.26% +0.20% 
Sum of Certainty Equivalents (million SP) 
2005 baseline results 12794.99 8590.02 5509.12 26894.13 
reform baseline results 13260.61 9709.99 6558.25 29528.85 
% change +3.64% +13.04% +19.04% +9.80% 
Coefficient of variation of Certainty Equivalents at farms’ level 
2005 baseline results 0.54 0.42 0.18 0.68 
reform baseline results 0.55 0.40 0.20 0.68 
% change +2.72% -5.10% +9.02% -0.39% 
Source: study results  
Table 4.4 also reports the coefficient of variation of average income and income stability among 
individual farming typologies. This coefficient is used as a indicator for income distribution among 
different farming systems at the governorate level as well as at DERAHA level. The results show an 
a slight increase in the variation of average income and income stability in the entire region; 
however, the changes in the value of this coefficient are different from governorate to the other; 
while they are positive in HAG and DEG, they are negative in RAG, illustrating an fall in income 
equality in the former case but an increase in the latter. Therefore, although the new policy reforms 
promote average income and income stability in all governorates, they promote income equality 
only in RAG. 
Returns to factors of production are usually used to as indicators on the efficiency of resource 
utilisation. Table 4.5 illustrates the impact of the recent policy changes on returns to land, labour 
and water. In line with improvements in income level and stability demonstrated above, returns to 
the three resources witness some improvements. Not surprisingly, DEG, which witnesses the 
highest improvement in income level and in income stability, observes also the highest 
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improvement in returns to factors of production (about 8-10%) followed by RAG which has a 
similar situation although the percentage changes for all variables are lower than those of DEG. 
Here it is interesting to highlight the fact that improvements in income level and stability in these 
two governorates are due to both increased profitability of some crops and the increased cropped 
area (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). HAG also observes an improvement in returns to factors of production 
although it is the only governorate in which no improvement is noticed in the cropped area, which 
means that this improvement is due only to the increased profitability of some crops due to the 
recent policy reforms. 
Table 4. 5. Impact of policy reforms on returns to land, labour and water 
governorate HAG RAG DEG DERAHA 
GM per ha (SP/ha) 
2005 baseline results 29113.24 39909.81 32569.59 32660.08 
reform baseline results 30082.57 41312.93 35308.61 34275.87 
% change 3.33% 3.52% 8.41% 4.95% 
 GM per unit of family labour (SP/hour) 
2005 baseline results 119.27 150.38 106.52 124.2 
reform baseline results 123.71 156.91 118.06 131.29 
% change 3.72% 4.34% 10.83% 5.71% 
 GM per unit of total labour (SP/hour) 
2005 baseline results 89.19 97.61 106.43 95.11 
reform baseline results 92.58 102.1 117.92 100.6 
% change 3.80% 4.60% 10.80% 5.77% 
 GM per unit of water use (SP/CM) 
2005 baseline results 3.61 2.8 2.53 3.05 
reform baseline results 3.75 2.88 2.80 3.19 
% change 3.88% 2.86% 10.67% 4.59% 
Source: study results 
4.2. Simulations of new alternative policies  
4.2.1. Impact of modernising the irrigation system 
The awareness in the importance of modern irrigation to ration the use of water has recently risen 
in Syria, especially that the agricultural sector consumes about 90% of the total water use in the 
Country, while irrigated areas using modern irrigation techniques do not account to more than 
20%. This percentage is much less in DERAHA and it was 7% in 2007. This issue has become more 
relevant after the subsequent waves of drought that hit the Country. 
As a response to that the GOS declared in 2005 the foundation of the Department of the NPCMI, 
which was later coupled with the foundation of a national Fund for the conversion to modern 
irrigation, linked directly to the MAAR, aiming to convert all irrigated areas of the Country to 
modern irrigation techniques. The fund works with favourable credit terms since loans are without 
interest and the repayment period lasts for ten years. In addition, the fund will contribute up to 20-
35% of the costs as a subsidy. Later on, the GOS declared that conversion to modern irrigation is 
obligatory and all farmers will have access to the credit, since even personal collateral became 
accepted. 
The loans are combined with extension and training programs to assist farmers on technical 
aspects on the use of modern irrigation techniques. Potential beneficiaries will be classified in 
groups so that priorities can be considered, which will be first given to small and poor farmers. 
Furthermore, priorities will be given to areas more technically suitable to modern irrigation, or to 
areas where the dominant cropping patterns are more appropriate for the  adoption of modern 
irrigation on the technical, practical and economic aspects. Priorities are also given to areas where 
water problem is critical (e.g. AKB). 
This simulation is performed in two separate scenarios: first, we will assess the impact of 
conversion to modern irrigation on all the model variables; second, we will assess the impact of 
increasing irrigation efficiency after adopting modern irrigation techniques. 
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4.2.1.1. Impact of adopting modern irrigation techniques 
This scenario aims to assess the impacts of converting all farms to modern irrigation which implies 
that farmers have to install two kinds of modern irrigation nets: drip and sprinkler. This is based 
on the fact that the suitability of the two techniques differs according to different crops. For 
example, while cotton can be irrigated with both techniques, it can be argued that it is better to 
irrigated with drip irrigation since water saving and cotton yields are higher with drip irrigation 
than with sprinkler. On the other hand, some crops, such as wheat and barley, cannot be irrigated 
by drip irrigation nets. 
The model takes into account such technical disparities and constraints in which it differentiates 
crops’ yields according to irrigation techniques, and when a crop is not irrigable by a certain 
technique its yield then is assumed to be zero. Modern irrigation techniques are modelled by 
dummy variables, which take the value of one if the relevant technique exists in the corresponding 
farm type, zero otherwise. This implies that when a farm has the values of the two dummies equal 
to zero, the only available irrigation techniques are flood and rainfed (without irrigation). 
Therefore, the scenario is performed by converting all the values of the dummies to one. Table 4.6 
demonstrates the potential impact of the conversion on water use and cropping patterns in 
DERAHA. 
Table 4. 6. Impact of conversion to modern irrigation on water use and cropping patterns 
  reform baseline  
Conversion to modern 
irrigation 
% change 
Water use (million CM) 
In HAG 3575 3213 -10.13 
In RAG 3391 3063 -9.66 
In DEG 2473 2301 -6.97 
Wheat area (ha) 
In HAG 341933 342116 +0.05 
In RAG 134983 136154 +0.87 
In DEG 109578 108923 -0.60 
Cotton area (ha) 
In HAG 87447 87447 +0.00 
In RAG 60148 60148 +0.00 
In DEG 22906 25106 +9.60 
Sugar beet area (ha) 
In RAG 4958 4687 -5.46 
In DEG 3701 3992 +7.87 
Maize area (ha) 
In HAG 398 6776 +1602.53 
In RAG 30092 42584 +41.51 
In DEG 39498 46986 +18.96 
Intercalary crops area (ha) 
In HAG 2871 2973 +3.56 
In RAG 1963 2220 +13.11 
In DEG 13987 13967 -0.14 
Other winter crop area (ha) 
In HAG 12872 12689 -1.42 
In RAG 4594 4408 -4.05 
In DEG 6189 6104 -1.37 
Total cropping area (ha) 
In HAG 445521 452001 +1.45 
In RAG 236738 251798 +6.36 
In DEG 195859 205079 +4.71 
Source: study results 
A part from the increases in the area of maize in all DERAHA, especially in HAG, and decreases in 
areas of the group of other winter crops in RAG as well as increases of Intercalary crops area in 
RAG, no important changes in cropping patterns take place as a result of conversion to modern 
irrigation. Obviously, the increases of yields are behind the increases in the area of some crops, that 
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is the area of maize is doubled several times in HAG. The quantity of water saved is also small due 
to two reasons: the first is technical in the sense that the efficiency of modern irrigation technique 
is low due to know-how constraints. Several studies highlighted that farmers lack the required 
knowledge and skills that enable them to use the modern technology efficiently (NAPC 2005a, 
Somi 2002, Varela-Ortega and Sagardoy 2001). In addition, our model assumes that sprinkler and 
drip techniques save 10% and 20% respectively compared to the flood traditional one, which may 
lead to expect that water saved should be 10% at least when both techniques are adopted. However, 
the percentage of water saved relative to total use reaches 10% only in HAG, which implies that a 
portion of the water saved by the adoption of modern irrigation is being used to expand the area of 
some crops that was not possible before since water constraint was binding. 
Table 4. 7. Impact of conversion to modern irrigation on water use and balance in AKB 
Water availability (million CM) 2388 
Water use of reform baseline (million CM)  3575 
Water use after conversion to modern irrigation (million CM)  3213 
Water balance after reform (million CM) -1187 
Water balance after conversion to modern irrigation (million CM) -825 
Water saved after conversion to modern irrigation (million CM) 362 
Source: study results 
At the level of AKB, the amount of water saved is noticeable (more than 10% million CM); however, 
there remains a significant deficit of more than 800 million CM (Table 4.7). This duplicates the 
results of several past studies, stating that given the current efficiency of modern irrigation 
techniques, the latter cannot solve the problem of water deficit in AKB, and therefore, a change in 
the cropping patterns may be inevitable if water deficit is to be restored. However, other sources 
assume that there is a large space to improve the efficiency of modern irrigation through a set of 
possible instruments. The impact of that on the water use and balance is going to be traced in the 
following section. 
Table 4. 8. Impact of conversion to modern irrigation on employment and income 
Governorate HAG RAG DEG total DERAHA 
Total agricultural employment (thousand hour) 
Reform baseline 144765 95787 58645 299197 
Conversion to modern irrigation 147017 99202 63300 309519 
% change +1.56% +3.57% +7.94% +3.45% 
Hired agricultural employment (thousand hour) 
Reform baseline 36429 33456 66 69951 
Conversion to modern irrigation 37129 46864 73 84066 
% change +1.92% +40.08% +10.23% +20.18% 
Sum of Gross Margins (million SP) 
Reform baseline 13402 9780 6916 30098 
Conversion to modern irrigation 17650 12320 8807 38778 
% change +31.70% +25.98% +27.35% +28.84% 
Coefficient of variation of Gross margins at farms’ level 
Reform baseline 0.55 0.39 0.20 0.67 
Conversion to modern irrigation 0.50 0.38 0.20 0.62 
% change -8.30% -1.97% -1.85% -8.23% 
Sum of Certainty Equivalents (million SP) 
Reform baseline 13261.0 9710.0 6558.0 29529.0 
Conversion to modern irrigation 17481.6 12238.0 8354.4 38074.0 
% change +31.83% +26.04% +27.39% +28.94% 
Coefficient of variation of Certainty Equivalents at farms’ level 
Reform baseline 0.55 0.40 0.20 0.68 
Conversion to modern irrigation 0.51 0.39 0.19 0.68 
% change -8.40% -2.38% -2.58% -8.32% 
Source: study results 
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Nevertheless, the impact of conversion to modern irrigation is positive generally on agricultural 
employment and incomes. This is shown clearly in Table 4.8 where the increases in all variables 
are obvious. Very distinct is the relatively higher increase in agricultural hired employment in RAG, 
which is due to a lesser family labour availability in that governorate relative to the other ones. 
However, the general increases in employment in all DERAHA are likely to be caused by increased 
yields resulting from adopting the modern techniques, while general increased incomes are caused 
also by reduced pumping costs. 
Table 4. 9. Impact of conversion to modern irrigation on returns to land, labour and water 
Governorate HAG RAG DEG total DERAHA 
GM per ha (SP/ha) 
Reform baseline 30083 41313 35309 34276 
Conversion to modern irrigation 39049 49383 42797 42741 
% change +29.80% +19.53% +21.21% +24.70% 
GM per unit of family labour (SP/hour) 
Reform baseline 124 157 118 131 
Conversion to modern irrigation 161 235 139 172 
% change +29.53% +49.94% +18.05% +31.30% 
GM per unit of total labour (SP/hour) 
Reform baseline 93 102 118 101 
Conversion to modern irrigation 120 124 139 125 
% change +29.09% +21.76% +17.92% +24.04% 
GM per unit of water use (SP/CM) 
Reform baseline 3.75 2.88 2.80 3.19 
Conversion to modern irrigation 5.49 4.02 3.83 4.52 
% change +46.40% +39.58% +36.79% +41.69% 
Source: study results 
Table 4.8 also reports the coefficient of variation of average income and income stability among 
individual farming typologies. The results show that this scenario generally promotes income 
equality since the coefficient of variation witnesses a fall in the three governorates although the 
magnitude of this fall differs from one governorate to the other. It is interesting to note that this fall 
is considerable in HAG  where the coefficient of variation has a noticeably higher value in the 
reform baseline, but the equality impact of the scenario is higher there. 
Concerning the impact on returns to farms’ resources, the model predicts significant 
improvements. Increased returns to land are caused by increased average income and reduced 
costs (due to reduced pumping costs of irrigation) per hectare. Returns to water is caused by 
increased average incomes per hectare and reduced irrigation requirements by crops. Returns to 
family labour are very high in RAG, since family labour availability is relatively low in that 
governorate, given that increased returns to labour in general are caused by the fact that incomes 
are increased more proportionately than labour requirements (Table 4.9). 
4.2.2.2. Impact of improving irrigation efficiency 
Although significant improvements are observed in terms of incomes, employment and returns to 
factors of production due to the adoption of modern irrigation techniques, the benefit in terms of 
water saving is very small due to the low current efficiency. This indicates that there exists a room 
for improving irrigation efficiency through improving the know-how of farmers. Previous studies 
demonstrate the existence of technical, environmental, and educational constraints that limit the 
efficiency of modern irrigation. These constraints relate to different soil quality, different types and 
qualities of irrigation networks, and lack of know-how from the side of farmers on how to use 
modern irrigation techniques effectively. 
In this sub-scenario, we will assume a gradual increase in the efficiency of modern irrigation that 
would be the consequence of releasing one or more of the constraints highlighted above. The 
scenario is performed by the use of an efficiency parameter that takes the value of zero at the 
status quo. This parameter is introduced into equations [3.11] and [3.29] as well as into inequality 
[3.18] that are all transformed to the following formulae: 
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4 = ∑ ∑ ∑ %&,(,)) ∗ <=&,(,) ∗ <(& ∗ (1 − )       [4.2] 
∑ ∑ ∑ %&,(,) ∗ 6E&,(,> ∗ (1 − ) ≤ 6E>)(&        [4.3] 
6R+ = ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ %&,(,)6E&,(,> ∗ (1 − ))(&>       [4.4] 
Where  is the irrigation efficiency parameter, while all other terms are defined in section 3.2. 
Increasing irrigation efficiency is performed by a gradual growth in the value of the efficiency 
parameter, assuming a linear relationship between water consumption and pumping costs as 
reflected in the equations [4.2] and [4.4]. Therefore, when the efficiency parameter has the value of 
zero, it corresponds to the current irrigation efficiency, while when it takes the value of 0.5, it 
corresponds to an increase in irrigation efficiency equal to 100%, implying that irrigation 
requirements of all crops are reduced to half. 
Figure 4.1 traces the impact of improving irrigation efficiency on water use in the three 
governorates of DERAHA. All governorates witness a gradual decrease in water use at the 
beginning. At higher levels of efficiency, however, while water use in RAG and DEG continues to go 
down, HAG witnesses an increased water use that persists even when irrigation efficiency reaches 
100% (when the efficiency parameter has the value of 0.5). It is interesting to notice that the rise of 
water use is materialised though discrete jumps. 
Figure  04.1. Impact of improving modern irrigation efficiency on water use 
 
Source: study results 
Figure 4.2, which illustrates the impact of improving irrigation efficiency on cropping patterns of 
all DERAHA, furnishes some hints about the reasons behind the seemingly strange behaviour in 
HAG. It demonstrates that areas of all crops remain constant except that of intercalary crops which 
witnesses significant increases similar in their forms to those of water use in Figure 4.1. Figure 
4.3 completes the image by showing that area of intercalary crops grows only in HAG as irrigation 
efficiency increases. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that in HAG water saved by 
increasing irrigation efficiency gets used to expand the cultivation of some intercalary crops, 
namely maize. These crops are not cultivated in large area under low levels of irrigation efficiency 
mainly due to irrigation water constraint, but also due to high pumping costs that make such crops 
much less profitable in HAG then. As irrigation efficiency increases, the available water in each 
farm becomes sufficient to irrigate more extra areas and the pumping costs of a unit of water is 
decreased. 
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Figure  04.2. Impact of improving modern irrigation efficiency on cropping patterns 
 
Source: study results 
Figure 4.3. Impact of improving irrigation efficiency on area of intercalary crops 
 
Source: study results 
All of the above has implication for the most efficient way to solve the water problem in AKB. 
Figure 4.4 shows how water deficit approaches zero at efficiency level of about 50%, but then it 
goes up again in a fluctuating way that reflects rapid increases in the area of intercalary crops at 
certain levels of irrigation efficiency. This points out that modernising the irrigation system may 
not suffice to restore water balance in Al-Khabour, a very important point that we have to come 
back to in the next chapter. 
The impact of increasing irrigation efficiency on agricultural employment and income is shown in 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. Agricultural employment increases in line with the expansion of 
intercalary crops’ cultivation; therefore, while it increases at a constant rate in RAG and DEG it 
witnesses some jumps in HAG. Increases of agricultural incomes on the other hand occur at a 
constant rate as shown in Figure 4.6. 
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Figure  04.4. Impact of improving irrigation efficiency on water balance in AKB 
 
Source: study results 
Figure  04. 05. Impact of improving irrigation efficiency on agricultural employment 
 
Source: study results 
Figure  04.6. Impact of improving irrigation efficiency on aggregate agricultural income 
 
Source: study results 
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4.2.1. Impact of stabilising and increasing cumin price 
This simulation aims at measuring the impact of stabilising and increasing the price of cumin, 
which is a crop that has not been important for the Syrian agriculture so far. However, it may be a 
promising crop for the future since it has a growing international market due to the expansion of its 
use in medical industries. Furthermore, cumin can help to save water since it has low irrigation 
requirements; in fact, it is mostly grown in Syria now as a rainfed crop in agro-climatic zones 1, 2 
and sometimes 3. However, its yield experiences high degree of fluctuations especially in zones 2 
and 3 due to rainfall fluctuations, and so it is assumed that some supplementary irrigation may 
help in increasing and stabilising its yields. 
Our analytical model allows cumin to be cultivated with or without irrigation, and its yield differs 
according to that. When it is grown without irrigation its yield differs according to agro-climatic 
zones, while it has a stable yield once it is grown with irrigation. In the latter case, however, it has 
different irrigation requirements according to different agro-climatic zones. The simulation 
consists of two scenarios: in the first one we will measure the impact of stabilising cumin price, 
while in the second we will trace the impact of increasing the price after having stabilised it. 
4.2.1.1. Impact of stabilising cumin price 
The scenario is performed by assuming that the GOS guarantees a stable price for cumin, and this 
price is supposed to be the mean of the price series of cumin shown in Table 3.1. which is equal to 
50.08 SP/kg. Table 4.11 summarises the results of this scenario comparing them with the results 
of reform baseline. The table shows some interesting changes in water use and cropping patterns. 
First thing is that cumin appears in the cropping mixes of all governorates, its area in HAG is 
extremely large where it accounts about 30% of the total cropped area. Its area is also markedly 
large in RAG, and it counts to about 12% of the total cropped area. Coupled with this, HAG also 
witnesses a great increase in the area of intercalary crops and a sharp decrease in the area of wheat. 
The interpretation of these changes is that cumin with stable price has a certainty equivalent higher 
than that of wheat for many farming systems, knowing that they both compete for land as they are 
both winter crops and grown over the period from November to June. 
Moreover, cumin irrigation requirements are much lower than those of wheat, which means that 
the former farming systems will have more irrigation water that can be used to produce a crop that 
does not compete with cumin for land which is maize in our case. The same analysis applies also to 
many farming systems in RAG which demonstrates a similar situation of HAG although the sharp 
decrease is more with the group of other winter crops. On the other hand, areas of cotton and sugar 
beet are almost unchanged, but the total cropped area experiences a very small change in the three 
governorates. Water use goes down in the three governorate though its reduction is only 
perceptible in HAG. This illustrates the importance of this scenario for water balance in AKB, as 
Table 4.10 confirms a large amount of water saving equal to 375 million CM. However, water 
deficit is still high enough to doubt the sufficiency of this scenario to deal with water problem in 
AKB. 
Table 4. 100. Impact of cumin price stabilisation on water use and balance in AKB 
Water availability (million CM) 2388 
Water use reform baseline (million CM)  3575 
Water use after stabilising cumin price (million CM) 3200 
Water balance reform baseline (million CM) -1187 
Water balance after stabilising cumin price (million CM) -812 
Water saved (million CM) 375 
Source: study results 
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Table 4. 111. Impact of stabilising cumin price on water use and cropping patterns 
 reform baseline 
results 
Scenario results % change 
Water use (million CM) 
In HAG 3575 3200 -10.50 
In RAG 3391 3260 -3.88 
In DEG 2473 2467 -0.24 
Wheat area (ha) 
In HAG 341933 208466 -39.03 
In RAG 134983 106440 -21.15 
In DEG 109578 109578 0.00 
Cotton area (ha) 
In HAG 87447 87447 0.00 
In RAG 60148 60145 0.00 
In DEG 22906 22906 0.00 
Sugar beet area (ha) 
In RAG 4958 4687 -5.45 
In DEG 3701 3701 0.00 
cumin area (ha) 
In HAG 0 133650 undefined 
In RAG 0 30193 Undefined 
In DEG 0 1297 Undefined 
Intercalary crops area (ha) 
In HAG 3269 10117 209.48 
In RAG 32055 35551 10.91 
In DEG 53485 53485 0.00 
Other winter crops area (ha) 
In HAG 12872 12689 -1.42 
In RAG 4587 3218 -29.85 
In DEG 6189 4683 -24.34 
Total cropped area (ha) 
In HAG 445521 452369 1.54 
In RAG 236738 240234 1.48 
In DEG 195859 195650 -0.11 
Source: study results 
The impact of this scenario on income and agricultural employment follows the line of conclusions 
drawn above. In DEG, where no vital change occurred to the cropping patterns, income and 
employment remained almost unchanged. The only exception is that hired labour use decreases by 
22%; however, this change is negligible knowing that hired labour is already very small in DEG. 
The highest increase in income level, income stability and agricultural employment is in HAG 
where all variables increases by about 15% with the exception of hired labour which increases by 
about 40%. This is explained by the fact that labour requirements of cumin are much higher than 
those of wheat due to the need for intensive labour during the harvest season. In RAG all variables 
improve, but at a lower rate than that of HAG. This scenario also promotes income equality since 
the coefficient of variation for income level and stability decreases especially in RAG and HAG 
where cumin area expands greatly (Table 4.12). 
The analysis of the scenario’s impact on resource use efficiency demonstrates some interesting 
results. Table 4.13 shows that there is no observable change in DEG. However, in RAG, the 
returns to land and water go up, while those of labour go down whether counting for family or for 
total labour. In HAG, only  total labour productivity goes down while all other variables go up. The 
increases in land and water productivities are easily understood as the stabilisation of cumin price 
promotes average income and certainty equivalents and cumin is less consuming of water. The 
decreases in labour productivity are due to the fact that cumin uses more labour than the main 
substituted crop (wheat). However, the improvement of family labour productivity in the case of 
HAG is mainly due to scarcity of family labour that makes many farming systems rely very much on 
hired labour. 
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Table 4. 12. Impact of stabilising cumin price on employment and income in DERAHA 
Governorate HAG RAG DEG total DERAHA 
Total agricultural employment (thousand hour) 
Reform baseline results 144765 95787 58645 299197 
Scenario results 169560 101695 58645 329900 
% change 17.13% 6.17% 0.00% 10.26% 
Hired agricultural employment (thousand hour) 
Reform baseline results 36429 33456 66 69951 
Scenario results 51632 35656 51 87340 
% change 41.73% 6.58% -22.31% 24.86% 
Sum of Gross Margins (million SP) 
Reform baseline results 13402 9780 6916 30098 
Scenario results 15319 9954 6917 32190 
% change 14.30% 1.78% 0.02% 6.95% 
 Coefficient of variation of Gross margins at farms’ level 
Reform baseline results 0.55 0.39 0.20 0.67 
Scenario results 0.52 0.35 0.20 0.66 
% change -6.02% -9.38% -0.39 -1.55% 
Sum of Certainty Equivalents (million SP) 
Reform baseline results 13261 9710 6558 29529 
Scenario results 15187 9889 6565 31641 
% change 14.53% 1.84% 0.10% 7.15% 
Coefficient of variation of Certainty Equivalents at farms’ level 
Reform baseline results 0.55 0.40 0.20 0.68 
Scenario results 0.52 0.36 0.19 0.66 
% change -6.17% -10.01% -4.08% -1.75% 
Source: study results 
Table 4. 13. Impact of cumin price stabilisation on returns to land, labour and water 
governorate HAG RAG DEG DERAHA 
GM per ha (SP/ha) 
reform baseline results 30083 41313 35309 34276 
scenario results 33864 41435 35352 36239 
% change 12.57% 0.30% 0.12% 5.73% 
 GM per unit of family labour (SP/hour) 
reform baseline results 124 157 118 131 
scenario results 130 151 118 133 
% change 5.00% -3.94% -0.02% 1.08% 
 GM per unit of total labour (SP/hour) 
reform baseline results 93 102 118 101 
scenario results 90 98 118 98 
% change -2.41% -4.13% 0.02% -3.01% 
 GM per unit of water use (SP/CM) 
reform baseline results 3.75 2.88 2.80 3.19 
scenario results 4.79 3.05 2.80 3.61 
% change 27.73% 5.90% 0.00% 13.17% 
Source: study results 
4.2.1.2. Impact of increasing cumin price 
Figure 4.7 traces the impact of increasing cumin price on water use in DERAHA. It is noticeable 
the decrease of water use in the three governorates as cumin price goes up. In HAG, the rate of 
water use decline is slow for lower cumin price, but it accelerates when price reaches 65 SP (about 
85 SP in current prices of 2009). In RAG instead, water use declines fast at low levels of cumin 
price to slow down immediately when cumin price reaches 54 SP (about 70 SP in current prices of 
2009). The situation in DEG is more similar to that of HAG although it seems that in at high levels 
of cumin price, the reduction in water use is more significant in DEG. This is because cumin 
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becomes highly profitable when it reaches 65 SP in DEG (about 88 SP in 2009 current prices) and 
it starts to replace wheat. 
Figure 4.8, on the other hand, demonstrates the impact on cropping patterns in all DERAHA 
region. At the aggregate level of the region, areas of all other crops tend to decrease while cumin 
area increases steadily. It is obvious the reduction in wheat area at the price of 65 SP when a 
significant reduction in water use occurs in DEG, which is coupled with a significant increase in 
cumin area as mentioned above and it is clear in the figure. At the higher cumin price assumed in 
the scenario, water saved amounts to about 480, 240 and 175 million CM in HAG, RAG and DEG 
respectively, which corresponds to 13%, 7% and 7% reduction relative the reform baseline results 
respectively. 
Figure 4.7. Impact of cumin price increase on water use 
 
Source: study results 
Figure 4.8. Impact of cumin price increase on cropping patterns 
 
Source: study results 
Water balance at AKB level is demonstrated in Figure 4.3, water deficit decreases steadily along 
with the increase in cumin price, reflecting that it is the consequence of the expansion of cumin 
cultivation at the expense of other crops that are more irrigation demanding than cumin. The shape 
of Figure 4.9 would make more sense when it is combined with changes in cropping patterns in 
the three governorates of DERAHA. At low prices of cumin, water saving is due to wheat 
substitution for cumin, which is evident in Figure 4.2. However, at higher levels of cumin price, 
other crops start to get substituted for cumin, a clear example of that is cotton whose total area in 
DERAHA starts to decline as cumin price reaches about 65 SP (Figure 4.8). 
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Figure  04.9. Impact of cumin price increase on water balance in AKB 
 
Source: study results 
Water saving increases by about 105 million CM at the highest cumin price assumed in the scenario 
in comparison with water saved by the previous scenario that only entails stabilising cumin price at 
its assumed market mean. This means that at such a price level, a significant water deficit will 
remain doubting the sufficiency of such a scenario to solve by itself the problem of water deficit in 
AKB.   
Figure  04.10. Impact of cumin price increase on total agricultural employment 
 
Source: study results 
The impact f this scenario on agricultural income and employment in the three governorates of 
DERAHA is verified in Figures 4.10 and 4.11. No apparent negative impact on employment is 
observed as cumin price goes up although a slight reduction is witnessed in HAG, it seems that at a 
high level of cumin price, it starts to substitute in HAG crops that are more labour-intensive such 
cotton. This is not the case in RAG and DEG where the latter observes a slight increase in 
employment since cumin is also a labour intensive crop. Interesting is the impact on agricultural 
incomes which seem to increase steadily at a constant growth rate in each governorate although the 
rate of income growth is different from one governorate to the other. In fact, the low rate of income 
growth in DEG demonstrates the ineffectiveness of this scenario if the objective is to improve 
farming income in DEG. 
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Figure  04.11. Impact of cumin price increase on aggregate agricultural incomes 
 
Source: study results 
Figures 4.12, 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15 illustrate the impact of cumin price increase on the 
productivity of factors of production. Figure 4.12 demonstrates that this scenario is not effective if 
the objective will be the improvement of land productivity in DEG where GMs per hectare remain 
constant regardless of the level of cumin price. On the other hand, land productivity improves 
progressively in HAG at a quite high rate, which is one other sign of the positive impact of such a 
scenario in HAG. In RAG, land productivity improves generally although at a fluctuating rate, 
indicating that cumin faces there some competition from other crops. 
Figure  04.12. Impact of cumin price increase on GM per hectare 
 
Source: study results 
The impact of cumin price increase on labour productivity is similar to that of land productivity 
although an apparent negative correlation is observed in DEG. Productivity of family labour is the 
highest in RAG and it is the lowest in DEG. This is because farmers in DEG, since they have 
generally small holdings, use much family labour compared to those of HAG and RAG, while the 
latter has the lowest rate of family labour use (Figure 4.13). Surprisingly, the productivity of total 
labour is the highest in DEG followed by RAG, while HAG comes at the end. This is because 
farmers in HAG and RAG rely much more on hired labour (Figure 4.14). 
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Figure  04. 013. Impact of cumin price increase on GM per unit of family labour 
 
Source: study results 
One interesting observation is the equalisation of returns to total labour in the three governorates 
when cumin price reaches the highest assumed value in the scenario. The increase of labour 
productivity in HAG and RAG is a consequence of income rise only since employment remains 
almost constant in these two governorates. However, in DEG while income goes down for the 
highest values of cumin price, agricultural employment goes up causing this apparent reduction in 
labour productivity. 
Figure  04.14. Impact of cumin price increase on GM per unit of total labour 
 
Source: study results 
Figure 4.15 illustrates the evident positive impact that the increase of cumin price has on water 
productivity. This is expected since the scenario demonstrates a reduction in water use, coupled 
with an increase in agricultural income. The Figure shows also that the efficiency of water use is 
always higher in HAG where water problem is more serious, which may indicate that farmers in 
HAG do better than farmers in RAG and DEG in allocating their irrigation water in an efficient way 
given the technology they have. This signs there may be some space for improving farm 
management in the areas where water use efficiency is lower. 
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Figure 4.15. Impact of cumin price increase on GM per unit of water use 
 
Source: study results 
4.2.3. Impact of giving credit on a per-hectare basis decoupling it from crops 
This simulation aims at measuring the impact of eliminating the distortion in the credit policy that 
favours now the strategic crops. This simulated policy will allow providing credit on the basis of the 
total farm size and not in function of the cultivated crops. To perform this scenario, some values of 
the coefficient of cash anticipation reported in Table 3.2 are changed in the way that makes the 
values of coefficient F& identical to those of coefficient &. In addition, inequality [3.19] is modified 
to become as follows: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ F& ∗ %&,(,) ∗ 48:,&,( ∗ *:,& + ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ F& ∗ %&,(,) ∗ &,(,> + ∑ ∑ ∑ & ∗ %&,(,) ∗ <=&,(,) ∗)(&)(&>)(:&
<+E?@.E∗6ℎ≤+5∗cE∗(1+4)      [4.5] 
Where: 
cE: is the amount assumed to be available per hectare from the ACB at the official interest rate 4, 
while all other parameters of the inequality are unchanged and defined in section 3.2. 
Table 4.14 illustrates the impact of this scenario on water use and cropping patterns in the three 
governorates of DERAHA. The most important observation from the table is that the impact is 
negligible in almost all governorates for both cropping patterns and water use. The only noticeable 
changes are for the areas of intercalary crops and other winter crops, in which the former increases 
by 15% while the latter decreases by 18%. However, we can easily neglect these changes knowing 
that the combined area of these two groups of crops does accounts only to less than 5% of the total 
cropped area. 
Knowing that the impact of this simulated policy is negligible on cropping patterns and water use, 
we can conclude that it is so also for average income, income stability and agricultural 
employment, which means also that returns to land, labour and capital are not expected to change 
considerably. This conclusion allows us to infer that the current credit policy, although favours 
strategic crops, has a very light effect on farmers’ decision making process in the presence of the 
pricing and delivery policy that heavily favours strategic crops. 
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Table 4. 14. Impact of eliminating credit policy distortion on water use and cropping patterns 
  reform baseline  
New credit policy 
scenario 
% change 
Water use (million CM) 
In HAG 3575 3575 0.00% 
In RAG 3391 3397 0.18% 
In DEG 2473 2473 -0.02% 
Wheat area (ha) 
In HAG 341933 342116 0.05% 
In RAG 134983 135829 0.63% 
In DEG 109578 109581 0.00% 
Cotton area (ha) 
In HAG 87447 87447 0.00% 
In RAG 60148 60148 0.00% 
In DEG 22906 22903 -0.01% 
Sugar beet area (ha) 
In RAG 4958 4958 -0.01% 
In DEG 3701 3701 0.01% 
Maize area (ha) 
In HAG 398 398 -0.01% 
In RAG 30092 30092 0.00% 
In DEG 39498 39498 0.00% 
Intercalary crops area (ha) 
In HAG 2871 2868 -0.09% 
In RAG 1963 2269 15.61% 
In DEG 13987 13992 0.03% 
Other winter crop area (ha) 
In HAG 12872 12689 -1.42% 
In RAG 4594 3748 -18.41% 
In DEG 6189 6189 0.00% 
Total cropped area (ha) 
In HAG 445521 445518 0.00% 
In RAG 236738 238641 0.80% 
In DEG 195859 195864 0.00% 
Source: study results 
4.2.4. Impact of decoupling the subsidy of cotton irrigated from wells 
As explained in section 4.1.1, the GOS decided recently to give farmers irrigating cotton from 
private wells a subsidy per hectare of cotton as a compensation for the increased price of diesel that 
took place in 2008, which significantly raised the pumping costs of water. This last scenario aims 
to measure the impact of decoupling this current subsidy from cotton production, while farmers 
will still receive the same amount of compensation, but given on the basis of the farm size. The 
rationale of this scenario is that cotton is an irrigation-intensive crop and so linking a subsidy to its 
production may exacerbate the water scarcity problem. Therefore, we aim to predict if there will be 
a significant amount of water saved if the subsidy is decoupled from cotton production. To perform 
the scenario, equation [4.1] must be modified as to become as follows: 
 = ∑ *! ∗ ! + 5 ∗ Ic ∗ *L!          [4.6] 
Where: 
Ic: is the amount of subsidy per hectare given to farmers who use private wells for irrigation (SP)  
5: is the farm size (ha), 
*L: is the dummy variable *L takes the value of one if the relevant farm is irrigated from private 
wells, zero otherwise.  
All other terms of the equation [4.6] are unchanged and explained in section 3.2. 
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Table 4. 15. Impact of decoupling the subsidy given to cotton irrigated from private wells 
  reform baseline  
New subsidy system 
scenario 
% change 
Water use (million CM) 
In HAG 3575 3575 0.00% 
In RAG 3391 3397 0.18% 
In DEG 2473 2473 -0.02% 
Wheat area (ha) 
In HAG 341933 342608 0.20% 
In RAG 134983 140747 4.27% 
In DEG 109578 111217 1.50% 
Cotton area (ha) 
In HAG 87447 86569 -1.00% 
In RAG 60148 54362 -9.62% 
In DEG 22906 21267 -7.15% 
Sugar beet area (ha) 
In RAG 4958 4958 -0.01% 
In DEG 3701 3701 0.01% 
Maize area (ha) 
In HAG 398 398 -0.01% 
In RAG 30092 37410 24.32% 
In DEG 39498 41092 4.03% 
Intercalary crops area (ha) 
In HAG 2871 2881 0.34% 
In RAG 1963 1969 0.30% 
In DEG 13987 14436 3.21% 
Other winter crop area (ha) 
In HAG 12872 13075 1.58% 
In RAG 4594 4617 0.49% 
In DEG 6189 5315 -14.12% 
Total cropped area (ha) 
In HAG 445521 445531 0.00% 
In RAG 236738 245658 3.77% 
In DEG 195859 197902 1.04% 
Source: study results 
Table 4. 16. Impact of decoupling the subsidy given to cotton irrigated from private wells on 
employment and income 
Governorate HAG RAG DEG total DERAHA 
Total agricultural employment (thousand hour) 
Reform baseline results 144765 95787 58645 299197 
Scenario results 144100 91912 57536 293548 
% change -0.46% -4.05% -1.89% -1.89% 
Hired agricultural employment (thousand hour) 
Reform baseline results 36429 33456 66 69951 
Scenario results 35882 31218 66 67166 
% change -1.50% -6.69% 0.42% -3.98% 
Sum of Gross Margins (million SP) 
Reform baseline results 13402 9780 6916 30098 
Scenario results 13555 9755 6965 30275 
% change 1.14% -0.26% 0.71% 0.59% 
Sum of Certainty Equivalents (million SP) 
Reform baseline results 13261 9710 6558 29529 
Scenario results 13412 9684 6608 29704 
% change 1.14% -0.27% 0.76% 0.59% 
Source: study results 
Table 4.15 illustrates the impact of this scenario on water use and cropping patterns in the three 
governorates of DERAHA. Obviously, although cotton area goes down noticeably, water change is 
almost zero. This is because the water saved from decreasing cotton area is used to expand other 
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crops, namely wheat and maize. This implies that decoupling this subsidy from cotton production 
were not sufficient if water saving would be the objective to be achieved. 
Table 4.16 shows the impact that this scenario may have on agricultural incomes and employment 
in DERAHA. Average income level and its stability are not expected to change much since all 
changes do not account to 2%. Impacts on employment, on the other hand, is evident in RAG 
where the decrease in cotton area is the highest since cotton is a very labour-intensive crop. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
5.1. Introduction 
Agricultural policy in Syria, as many of its counterparts in other countries, continues striving to 
achieve several contradictory objectives through compromising sets of policy instruments. The 
main objectives of the agricultural policy as defined in the Syrian Agricultural Strategy for the 
period 2001-2010 concern, at the same time, improving farmers’ incomes, increasing self-
sufficiency of basic staple foodstuffs and conserving scarce natural resources, namely water (NAPC 
2006). According to this strategy, the GOS has been using mainly the pricing policy to achieve the 
first and the second objectives, while very little had been done to achieve the objective related to 
water conservation. On the contrary, there was a period in which, farmers were encouraged to use 
water irrationally through a random digging of wells to expand irrigated cultivation. 
However, the GOS recently declared a national plan to convert all irrigated areas in the Country to 
modern irrigation as a consequence of increased awareness on the issue of water scarcity in the 
Country and at the regional level as well. In the meantime, several suggestions have been made to 
change the structure of current cropping patterns in the Country in an attempt to switch some 
areas from water-intensive crops to others that have lower irrigation requirements. Nevertheless, 
in all cases, the question of the impact of such structural changes in the agricultural sector on 
farmers’ incomes and their stability remains legitimate, whether such changes are caused by 
modernising the irrigation system, modifying the current cropping patterns, or any combination of 
both. 
This thesis aims at measuring the impact of agricultural policy on water use in the north-east of 
Syria (DERAHA), while assessing the potential risks on farmers’ incomes and their stability that 
may be caused by any proposed alternative policy scenario. The rationale behind choosing 
DERAHA is evident since its agriculture is most dependent on strategic crops whose prices are set 
by the GOS and their outputs are totally or partially delivered to parastatal agencies. Therefore, it is 
expected that any new alternative policy will have greater impact in farming incomes in this region. 
In addition, water scarcity problem, which is of concern in most areas of the Country, is well 
observed in DERAHA especially in HAG where AKB experiences a high hydraulic deficit. 
A mathematical programming model using the Expected Utility Theory applied through mean-
variance principle, combined with a set of representative farms, is used to estimate farm incomes 
and water use under different conditions. In particular, the model results of the study reference 
year (2005) are compared to the results of a new baseline which takes into account all policy 
reforms that have taken place in the period 2005-2009. Then this new baseline (reform baseline) is 
used to simulate new possible alternative policies from which considered in this thesis are the 
impact of modernising the irrigation system, stabilising and supporting cumin price, decoupling 
agricultural short-term credit from strategic crops, and decoupling the subsidy given currently to 
cotton irrigated from private wells. 
5.2. Summary of major results 
The comparison between the baseline results of 2005 and the reform baseline results shows that 
the recent reform is expected to have light impacts on water use and farming income. Changes in 
water use is less than 5% in the entire region although it is negative in HAG while it is positive in 
RAG and DEG. However, changes in income level and stability are more noticeable in the three 
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governorates and characterised by positive changes. The highest increase in average income is in 
DEG (15% almost) followed by RAG (11% almost) while the increase is lowest in HAG (3% almost). 
The impact on the stability of income has also the same order, but it is of interest to mention that 
the impact of the recent policy reforms due to stabilising maize price is higher on income stability 
than on average income in the three governorates, in which it reaches about 19%, 13% and 4% in 
DEG, RAG, and HAG respectively. 
Moreover, the results of other alternative policy scenarios reveal several interesting policy 
implications that are not obvious at the first sight. They illustrate that the adoption of modern 
irrigation techniques by all farms of the region does not solve the water scarcity problem in AKB 
where there will still be a deficit of more than eight hundred CMs due to two facts: first, the present 
efficiency of modern irrigation techniques at the farm level is very low compared to that in research 
stations. Second, water saved by the adoption of modern irrigation may be used to expand irrigated 
land. The latter observation is plainly observed in HAG where currently intercalary cropping is 
constrained by the scarcity of irrigation water. As irrigation efficiency increases, per unit irrigation 
costs also decline and then a major part of the water saved gets used to expand irrigated cultivation 
of intercalary crops. 
In addition, the model results allow us to evaluate and to assess the effectiveness of various public 
policy instruments, and to reveal which of them affect the decision-making of farmers the most. 
They show that decoupling the official credit provided by the ACB from strategic crops would have 
negligible effects on cropping patterns and water use consequently. Furthermore, decoupling the 
subsidy that is presently linked to cotton irrigated from private wells has also small effects on water 
use although some changes in the cropping patterns are observed in which cotton area goes down 
while the areas of wheat and maize go up. Here again, the water saved from decreased cotton area 
is used to expand those of wheat and maize. On the other hand, stabilising cumin price produces 
noticeable changes whether in cropping patterns or/and in water consumption. The latter is 
reduced by some 10% in HAG mainly as a result of expanding cumin cultivation at the expense of 
wheat, but also at the expense other winter crops in RAG and DEG where water use is reduced 
slightly. Consequently, the model results affirm that price policy is potentially the instrument that 
affects farmers’ decision the most. If effective in stabilizing price for water saving crops, this may 
be an important tool to combine farm welfare improvement with increased sustainability in water 
use. 
5.3. Merits and limitations of the study 
The first limitation of the study is that the analytical model used in this study needs a large amount 
of data, which limits its applicability by individual researchers unless they have access to census 
data or at least they have resources to conduct a large ad hoc survey. Conducting such studies 
without having sufficient data detailed at the farm level forces researchers to rely on ad hoc 
assumptions about values of technical parameters that may be unrealistic, and in order to calibrate 
the model results on the observed behaviour they may have to impose further assumptions without 
a scientific basis. 
In addition, our model, in its current design, does not allow us to assess the costs of the proposed 
alternative policies, which limits our ability to make precise recommendations as the cost of any 
policy is a very important element and a new policy is only justified if its costs are overweighed by 
its benefits. 
One other important limitation is that the model representativeness of the farming sector in 
DERAHA is not perfect. For the purpose of simplification, many assumptions are maintained and 
some of them may not be realistic. The way the matrixes of technical coefficients are modelled 
imply that farmers know in advance the yields to be harvested and the level of inputs to be applied 
regardless of the impact of subsequent events that may motivate farmers to change their 
production plans during the agricultural season. The way prices of agricultural products are 
modelled imply that farmers are aware of the assumed states of nature and of the values that prices 
take in each of them with the associated probability, which is a very strong assumption to 
acknowledge. In addition, the objective function assumes that farmers seek to avoid income 
fluctuations regardless of whether they are negative or positive, which may not be necessarily true. 
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These comments mean that the interpretation of the results is performed with care especially if 
policy recommendations are on stake. 
However, this does not mean that the model is far from being representative of the farming sector. 
It is acceptable to assume that farmers try to maximise profits but they are conditioned by risky 
and uncertain environment. Therefore, given the amount and the types of data available, we believe 
that our model is the best way to capture the basic elements of the agricultural irrigated sector in 
DERAHA taking into consideration the component of risk and uncertainty. As we mentioned right 
above, the model helps revealing policy implications that are not evident, as it allows to solve 
problems with conflicting objectives such as to know how we can reduce water consumption 
without penalising farmers’ incomes.  
One other merit of such models is that they assist the modellers to think comprehensively and 
deeply of the technical aspects of farm management, that is a very important issue in the field of 
applied economics research. Learning these technical details is the key for improving our 
understanding of farmers’ behaviour, which will allow us to improve our modelling skills and so 
produce more reliable results and recommendations. 
The model has also the merit of being quite flexible, and so it can be easily improved if more 
reliable data are available. The way it is constructed using the GAMS software allows changing data 
matrix without changing the model structure. In addition, the model is constructed with the 
assistance of the command loop which allows the structure of the model to be general, while a set 
of dummy variables links this general structure to every single farm. Therefore, the model can be 
solved for all farms together without the need to change the model structure every time. This allows 
solving for large number of farms in a very short time, and therefore, allows including other Syrian 
governorates in the model when their data become available without changing the general 
structure of the model. 
5.4. Suggestions for future research 
Some of the limitations highlighted above can be overcome by further improvements of the 
analytical model. The costs of the alternative proposed policy can be included in the model by 
adjusting the latter to take into account multiple objective functions. This means transforming the 
model to a sectoral structure as explained in Hazell and Norton (1986), in which a set of constraints 
of government budgetary resources is introduced. Another way of improving the model structure is 
through making it a general equilibrium model in which prices are determined endogenously. 
However, this requires extending the model to include all the Syrian agricultural sector which 
requires quite large amount of data, but also significant modification of the model structure.  
However, the model in its present structure can be used for conducting further research. Many 
possible policy scenarios can be performed, from which we only did four, which we currently 
consider the most important. However, other interesting scenarios might be interesting in the 
future depending on the conditions of relevant commodity markets at the international level. Here, 
scenarios of changing prices of some strategic crops such as wheat and cotton may be interesting if 
prices of these commodity change significantly at the world market. In addition, the model can be 
also used to conduct joint scenarios, modernising the irrigation system while stabilising cumin 
price is one example. Another interesting example maybe abolishing the subsidy linked to cotton 
irrigated from wells and introducing a new subsidy system in which the latter is linked to some 
policy objectives such as reducing summer cropping for the sake of saving water. Another kind of 
scenarios is the introduction of new crops that may assist in realising some policy preferences such 
as saving irrigation water; however, the technical parameters of these crops must be known with 
high precision if results are to be reliable. 
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Appendix: Model and Data 
I.1. GAMS Model 
 
$OFFUPPER OFFSYMLIST OFFUELLIST OFFSYMXREF OFFUELXREF   
OPTION NLP = MINOS ; 
 
sets 
    i  iter    / 1*1 / 
   rr  mantikas / 1*10 / 
* mantika is the administrative unit that is lower than governorate 
* governorate is the highest administrative unit in Syria (equivalent to regione * in Italy) 
  agz  agro climatic zones / 1*5 / 
  fff  maximum number of representative farms in a mantika / 1*15 / 
    x  fixed factors and technology dummies of farming systems 
                                          /cash, land, sprink,drip,number,agz, 
                                          river, punet,pwell, cottonls,autsugls, 
                                          winsugls,barlreq, rac / 
$ontext 
DEFINITIONS OF FIXED FACTORS 
- cash is the availability of cash by SP 
- land is the land (farming system's size) by hectare 
- sprink is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a sprinkler 
  irrigation technique is present, 0 otherwise. 
- drip is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a drip 
  irrigation technique is present, 0 otherwise. 
- number is the number of farms represented by each farming system. 
- agz defines the location of the farming system in different agro-ecological 
  zones. 
- river is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the relevant farming 
  system's water source is a river, 0 otherwise. 
- net is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the relevant farming 
  system's water source is a public net, 0 otherwise. 
- well is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the relevant farming 
  system's water source is a private well, 0 otherwise. 
- cottonsls is a parameter related the cotton policy constraint, it represents 
  the maximum area that can be cultivated under cotton by each farming system. 
- autsugls is a parameter related the sugarbeet policy constraint, it represents 
  the maximum area that can be cultivated under automn sugarbeet by each farming 
  system. 
- winsugls is a parameter related the sugarbeet policy constraint, it represents 
  the maximum area that can be cultivated under winter sugarbeet by each farming 
  system. 
- barlreq is parameter related barley. It is based on a survey observation 
  stating that farmers grow barley only to feed their sheep (not because it is 
  profitable), so it represents the minimum area that must be cultivated under 
  sheep to feed the livestock. 
- rac is the risk aversion coefficient, and it was estimated by calibrating the 
  model on different values for it, then we chose the one that gave the closest 
  cropping mix to the observed one for each farm type. 
$offtext 
 
  irr irrigation techniques potentially available to each farming system 
$ontext 
There are four irrigation techniques: rainfed, flood (by gravity), sprinkler, 
and drip moderm schemes. They were used as a criterion of technological 
differences among farm types in the classification. 
$offtext 
 / rain 
   flood 
   sprink 
   drip / 
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  wtr irrigation water sources 
$ontext 
There are three irrigatation water sources: rivers, public nets, and private 
wells. They were used as a crietrion for technological differences among farm 
types in the classification. 
$offtext 
 / riv 
   net 
   wel / 
 
  t month 
*Months of the year, many parameters are given by month 
 / jan 
   feb 
   mar 
   apr 
   may 
   jun 
   jul 
   aug 
   sep 
   oct 
   nov 
   dec / 
 
* BEGIN CROP DATA 
  c  the set of crops that are actually or eventually cultivated 
$ontext 
DEFINITIONS OF CROPS 
wheat is winter wheat (winter crop) 
barley is winter barley (winter crop) 
intmaiz is intercalary maize (a summer crop) 
lentil is winter lentil (winter crop) 
chick is winter chickpea (winter crop) 
bdbean is winter dry broad bean (a winter crop) 
sybean is intercalary soybean (a summer crop) 
autsugar is automn sugarbeet (a winter crop) 
winsugar is winter sugarbeet (a winter crop) 
sesame is intercalary sesame (a summer crop) 
peanut is summer peanut (a summer crop) 
cumin is winter cumin (winter crop) 
cotton is summer cotton (a summer crop) 
autmelon is automn watermelon (a summer crop) 
summelon is summer watermelon (a summer crop) 
sprptt is spring potato (a winter crop) 
sumtmt is summer tomato (a summer crop) 
sumegg is summer eggplant (a summer crop) 
 
$offtext 
 
 / wheat 
   barley 
   intmaiz 
   lentil 
   chick 
   bdbean 
   sybean 
   autsugar 
   winsugar 
   sesame 
   peanut 
   cumin 
   cotton 
   autmelon 
   summelon 
   sprptt 
   sumtmt 
   sumegg   / 
 
    cer(c) cereals 
 / wheat 
   barley / 
 
$ontext 
The following subset: exhcrop(c) represents the crops that cannot be grown in 
the same landplot after harvesting cereal crops because they overlap with cereal 
crops for their land requirements (see table landreq(c,t)). Most of them can be 
considered soil exhausting, and so must be rotated with wheat or barley, and so 
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their total area must not exceed 50% total farm area (see equation rotation(t)) 
$offtext 
  exhcrop(c) exhaustive crops that must be rotated every other year with cereals 
  /lentil 
   chick 
   bdbean 
   autsugar 
   winsugar 
   cumin 
   peanut 
   cotton 
   sprptt / 
 
  stracrop(c) the strategic crops that are covered by the credit system 
  /wheat 
   barley 
   autsugar 
   winsugar 
   cotton / 
 
  othercrop(c) the crops that are not covered by the credit system 
 / intmaiz 
   lentil 
   chick 
   bdbean 
   sybean 
   sesame 
   peanut 
   cumin 
   autmelon 
   summelon 
   sprptt 
   sumtmt 
   sumegg   / 
 
  sn the set of states of nature 
  /1*10 / 
$ontext 
we used for convinience the assumption that farmers face ten states of nature 
based on Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Numerical Methods in Economics: Kenneth & 
Judd, 1998 Massachusetts Institute for Technology, the USA, Library of 
Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. 
$offtext 
 
   p products: each product is composed of one crop or more 
 / wheat 
   barley 
   maize 
   lentil 
   chickpea 
   broadbean 
   soybean 
   sugarbeet 
   sesame 
   peanut 
   cumin 
   cotton 
   wmelonsum 
   wmelonaut 
   potato 
   tomato 
   eggplant / 
 
   in input 
 / Nfert 
   Pfert 
   Kfert 
   seed 
   other  / 
; 
 
$INCLUDE C:\doctoral\Thesis\GAMS files\2-region-base.gms 
 
 
* This set is just to allow repeating the set of products 
alias (p,pp) ; 
$ontext 
these parameters and the following equations aim to allow: 
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1- the calculation of the mean prices of all products 
2- the calculation of variance-covariance matrix of the prices of all products 
3- the above two will allow us to calculate the total revenue variance of a 
   farm type, which will be used in calculating the certainty equivalent which 
   is the objective function to be maximised in our model. 
$offtext 
 
parameter 
mean(p)      average prices of products 
covar(p,pp)  variance-covariance matrix of prices of various products   ; 
 
mean(p) = sum(sn, price(p,sn)*prob(sn)) ; 
covar(p,pp) = sum(sn,(price(p,sn)-mean(p))*(price(pp,sn)-mean(pp))*prob(sn)); 
 
display mean, covar ; 
 
* Here we define parameters which will be connected to their equivalents at the 
* farm type level through the loop (see below) 
parameter 
  waterav(t)          irrigation water availability by month 
  famlab(t)           family labour availability by month 
  yyield(c,irr,p)     yields of different crops 
  watereq(c,irr,t)    water requirements per month for different crops 
  laboureq(c,irr,t)   labour requirements per month for different crops 
  iinputs(in,c,irr)   physical inputs requirements for different crops 
  diesel(c,irr,wtr)   diesel requirements for different crops 
  rentals(c,irr,t)    rental machinery costs per month for different crops 
 
* Here we define scalars which will be connected to their equivalents at the 
* farm type level through the loop (see below) 
scalar 
  cash       availability of cash 
  land       farm size per hectare 
  sprink     zero if no sprink irrigation available on the relevant farm 
  drip       zero if no drip irrigation available on the relevant farm 
  river      if irrigation water source is a river 
  punet      if irrigation water sources is public net 
  pwell      if irrigation source is a private well 
  cottonls   cotton licensing requirement 
  autsugls   automn sugarbeet licensing requirement 
  winsugls   winter sugarbeet licensing requirement 
  barlreq    barley area required for sheep 
  rac        the risk aversion coefficient 
 ; 
 
* here we define the model variables, the basic two variables are xcrop and hlab 
* therefore, all other variables are dependent on them 
Variables 
           xcrop(c,irr,wtr) cropping activity                      (hectares) 
           quantity(p)      quantity produced by product           (kg) 
           revenue          Total average revenue                  (SP) 
           labcost          labour cost                            (SP) 
           hlab(t)          hired labour                           (hours) 
           water            water consumption                      (cubic meter) 
           labour           total labour employed                  (hour) 
           hlabour          hired labour employed                  (hour) 
           flabour          family labour used                     (hour) 
           inputcost1       inputs variable costs for strategic    (SP) 
           inputcost2       inputs variable costs for others       (SP) 
           rentalcost1      rental machinery cost for strategic    (SP) 
           rentalcost2      rental machinery cost for others       (SP) 
           irrcost          the costs of pumping irrigation water  (SP) 
           totcost          total variable costs                   (SP) 
           totvariance      Total income variance                  (SP) 
           grossmargin      gross margin                           (SP) 
           certequiv        Certainty equivalent                   (SP) 
; 
* Here we define the variables that must be negative, they are the two basic 
* variables 
positive variables 
           xcrop(c,irr,wtr) 
           hlab(t) ; 
 
* Here we define the equations, see below the meaning of everyone 
equations   landbal(t)     land balance                      (hectares) 
            rotation(t)    rotational requirement 
            laborbal(t)    labour balance                    (hours) 
            cashbal        cash balance                      (SP) 
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            watercon(t)    water constraint                  (cubic meter) 
            irrigation1(t) modern irrigation constraint 
            irrigation2(t) modern irrigation constraint 
            source1(t)     irrigation source constraint 
            source2(t)     irrigation source constraint 
            source3(t)     irrigation source constraint 
            cotlic         cotton licensing constraint       (hectares) 
            suglic1        autsugarbeet licensing            (hectares) 
            suglic2        winsugarbeet licensing            (hectares) 
            barcon         barley area needed for sheep      (hectares) 
            output(p)      quantity accounting by product    (kg) 
            arev           average revenue accounting        (SP) 
            inpcosts1      input cost accounting strategic   (SP) 
            inpcosts2      input cost accounting others      (SP) 
            diescost       diesel costs                      (SP) 
            rentcost1      rental cost accounting strategic  (SP) 
            rentcost2      rental cost accounting others     (SP) 
            alab           labour cost accounting            (SP) 
            wateruse       water use                         (cubic meter) 
            laboruse       labour use                        (hour) 
            hiredlab       hired labour employed             (hour) 
            familylab      family labour used                (hour) 
            cost           total costs accounting            (SP) 
            totvar         total income variance accounting  (SP) 
            GM             gross margin accounting           (SP) 
            CE             certainty equivalent accounting   (SP) 
 
; 
 
* the equations are classified in three main groups 
* the first includes the constraints equations 
* the second includes the objective functions equations 
* the third includes results equations 
 
* the constraints equations 
 
* land constraint: total cultivated area by month must not exceed the farm size 
landbal(t)..  sum(wtr,sum(irr,sum(c, xcrop(c,irr,wtr)*landreq(c,t)))) =l= land ; 
 
* the sum of exhaustive crops must not exceed 50% of the total land area of a 
* farm type, that is to say the sum of cereal crops' areas must be 50% at least 
rotation(t)..  sum(wtr,sum(irr,sum(exhcrop,xcrop(exhcrop,irr,wtr)* 
                                     landreq(exhcrop,t)))) =l= 0.5*land ; 
 
* the sum of total labour used in by month must not exceed the available family 
* labour plus hired labour in the same month 
laborbal(t)..  sum(wtr,sum(c, sum(irr, xcrop(c,irr,wtr)*laboureq(c,irr,t))))=l= 
                                                          famlab(t) + hlab(t)  ; 
 
* the sum of irrigation water used by month must not exceed the available water 
* in the same month 
watercon(t)..  sum(wtr,sum(c,sum(irr, xcrop(c,irr,wtr)*watereq(c,irr,t)))) 
                                                                =l= waterav(t) ; 
 
* the sum of costs times the corresponding coefficient of cash anticipation must 
* not exceed the availbility of cash at the beginning of the agricultural year 
* for each farm type 
cashbal..    sum(c, sum(in,sum(irr,sum(wtr, alpha(c)*xcrop(c,irr,wtr)* 
                    (iinputs(in,c,irr)*priceinp(in,c)))))) + 
             sum(t,sum(c,sum(irr,sum(wtr,alpha(c)*xcrop(c,irr,wtr)* 
                    rentals(c,irr,t)))))+ sum(c,sum(irr,sum(wtr, beta(c)* 
                    xcrop(c,irr,wtr)*diesel(c,irr,wtr)*dies))) 
                                         + sum(t,hlab(t)*hwage) =l= cash; 
$ontext 
For simplicity, we assume here that the costs of hired labour cannot be covered 
by the credit system. This is justified by the fact that short-term credit is 
always provided on a crop basis, while hired labour is determined in our model 
on a month basis regardless of the crop for which it will be used. 
$offtext 
 
* the following five equations aim at allowing GAMS to read the dummy variables 
 
* this is for the dummy of sprinkler irrigation 
irrigation1(t)..  sum(c, sum(wtr,xcrop(c,"sprink",wtr)*landreq(c,t))) =l= 
                                                                   sprink*land ; 
 
* this is for the dummy of drip irrigation 
irrigation2(t)..  sum(c,sum(wtr, xcrop(c,"drip",wtr)*landreq(c,t))) =l= 
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                                                                     drip*land ; 
 
* this is for the dummy of river water source 
source1(t)..      sum(c,sum(irr,xcrop(c,irr,"riv")*landreq(c,t))) =l= 
                                                                    river*land ; 
 
* this is for the dummy of public net water source 
source2(t)..      sum(c,sum(irr,xcrop(c,irr,"net")*landreq(c,t))) =l= 
                                                                    punet*land ; 
 
* this is for the dummy of private well water source 
source3(t)..      sum(c,sum(irr,xcrop(c,irr,"wel")*landreq(c,t))) =l= 
                                                                    pwell*land ; 
 
* the following three equations are policy constraints representing licensing 
* systems for various crops 
 
* this is for cotton 
cotlic..      sum(wtr,sum(irr, xcrop("cotton",irr,wtr))) =l= cottonls ; 
 
* this is for automn sugarbeet 
suglic1..     sum(wtr,sum(irr, xcrop("autsugar",irr,wtr))) =l= autsugls ; 
 
* this is for winter sugarbeet 
suglic2..     sum(wtr,sum(irr, xcrop("winsugar",irr,wtr))) =l= winsugls ; 
 
* this constraint represents the problem of irrigated barley that is grown for 
* feeding the sheep 
barcon..      sum(wtr,sum(irr, xcrop("barley",irr,wtr))) =g= barlreq ; 
 
* accounting equations to form the elements of the objective function 
 
* this equation is to calculate the quantity produced by product 
output(p)..    quantity(p) =e= sum(c,sum(irr,sum(wtr,xcrop(c,irr,wtr)* 
                                                            yyield(c,irr,p)))); 
 
* this is to calculate the total revenue taken into account price variation 
* and probability parameter 
arev..         revenue =e= sum(p,quantity(p)*mean(p)) ; 
 
* this is to calucalate physical input costs (fertilizers, seeds and others) 
* for crops covered by the credit system 
inpcosts1..    inputcost1 =e= sum(stracrop, sum(in, sum(irr,sum(wtr, 
                              xcrop(stracrop,irr,wtr)* iinputs(in,stracrop,irr)) 
                              *priceinp(in,stracrop)*(1 + intrate)))); 
 
* this is to calucalate physical input costs (fertilizers, seeds and others) 
* for crops NOT covered by the credit system 
inpcosts2..    inputcost2 =e= sum(othercrop,sum(in,sum(irr,sum(wtr, 
                                    xcrop(othercrop,irr,wtr)* iinputs(in, 
                                    othercrop,irr))*priceinp(in,othercrop)))); 
 
* this is to calculate pumping costs (diesel) 
diescost..     irrcost =e= sum(wtr,sum(c,sum(irr, xcrop(c,irr,wtr)* 
                                                     diesel(c,irr,wtr)*dies))) ; 
 
* this is to calculate the costs of renting machinery for crops covered by the 
* credit system 
rentcost1..     rentalcost1 =e= sum(t, sum(irr, sum(wtr,sum(stracrop, 
                                xcrop(stracrop,irr,wtr)*rentals(stracrop,irr,t) 
                                *(1 + intrate))))); 
* this is to calculate the costs of renting machinery for crops NOT covered by 
* the credit system 
rentcost2..    rentalcost2 =e= sum(t,sum(irr,sum(wtr,sum(othercrop, 
                                                     xcrop(othercrop,irr,wtr)* 
                                                   rentals(othercrop,irr,t))))); 
 
* this is to calculate the cost of hired labour 
alab..         labcost =e= sum(t, hlab(t)*hwage); 
 
* this is to calculate total costs 
cost..         totcost =e= inputcost1 + inputcost2 + irrcost + rentalcost1 + 
                            rentalcost2 + labcost + waterfee*land*punet ; 
 
* this is to calculate the variance of the total farm revenue 
totvar..       totvariance =e= (sum(pp,sum(p,quantity(pp)* 
                                                    covar(p,pp)*quantity(p)))) ; 
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* this is to calculate the total gross margin 
GM..           grossmargin =e= revenue - totcost  ; 
 
 
* this is the objective function: it is the certainty equivalent 
CE..           certequiv =e= grossmargin - 0.5*rac*totvariance ; 
 
* these equations are to calculate some outputs of the model 
 
* this equation is to calculate irrigation water use 
wateruse..     water =e= sum(t,sum(c,sum(irr,sum(wtr, xcrop(c,irr,wtr)* 
                                                           watereq(c,irr,t))))); 
 
* this equation is to calculate total labour use 
laboruse..     labour =e= sum(t,sum(c,sum(irr,sum(wtr,xcrop(c,irr,wtr)* 
                                                          laboureq(c,irr,t))))); 
 
* this equation is to calculate hired labour employed 
hiredlab..     hlabour =e= sum(t, hlab(t)) ; 
 
* this equation is to calculate family labour used 
familylab..    flabour =e= labour - hlabour ; 
 
 
$INCLUDE C:\doctoral\Thesis\GAMS files\3-mantikas-base.gms 
$INCLUDE C:\doctoral\Thesis\GAMS files\4-farms-base.gms 
 
 Model farmrev farm model /all/    ; 
 
* THESE PARAMETERS ARE FOR REPORTING ONLY 
parameter 
          supply(p,rr,i)            outputs by product and mantika (ton) 
          area(c,irr,wtr,rr,i)      areas of crops at mantika level (ha) 
 
          waterconsumption(rr,i)    water use by mantika (million CM) 
          agriemployment(rr,i)      total labour use by mantika (thousand h) 
          hiredemployment(rr,i)     hired labour use by mantika (thousand h) 
          netrevenue(rr,i)          GM at mantika level (million SP) 
          grossutility(rr,i)        CE at the mantika level (million SP) 
          areaM(rr,i)               cropping area at mantika level (thousand ha) 
 
* these two parameters are useful for validation and calibration 
          report(i,rr,fff,wtr,c,irr) cropping patterns at the farm level 
          imbalance(i,rr,fff,wtr,c,irr) 
* CE means certainty equivalent 
* GM means gross margin 
* FL means family labour 
* TL means total labour 
* TW means total water use 
* SP means syrian pound 
* ha means hectare 
* h means working hour 
* CM means cubic meter 
 
          exputility(rr,fff,i)    CE at farm level (SP) 
          grossmargins(rr,fff,i)  GM at farm level (SP) 
 
          exputHa(rr,fff,i)       CE by hectare at farm level (SP per ha) 
          grossmHa(rr,fff,i)      GM by hectare at farm level (SP per ha) 
 
          famlabour(rr,fff,i)     FL used at farm level (h) 
          exputLabF(rr,fff,i)     CE by unit of FL at farm level (SP per h) 
          grossmLabF(rr,fff,i)    GM by unit of FL at farm level (SP per h) 
 
          totlabour(rr,fff,i)     TL employed at farm level (h) 
          exputLabT(rr,fff,i)     CE by unit of TL at farm level (SP per h) 
          grossmLabT(rr,fff,i)    GM by unit of TL at farm level (SP per h) 
 
          totwater(rr,fff,i)      TW used at farm level (CM) 
          exputWat(rr,fff,i)      CE by unit of TW at farm level (SP per CM) 
          grossmWat(rr,fff,i)     GM by unit of TW at farm level (SP per CM) 
 
          exputHaM(rr,i)          CE by hectare at mantika level (SP per ha) 
          grossmHaM(rr,i)         GM by hectare at mantika level (SP per ha) 
 
          exputLabFM(rr,i)        CE by unit of FL at mantika level (SP per h) 
          grossmLabFM(rr,i)       GM by unit of FL at mantika level (SP per h) 
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          exputLabTM(rr,i)        CE by unit of TL at mantika level (SP per h) 
          grossmLabTM(rr,i)       GM by unit of TL at mantika level (SP per h) 
 
          exputWatM(rr,i)         CE by unit of TW at mantika level (SP per CM) 
          grossmWatM(rr,i)        GM by unit of TW at manitka level (SP per CM) 
 
          report1(p,i,*)          outputs by product by governorate (ton) 
          report2(c,i,*)          areas of crops by governorate (ha) 
          report12(i,*)           total cropping area ny governorate (ha) 
          report3(i,*)            water use by basin (million CM) 
          report4(i,*)            labour use by governorate (thousand h) 
          report5(i,*)            hired labour use by governorate (thousand h) 
          report6(i,*)            GM by governorate (million SP) 
          report7(i,*)            CE by governorate (million SP) 
 
          report8(i,*)            GM per hectare by gov (SP per ha) 
          report9(i,*)            GM per unit of family labour by gov (SP per h) 
          report10(i,*)           GM per unit of total labour by gov (SP per h) 
          report11(i,*)           GM per unit of water used by gov (SP per CM) 
 
   ; 
 
 
supply(p,rr,i) = 0  ; 
waterconsumption(rr,i) = 0; 
agriemployment(rr,i) = 0 ; 
hiredemployment(rr,i) = 0 ; 
netrevenue(rr,i)= 0 ; 
grossutility(rr,i) = 0 ; 
areaM(rr,i) = 0 ; 
area(c,irr,wtr,rr,i) = 0 ; 
 
set 
    rrr(rr)    mantikas solved in the loop               /1*10 / 
    ffff(fff)  farms solved in the loop                  /1*15 / 
 
set 
    has(rrr)   Mantikas of Al-Hassakeh                   /1*4/ 
    rak(rrr)   Mantikas of Al-Rakka                      /5*7 / 
    der(rrr)   Mantikas of Deir-Ezzour                   /8*10/ 
 
 ; 
 
Loop(i, 
supply(p,rrr,i) = 0 ; 
waterconsumption(rrr,i) = 0 ; 
agriemployment(rrr,i) = 0 ; 
hiredemployment(rrr,i) = 0 ; 
netrevenue(rrr,i) = 0 ; 
areaM (rrr,i) = 0 ; 
area(c,irr,wtr,rrr,i) = 0 ; 
 Loop(rrr, 
  Loop(ffff, 
* Here is the initialization of model scalars according to each farm type 
   cash = farm(rrr,ffff,"cash"); 
   land = farm(rrr,ffff,"land"); 
   sprink = farm(rrr,ffff,"sprink"); 
   drip = farm(rrr,ffff,"drip"); 
   river = farm(rrr,ffff,"river"); 
   punet = farm(rrr,ffff,"punet"); 
   pwell = farm(rrr,ffff,"pwell") ; 
   cottonls = farm(rrr,ffff,"cottonls") ; 
   autsugls = farm(rrr,ffff,"autsugls") ; 
   winsugls = farm(rrr,ffff,"winsugls") ; 
   barlreq = farm(rrr,ffff,"barlreq") ; 
   rac = farm(rrr,ffff,"rac") ; 
* Here is the initialization of model parameters according to each farm type 
   waterav(t) = wateravail(rrr,ffff,t); 
   famlab(t) = famlabav(rrr,ffff,t); 
* Here is the inilialization of model parameters according to mantika and 
* agro-ecological zone 
   yyield(c,irr,p)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=1) = yield(rrr,c,p,irr,"1"); 
   yyield(c,irr,p)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=2) = yield(rrr,c,p,irr,"2"); 
   yyield(c,irr,p)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=3) = yield(rrr,c,p,irr,"3"); 
   yyield(c,irr,p)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=4) = yield(rrr,c,p,irr,"4"); 
   yyield(c,irr,p)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=5) = yield(rrr,c,p,irr,"5"); 
 
   watereq(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=1) = waterreq(rrr,"1",c,irr,t); 
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   watereq(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=2) = waterreq(rrr,"2",c,irr,t); 
   watereq(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=3) = waterreq(rrr,"3",c,irr,t); 
   watereq(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=4) = waterreq(rrr,"4",c,irr,t); 
   watereq(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=5) = waterreq(rrr,"5",c,irr,t); 
 
   laboureq(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=1) = labourreq(rrr,"1",c,irr,t); 
   laboureq(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=2) = labourreq(rrr,"2",c,irr,t); 
   laboureq(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=3) = labourreq(rrr,"3",c,irr,t); 
   laboureq(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=4) = labourreq(rrr,"4",c,irr,t); 
   laboureq(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=5) = labourreq(rrr,"5",c,irr,t); 
 
   iinputs(in,c,irr)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=1) = input(rrr,"1",in,c,irr); 
   iinputs(in,c,irr)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=2) = input(rrr,"2",in,c,irr); 
   iinputs(in,c,irr)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=3) = input(rrr,"3",in,c,irr); 
   iinputs(in,c,irr)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=4) = input(rrr,"4",in,c,irr); 
   iinputs(in,c,irr)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=5) = input(rrr,"5",in,c,irr); 
 
   rentals(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=1) = rentalmachcost(rrr,"1",c,irr,t); 
   rentals(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=2) = rentalmachcost(rrr,"2",c,irr,t); 
   rentals(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=3) = rentalmachcost(rrr,"3",c,irr,t); 
   rentals(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=4) = rentalmachcost(rrr,"4",c,irr,t); 
   rentals(c,irr,t)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=5) = rentalmachcost(rrr,"5",c,irr,t); 
 
   diesel(c,irr,wtr)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=1)= dieselreq(rrr,c,irr,wtr,"1"); 
   diesel(c,irr,wtr)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=2)= dieselreq(rrr,c,irr,wtr,"2"); 
   diesel(c,irr,wtr)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=3)= dieselreq(rrr,c,irr,wtr,"3"); 
   diesel(c,irr,wtr)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=4)= dieselreq(rrr,c,irr,wtr,"4"); 
   diesel(c,irr,wtr)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"agz")=5)= dieselreq(rrr,c,irr,wtr,"5"); 
 
 
   solve farmrev  using nlp maximizing certequiv ; 
 
*calculate the areas of different crops by farm (unit: ha) 
   report(i,rrr,ffff,wtr,c,irr) = xcrop.l(c,irr,wtr) ; 
 
*caculate certainty equivalents by farm (unit: SP) 
   exputility(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = certequiv.l ; 
 
*calculate gross margins by farm (unit: SP) 
   grossmargins(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = grossmargin.l ; 
 
*calculate certainty equivalent by hectere (unit: SP/ha) 
   exputHa(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = 
                                           certequiv.l/farm(rrr,ffff,"land")  ; 
 
*calculate gross margin by hectere (unit: SP/ha) 
   grossmHa(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = 
                                          grossmargin.l/farm(rrr,ffff,"land") ; 
 
*calculate family labour used by farm (unit: hour) 
  famlabour(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = flabour.l ; 
 
*calculate certainty equivalent by unit of family labour (unit: SP/hour) 
  exputLabF(rrr,ffff,i)$ (farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = certequiv.l/flabour.l ; 
 
*calculate gross margins by unit of family labour (unit: SP/hour) 
  grossmLabF(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = grossmargin.l/flabour.l ; 
 
*calculate total labour used by farm (unit: hour) 
  totlabour(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = labour.l ; 
 
*calculate certainty equivalent by unit of labour (unit: SP/hour) 
  exputLabT(rrr,ffff,i)$ (farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = certequiv.l/labour.l ; 
 
*calculate gross margins by unit of family labour (unit: SP/hour) 
  grossmLabT(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = grossmargin.l/labour.l ; 
 
*calculate water used by farm (unit: cubic meter) 
  totwater(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land")gt 0) = water.l ; 
 
*calculate certainty equivalent by unit of water used (unit: SP/cubic meter) 
  exputWat(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land") gt 0) = certequiv.l/water.l ; 
 
*calculate gross margin by unit of water used (unit: SP/cubic meter) 
  grossmWat(rrr,ffff,i)$(farm(rrr,ffff,"land") gt 0) = grossmargin.l/water.l ; 
 
*calculate the regions' aggregate supply (unit:ton) 
   supply(p,rrr,i) = supply(p,rrr,i) + farm(rrr,ffff,"number")* 
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             sum(c, sum(irr,sum(wtr, xcrop.l(c,irr,wtr)*yyield(c,irr,p))))/1000; 
 
*Calculate the cropping areas by crop and mantika (unit: ha) 
   area(c,irr,wtr,rrr,i) = area(c,irr,wtr,rrr,i) + 
                                farm(rrr,ffff,"number")*xcrop.l(c,irr,wtr); 
 
*calculate total cropping area at mantika level (unit: ha) 
   areaM(rrr,i) = areaM(rrr,i) + farm(rrr,ffff,"number")* 
                             sum(c,sum(irr,sum(wtr, xcrop.l(c,irr,wtr)))) ; 
 
*calculate the mantikas' aggregate water use (unit: cubic meters) 
   waterconsumption(rrr,i) = waterconsumption(rrr,i) + 
                                        farm(rrr,ffff,"number")*water.l; 
 
*calculate the aggregate agricultural employment (unit: hour) 
   agriemployment(rrr,i) = agriemployment(rrr,i) + 
                                         farm(rrr,ffff,"number")*labour.l ; 
 
*calculate the aggregate hired casual agricultural labour (unit: hour) 
   hiredemployment(rrr,i) = hiredemployment(rrr,i) + 
                                       farm(rrr,ffff,"number")*hlabour.l ; 
 
*calculate the gross margins at mantika level (unit: SP) 
   netrevenue(rrr,i) = netrevenue(rrr,i) + 
                                 farm(rrr,ffff,"number")*grossmargin.l ; 
 
*calculate the certainty equivalents at mantika level (unit: SP) 
   grossutility(rrr,i) = grossutility(rrr,i) + farm(rrr,ffff,"number") 
                                                         *certequiv.l ; 
 
*calculate the CE by hectare at mantika level (SP/ha) 
   exputHaM(rrr,i) = grossutility(rrr,i)/(areaM(rrr,i)); 
 
*calculate the GM by hectare at mantika level (SP/ha) 
   grossmHaM(rrr,i) = netrevenue(rrr,i)/(areaM(rrr,i)); 
 
*calculate CE by unit of FL at mantika level (SP/hour) 
   exputLabFM(rrr,i) = grossutility(rrr,i)/((agriemployment(rrr,i) - 
                                    hiredemployment(rrr,i))) ; 
 
*calculate GM by unit of FL at mantika level (SP/hour) 
   grossmLabFM(rrr,i) = netrevenue(rrr,i)/((agriemployment(rrr,i) - 
                                    hiredemployment(rrr,i))) ; 
 
*calculate CE by unit of TL at mantika level (SP/hour) 
   exputLabTM(rrr,i) = grossutility(rrr,i)/(agriemployment(rrr,i)) ; 
 
*calculate GM by unit of TL at mantika level (SP/hour) 
   grossmLabTM(rrr,i) = netrevenue(rrr,i)/(agriemployment(rrr,i)) ; 
 
*calculate CE by unit of TW at mantika level (SP/cubic meter) 
   exputWatM(rrr,i) = grossutility(rrr,i)/waterconsumption(rrr,i) ; 
 
*calculate GM by unit of TW at mantika level (SP/cubic meter) 
   grossmWaTM(rrr,i) = netrevenue(rrr,i)/waterconsumption(rrr,i) ; 
 
 ); 
); 
 
report1(p,i,"output") = sum(rrr,supply(p,rrr,i)); 
report1(p,i,"outputHas") = sum(has,supply(p,has,i)) ; 
report1(p,i,"outputRak") = sum(rak,supply(p,rak,i)) ; 
report1(p,i,"outputDer") = sum(der,supply(p,der,i)); 
 
report2(c,i,"croparea") = sum(irr,sum(wtr,sum(rrr,area(c,irr,wtr,rrr,i)))); 
report2(c,i,"cropareaHas") = sum(irr,sum(wtr,sum(has,area(c,irr,wtr,has,i)))); 
report2(c,i,"cropareaRak") = sum(irr,sum(wtr,sum(rak,area(c,irr,wtr,rak,i)))); 
report2(c,i,"cropareaDer") = sum(irr,sum(wtr,sum(der,area(c,irr,wtr,der,i)))); 
 
report12(i,"cropping")=sum(c,sum(irr,sum(wtr,sum(rrr,area(c,irr,wtr,rrr,i))))) ; 
report12(i,"cropping1")=sum(c,sum(irr,sum(wtr,sum(has,area(c,irr,wtr,has,i))))); 
report12(i,"cropping2")=sum(c,sum(irr,sum(wtr,sum(rak,area(c,irr,wtr,rak,i))))); 
report12(i,"cropping3")=sum(c,sum(irr,sum(wtr,sum(der,area(c,irr,wtr,der,i))))); 
 
report3(i,"wateruse") = sum(rrr,waterconsumption(rrr,i))/1000000 ; 
report3(i,"waterHas") = sum(has,waterconsumption(has,i))/1000000 ; 
report3(i,"waterRak") = sum(rak,waterconsumption(rak,i))/1000000 ; 
report3(i,"waterDer") = sum(der,waterconsumption(der,i))/1000000 ; 
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report4(i,"labouruse") = sum(rrr,agriemployment(rrr,i))/1000; 
report4(i,"labHas") = sum(has,agriemployment(has,i))/1000; 
report4(i,"labRak") = sum(rak,agriemployment(rak,i))/1000; 
report4(i,"labDer") = sum(der,agriemployment(der,i))/1000; 
 
report5(i,"hiredlab") = sum(rrr,hiredemployment(rrr,i))/1000; 
report5(i,"hiredlabHas") =  sum(has,hiredemployment(has,i))/1000; 
report5(i,"hiredlabRak") =  sum(rak,hiredemployment(rak,i))/1000; 
report5(i,"hiredlabDer") =  sum(der,hiredemployment(der,i))/1000; 
 
report6(i,"GM") = sum(rrr,netrevenue(rrr,i))/1000000 ; 
report6(i,"GMHas") = sum(has,netrevenue(has,i))/1000000 ; 
report6(i,"GMRak") = sum(rak,netrevenue(rak,i))/1000000 ; 
report6(i,"GMDer") = sum(der,netrevenue(der,i))/1000000 ; 
 
report7(i,"utility") = sum(rrr,grossutility(rrr,i))/1000000 ; 
report7(i,"utilityHas") = sum(has,grossutility(has,i))/1000000 ; 
report7(i,"utilityRak") = sum(rak,grossutility(rak,i))/1000000 ; 
report7(i,"utilityDer") = sum(der,grossutility(der,i))/1000000 ; 
 
report8(i,"GMperHA") = sum(rrr,netrevenue(rrr,i))/sum(rrr,sum(ffff,farm 
                                   (rrr,ffff,"number")*farm(rrr,ffff,"land"))); 
report8(i,"GMperHA1") = sum(has,netrevenue(has,i))/sum(has,sum(ffff,farm 
                                   (has,ffff,"number")*farm(has,ffff,"land"))); 
report8(i,"GMperHA2") = sum(rak,netrevenue(rak,i))/sum(rak,sum(ffff,farm 
                                   (rak,ffff,"number")*farm(rak,ffff,"land"))); 
report8(i,"GMperHA3") = sum(der,netrevenue(der,i))/sum(der,sum(ffff,farm 
                                   (der,ffff,"number")*farm(der,ffff,"land"))) ; 
 
report9(i,"GMperFL")=sum(rrr,netrevenue(rrr,i))/(sum(rrr,agriemployment(rrr,i)) 
                                             - sum(rrr,hiredemployment(rrr,i))); 
report9(i,"GMperFL1")=sum(has,netrevenue(has,i))/(sum(has,agriemployment(has,i)) 
                                             - sum(has,hiredemployment(has,i))); 
report9(i,"GMperFL2")=sum(rak,netrevenue(rak,i))/(sum(rak,agriemployment(rak,i)) 
                                             - sum(rak,hiredemployment(rak,i))); 
report9(i,"GMperFL3")=sum(der,netrevenue(der,i))/(sum(der,agriemployment(der,i)) 
                                             - sum(der,hiredemployment(der,i))); 
 
report10(i,"GMperTL")=sum(rrr,netrevenue(rrr,i))/sum(rrr,agriemployment(rrr,i)); 
report10(i,"GMperTL1")=sum(has,netrevenue(has,i))/sum(has,agriemployment(has,i)); 
report10(i,"GMperTL2")=sum(rak,netrevenue(rak,i))/sum(rak,agriemployment(rak,i)); 
report10(i,"GMperTL3")=sum(der,netrevenue(der,i))/sum(der,agriemployment(der,i)); 
 
report11(i,"GMperTL")=sum(rrr,netrevenue(rrr,i))/sum(rrr,waterconsumption(rrr,i)); 
report11(i,"GMperTL1")=sum(has,netrevenue(has,i))/sum(has,waterconsumption(has,i)); 
report11(i,"GMperTL2")=sum(rak,netrevenue(rak,i))/sum(rak,waterconsumption(rak,i)); 
report11(i,"GMperTL3")=sum(der,netrevenue(der,i))/sum(der,waterconsumption(der,i)); 
 
); 
 
imbalance(i,rrr,ffff,wtr,c,irr) = observed(rrr,ffff,wtr,c,irr)- 
                                                  report(i,rrr,ffff,wtr,c,irr); 
 
* these two reports are useful for validation and calibration: 
* "report" shows the areas of crops according by farm and irrigation technique 
*option report:2:3:2;display report 
*"imbalance" shows the differences between the areas given by the solution and 
* the abserved ones. 
*option imbalance:2:3:2;display imbalance 
 
* the areas of crops at governorate level 
option report2:2;display report2 
 
* total cropping area at governorate level 
option report12:2;display report12 
 
* water use at basin level 
option report3:2;display report3 
 
* total agricultural labour use at governorate level 
option report4:2;display report4 
 
* hired agricultural labour at governorate level 
option report5:2;display report5 
 
* gross margin at governorate level 
option report6:2;display report6 
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* certainty equivalent at governorate level 
option report7:2;display report7 
 
* GM per ha at the governorate level 
option report8:2;display report8 
 
* GM per unit of famil labour at governorate level 
option report9:2;display report9 
 
* GM per unit of total labour at governorate level 
option report10:2;display report10 
 
* GM per unit of water use at governorate level 
option report11:2;display report11 
 
I.2. data of parameters applied to all farm typologies 
I.2.1. Coefficients of cash anticipation 
parameter alpha(c) coefficient of cash anticipation of inputs covered by the credit system 
$ontext 
This parameter has been made to represent credit policy that favours strategic crops. These 
parameters are going to be used in the cash constraints equations. 
The parameters will be used with costs that are covered by the credit system 
As clear, crops that receive credit from the credit system have a coefficient 
of zero, while these not covered have coefficient greater than zero. The 
coefficient represents the proportion period of the crop's stay in land with 
respect to the entire year. 
Credit system covers costs of fertilizers and seeds for cotton, sugarbeet, wheat 
and barley. 
In addition, there are some costs that have no cash problem due to other sources 
of credit. For example, the cost of machinery used in harvesting wheat and 
barley is covered by the fact that it is either paid in kind (as a proportion of 
the output) or it is paid later (after farmers get the revenue of their output) 
Another example is the harvest of cotton in which farmers manage to postpone the 
payments until they have received the payments. 
$offtext 
/ wheat        0.00 
  barley       0.00 
  intmaiz      0.38 
  lentil       0.54 
  chick        0.54 
  bdbean       0.54 
  sybean       0.33 
  autsugar     0.00 
  winsugar     0.00 
  sesame       0.29 
  peanut       0.46 
  cumin        0.54 
  cotton       0.00 
  autmelon     0.33 
  summelon     0.29 
  sprptt       0.50 
  sumtmt       0.29 
  sumegg       0.29        / 
        ; 
 
parameter beta(c)  coefficient of cash anticipation of inputs not covered by the credit system 
$ontext 
This coefficient instead will be used in cash constraints for costs of inputs 
that are not covered by the credit sources (whether the formal credit system or 
the informal credit sources) for all crops. In other words, they will be used 
with all costs that require cash money to be covered. That is why they all 
have values greater than zero. 
$offtext 
 
/ wheat         0.67 
  barley        0.63 
  intmaiz       0.38 
  lentil        0.54 
  chick         0.54 
  bdbean        0.54 
  sybean        0.33 
  autsugar      0.83 
  winsugar      0.63 
  sesame        0.29 
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  peanut        0.46 
  cumin         0.54 
  cotton        0.71 
  autmelon      0.33 
  summelon      0.29 
  sprptt        0.50 
  sumtmt        0.29 
  sumegg        0.29       / 
; 
 
I.2.2. crops’ requirements of land by month 
* autmelon overlaps with barley in October. this may have to be revised since autmelon may be 
* considered intercalary crops 
table landreq(c,t)        land occupation of crops by month 
            jan    feb    mar    apr    may     jun     jul     aug     sep     oct     nov     dec 
wheat       1      1      1      1      1       0.5     0       0       0       0       1       1 
barley      1      1      1      1      0.5     0       0       0       0       0.5     1       1 
intmaiz     0      0      0      0      0       0.5     1       1       1       0.5     0       0 
lentil      1      1      1      1      1       0.5     0       0       0       0       0       0.5 
chick       1      1      1      1      1       0.5     0       0       0       0       0       0.5 
bdbean      1      1      1      1      1       1       0       0       0       0       0       0 
sybean      0      0      0      0      0       0.5     1       1       1       0       0       0 
autsugar    1      1      1      1      1       1       0.5     0       0       1       1       1 
winsugar    1      1      1      1      1       1       1       0       0       0       0       0 
sesame      0      0      0      0      0       0       1       1       1       0       0       0 
peanut      0      0.5    1      1      1       1       0.5     0       0       0       0       0 
cumin       1      1      1      1      1       0.5     0       0       0       0       0       0.5 
cotton      0      0      0      1      1       1       1       1       1       1       1       0 
autmelon    0      0      0      0      0       0       1       1       1       0.5     0       0 
summelon    0      0      0      0      0       0.5     1       1       0.5     0       0       0 
sprptt      0      1      1      1      1       1       0.5     0       0       0       0       0 
sumtmt      0      0      0      0      0       0.5     1       1       0.5     0       0       0 
sumegg      0      0      0      0      0       0.5     1       1       0.5     0       0       0 
; 
I.2.3 – matrix of prices assuming lognormal distribution 
Table price(p,sn) prices of various products in different states of nature 
$ontext 
re assumed to be lognormally distributed. This is because prices cannot collapse 
to zero, even when the supply is too high due to the existence of the possibility 
of storage. On the other hand, prices can go very high if the supply is too low 
and there is nothing can stop it. This in total justifies the choice of this 
distribution which has the form of an asymetric bell skewed very much to the 
right, in which the skewness increases more for commodities that are less storable 
$offtext 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
wheat 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50 
barley 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 
maize 6.83 7.54 8.22 8.90 9.60 10.36 11.18 12.11 13.19 14.57 
lentil 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 
chickpea 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 
broadbean 18.30 20.18 21.95 23.73 25.58 27.55 29.69 32.10 34.91 38.49 
soybean 14.24 15.57 16.81 18.05 19.33 20.69 22.16 23.79 25.69 28.09 
sugarbeet 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 
sesame 18.77 22.11 25.45 29.00 32.89 37.25 42.24 48.13 55.40 65.26 
peanut 14.22 16.50 18.74 21.09 23.63 26.45 29.64 33.36 37.89 43.94 
cumin 25.08 30.00 35.00 40.37 46.33 53.08 60.91 70.27 81.97 98.06 
cotton 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 27.00 
wmelonsum 1.44 1.74 2.04 2.37 2.74 3.17 3.66 4.26 5.01 6.05 
wmelonaut 1.59 1.95 2.33 2.75 3.22 3.76 4.41 5.19 6.20 7.61 
potato 1.84 2.49 3.23 4.12 5.20 6.55 8.27 10.54 13.69 18.55 
tomato 1.46 1.92 2.42 3.00 3.69 4.54 5.58 6.93 8.74 11.46 
eggplant 2.18 2.71 3.27 3.89 4.59 5.42 6.41 7.63 9.20 11.44 
; 
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I.2.4. probabilities associated to states of nature of price distribution 
 
Parameter prob(sn) probability of each state of nature for prices (they sum up to one) 
 
/ 1    0.0000043107 
  2    0.0007580709 
  3    0.0191115805 
  4    0.1354837029 
  5    0.3446423349 
  6    0.3446423349 
  7    0.1354837029 
  8    0.0191115805 
  9    0.0007580709 
  10   0.0000043107     / 
; 
 
I.2.5. prices of physical inputs and other costs (SP/kg) 
parameter priceinp(in,c) prices of various inputs: chemical fertilizers - seeds and others (SP per 
KG)  ; 
priceinp("Nfert",c)        =        7.70        ; 
priceinp("Pfert",c)        =        8.30        ; 
priceinp("Kfert",c)        =       12.10        ; 
priceinp("seed","wheat")   =       15.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","barley")  =       13.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","intmaiz") =       22.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","lentil")  =       55.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","chick")   =       60.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","bdbean")  =       30.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","sybean")  =       20.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","autsugar")=      430.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","winsugar")=      430.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","sesame")  =       50.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","peanut")  =       60.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","cumin")   =      150.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","cotton")  =       11.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","autmelon")=      100.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","summelon")=      100.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","sprptt")  =       30.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","sumtmt")  =     1000.00        ; 
priceinp("seed","sumegg")  =     1000.00        ; 
priceinp("other",c)        =        1.00        ; 
 
 
scalar hwage     hired labour wage (SP per Hour)                  / 25 /     ; 
scalar waterfee  irrigation water fee for public net (SP per ha)  /650/     ; 
scalar dies      price of diesel                                  / 8 /      ; 
scalar intrate   interest rate of the credit                      /0.06/ ; 
 
I.3. data of parameters differentiated by mantikas and agro-climatic zones 
I.3.1. yields of crops (kg/ha)  
table yield(rr,c,p,irr,agz)  
* yields of different crops given by mantika, crop, product, irrigation method and agro-climatic 
* zone (kg/ha) 
                                       1        2        3        4        5 
1.wheat.wheat.flood                  3730     3560     3830     3550     3710 
2.wheat.wheat.flood                  3610     4030     3680 
3.wheat.wheat.flood                  4130     4070     3700 
4.wheat.wheat.flood                  4020     3830     3830     3670 
1.wheat.wheat.sprink                 4103     3916     4213     3905     4081 
2.wheat.wheat.sprink                 3971     4433     4048 
3.wheat.wheat.sprink                 4543     4477     4070 
4.wheat.wheat.sprink                 4422     4213     4213     4037 
1.wheat.wheat.rain                   1434     1102     524      424      304 
2.wheat.wheat.rain                   1478     1016     796 
3.wheat.wheat.rain                   2180     1874     1332 
4.wheat.wheat.rain                   1372     902      504      232 
5.wheat.wheat.flood                    0        0      4528     4730     5194 
6.wheat.wheat.flood                    0        0      4996     4518     4400 
7.wheat.wheat.flood                    0      4350     4008     3470       0 
5.wheat.wheat.sprink                   0        0      4981     5203     5713 
6.wheat.wheat.sprink                   0        0      5496     4970     4840 
7.wheat.wheat.sprink                   0      4785     4409     3817       0 
5.wheat.wheat.rain                     0        0      402      394       20 
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6.wheat.wheat.rain                     0        0      880      450       20 
7.wheat.wheat.rain                     0      1286     608       40        0 
8.wheat.wheat.flood                    0        0        0        0      5000 
9.wheat.wheat.flood                    0        0        0        0      4000 
10.wheat.wheat.flood                   0        0        0        0      4200 
8.wheat.wheat.sprink                   0        0        0        0      5500 
9.wheat.wheat.sprink                   0        0        0        0      4400 
10.wheat.wheat.sprink                  0        0        0        0      4620 
8.wheat.wheat.rain                     0        0        0      280        0 
 
1.barley.barley.flood                3200     3070     3070     3070     2610 
2.barley.barley.flood                3000     3190     2510 
3.barley.barley.flood                3200     3190     2510 
4.barley.barley.flood                3000     3200     2510     2070 
1.barley.barley.sprink               3520     3377     3377     3377     2871 
2.barley.barley.sprink               3300     3509     2761 
3.barley.barley.sprink               3520     3509     2761 
4.barley.barley.sprink               3300     3520     2761     2277 
1.barley.barley.rain                 1422     1168     628      390      320 
2.barley.barley.rain                 1720     1242     954 
3.barley.barley.rain                 1908     1388     1218 
4.barley.barley.rain                 1304     874      292      202 
5.barley.barley.flood                  0        0      2750     2750     2350 
6.barley.barley.flood                  0        0      3200     3150     2700 
7.barley.barley.flood                  0      2770     2650     2384       0 
5.barley.barley.sprink                 0        0      3025     3025     2585 
6.barley.barley.sprink                 0        0      3520     3465     2970 
7.barley.barley.sprink                 0      3047     2915     2622       0 
5.barley.barley.rain                   0        0      574      222        0 
6.barley.barley.rain                   0        0      696      300        0 
7.barley.barley.rain                   0      1174     556      190        0 
8*10.barley.barley.flood               0        0        0      3040     3040 
8*10.barley.barley.sprink              0        0        0      3344     3344 
8.barley.barley.rain                   0        0        0      260        0 
 
1*4.intmaiz.maize.flood              2500     2500     2500     2500     2500 
1*4.intmaiz.maize.sprink             2750     2750     2750     2750     2750 
5.intmaiz.maize.flood                  0        0      5080     5080     4588 
6.intmaiz.maize.flood                  0        0      3764     3764     3764 
7.intmaiz.maize.flood                  0      3102     3102     3102       0 
5.intmaiz.maize.sprink                 0        0      5588     5588     5047 
6.intmaiz.maize.sprink                 0        0      4140     4140     4140 
7.intmaiz.maize.sprink                 0      3412     3412     3412       0 
8.intmaiz.maize.flood                  0        0        0        0      3370 
9.intmaiz.maize.flood                  0        0        0        0      3330 
10.intmaiz.maize.flood                 0        0        0        0      3540 
8.intmaiz.maize.sprink                 0        0        0        0      3707 
9.intmaiz.maize.sprink                 0        0        0        0      3663 
10.intmaiz.maize.sprink                0        0        0        0      3894 
 
1.lentil.lentil.rain                 1156     906      434        0        0 
2.lentil.lentil.rain                 1098     784      434        0        0 
3.lentil.lentil.rain                 1114     784      434        0        0 
4.lentil.lentil.rain                 1112     960     434        0        0 
5*10.lentil.lentil.rain                0      900        0        0        0 
1*10.lentil.lentil.flood             1100     1100     1100     1100     1100 
1*10.lentil.lentil.sprink            1210     1210     1210     1210     1210 
 
1*10.chick.chickpea.rain             990      540      220        0        0 
1*10.chick.chickpea.flood            1000     1000     1000     1000     1000 
1*10.chick.chickpea.sprink           1100     1100     1100     1100     1100 
 
1*4.bdbean.broadbean.flood           1200     1200     1200     1200     1200 
1*4.bdbean.broadbean.sprink          1320     1320     1320     1320     1320 
1*4.bdbean.broadbean.rain            500      500      500      500      500 
5.bdbean.broadbean.flood              0        0       1769     1769     2138 
6.bdbean.broadbean.flood              0        0       2794     2794     2794 
7.bdbean.broadbean.flood              0       2183     3029     3029      0 
5.bdbean.broadbean.sprink             0        0       1946     1946     2351 
6.bdbean.broadbean.sprink             0        0       3073     3073     3073 
7.bdbean.broadbean.sprink             0       2401     3332     3332      0 
8*10.bdbean.broadbean.flood           0        0        0        0       1800 
8*10.bdbean.broadbean.sprink          0        0        0        0       1980 
 
1*7.sybean.soybean.flood            1700     1700     1700     1650     1650 
1*7.sybean.soybean.sprink           1870     1870     1870     1715     1715 
 
1.autsugar.sugarbeet.flood           45000    45000    45000    43000    41090 
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2.autsugar.sugarbeet.flood           45000    45000    35280    36060    30130 
3.autsugar.sugarbeet.flood           36315    36315    36275    36060      0 
4.autsugar.sugarbeet.flood           36315    36315    36275    36060      0 
1.autsugar.sugarbeet.sprink          49500    49500    49500    47300    45199 
2.autsugar.sugarbeet.sprink          49500    49500    38808    39666    33143 
3.autsugar.sugarbeet.sprink          39947    39947    39903    39666      0 
4.autsugar.sugarbeet.sprink          39947    39947    39903    39666      0 
5.autsugar.sugarbeet.flood             0        0      45000    45000    45090 
6.autsugar.sugarbeet.flood             0        0      35280    36060    35130 
7.autsugar.sugarbeet.flood             0      36315    36275    36060      0 
5.autsugar.sugarbeet.sprink            0        0      49500    49500    49599 
6.autsugar.sugarbeet.sprink            0        0      38808    39666    33143 
7.autsugar.sugarbeet.sprink            0      39947    39903    39666      0 
8.autsugar.sugarbeet.flood             0        0        0      35500    35500 
9.autsugar.sugarbeet.flood             0        0        0        0      38900 
10.autsugar.sugarbeet.flood            0        0        0        0      37650 
8.autsugar.sugarbeet.sprink            0        0        0      39050    39050 
9.autsugar.sugarbeet.sprink            0        0        0        0      42790 
10.autsugar.sugarbeet.sprink           0        0        0        0      41415 
 
1*10.winsugar.sugarbeet.flood        43000    43000    43000    43000    43000 
1*10.winsugar.sugarbeet.sprink       44000    44000    44000    44000    44000 
 
1*4.sesame.sesame.flood              1200     1200     1200     1200     1200 
1*4.sesame.sesame.sprink             1220     1220     1220     1220     1220 
5.sesame.sesame.flood                  0        0      1200     1031     1017 
6.sesame.sesame.flood                  0        0      1290     1245     1200 
7.sesame.sesame.flood                  0      1170     1125     1020      0 
5.sesame.sesame.sprink                 0        0      1320     1134     1119 
6.sesame.sesame.sprink                 0        0      1419     1370     1320 
7.sesame.sesame.sprink                 0      1287     1238     1122      0 
8*10.sesame.sesame.flood               0        0       0        0       1400 
8*10.sesame.sesame.sprink              0        0       0        0       1540 
 
1*10.peanut.peanut.flood             3000     3000     3000     3000     2500 
1*10.peanut.peanut.sprink            2750     2750     2750     2750     2750 
1*10.peanut.peanut.drip              2875     2875     2875     2875     2875 
 
1.cumin.cumin.rain                   915      875      500        0        0 
2.cumin.cumin.rain                   877      875      500        0        0 
3.cumin.cumin.rain                   953      875      500        0        0 
4.cumin.cumin.rain                   900      800      500        0        0 
5.cumin.cumin.rain                     0        0      450        0        0 
6.cumin.cumin.rain                     0        0      450        0        0 
7*10.cumin.cumin.rain                  0      920      450        0        0 
1*7.cumin.cumin.flood               1000     1000     1000     1000     1000 
8*10.cumin.cumin.flood               600      600      600      600      600 
1*7.cumin.cumin.sprink              1100     1100     1100     1100     1100 
8*10.cumin.cumin.sprink              660      660      660      660      660 
 
1.cotton.cotton.flood                5280     4640     4460     4040     4080 
2.cotton.cotton.flood                4310     3980     3940 
3.cotton.cotton.flood                4380     4840     4670 
4.cotton.cotton.flood                4783     4840     5570     4520 
1.cotton.cotton.sprink               5808     5104     4906     4444     4488 
2.cotton.cotton.sprink               4741     4378     4334 
3.cotton.cotton.sprink               4818     5324     5137 
4.cotton.cotton.sprink               5261     5324     6127     4972 
1.cotton.cotton.drip                 6072     5336     5129     4646     4692 
2.cotton.cotton.drip                 4957     4577     4531 
3.cotton.cotton.drip                 5037     5566     5371 
4.cotton.cotton.drip                 5500     5566     6406     5198 
5.cotton.cotton.flood                  0        0      4190     4190     4290 
6.cotton.cotton.flood                  0        0      5420     4420     3760 
7.cotton.cotton.flood                  0      4310     3660     3660       0 
5.cotton.cotton.sprink                 0        0      4609     4609     4719 
6.cotton.cotton.sprink                 0        0      5962     4862     4136 
7.cotton.cotton.sprink                 0      4741     4026     4026       0 
5.cotton.cotton.drip                   0        0      4819     4819     4934 
6.cotton.cotton.drip                   0        0      6233     5083     4324 
7.cotton.cotton.drip                   0      4957     4209     4209       0 
8.cotton.cotton.flood                  0        0        0      3100     3100 
9.cotton.cotton.flood                  0        0        0        0      3820 
10.cotton.cotton.flood                 0        0        0        0      4020 
8.cotton.cotton.sprink                 0        0        0      3410     3410 
9.cotton.cotton.sprink                 0        0        0        0      4202 
10.cotton.cotton.sprink                0        0        0        0      4422 
8.cotton.cotton.drip                   0        0        0      3565     3565 
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9.cotton.cotton.drip                   0        0        0        0      4393 
10.cotton.cotton.drip                  0        0        0        0      4623 
 
1*4.summelon.wmelonsum.flood        50000    50000    50000    50000    50000 
1*4.summelon.wmelonsum.sprink       55000    55000    55000    55000    55000 
1*4.summelon.wmelonsum.drip         57500    57500    57500    57500    57500 
5*7.summelon.wmelonsum.flood          0      33000    33000    33000    33000 
5*7.summelon.wmelonsum.sprink         0      36300    36300    36300    36300 
5*7.summelon.wmelonsum.drip           0      37950    37950    37950    37950 
8*10.summelon.wmelonsum.flood         0        0        0        0      20000 
8*10.summelon.wmelonsum.sprink        0        0        0        0      22000 
8*10.summelon.wmelonsum.drip          0        0        0        0      23000 
 
1*4.autmelon.wmelonaut.flood        25000    25000    25000    25000    25000 
1*4.autmelon.wmelonaut.sprink       27500    27500    27500    27500    27500 
1*4.autmelon.wmelonaut.drip         28750    28750    28750    28750    28750 
1*4.autmelon.wmelonaut.rain         10000      0        0        0        0 
5.autmelon.wmelonaut.flood            0        0      20640    20640    26564 
6.autmelon.wmelonaut.flood            0        0      20640    30000    19547 
7.autmelon.wmelonaut.flood            0      26458    20640    20640 
5.autmelon.wmelonaut.sprink           0        0      22704    22704    29220 
6.autmelon.wmelonaut.sprink           0        0      22704    33000    21502 
7.autmelon.wmelonaut.sprink           0      29104    22704    22704      0 
5.autmelon.wmelonaut.drip             0        0      23736    23736    30549 
6.autmelon.wmelonaut.drip             0        0      23736    34500    22479 
7.autmelon.wmelonaut.drip             0      30427    23736    23736      0 
8.autmelon.wmelonaut.flood           0        0        0        0      30150 
9.autmelon.wmelonaut.flood           0        0        0        0      30330 
10.autmelon.wmelonaut.flood          0        0        0        0      30000 
8.autmelon.wmelonaut.sprink          0        0        0        0      33165 
9.autmelon.wmelonaut.sprink          0        0        0        0      33363 
10.autmelon.wmelonaut.sprink         0        0        0        0      33000 
8.autmelon.wmelonaut.drip            0        0        0        0      38140 
9.autmelon.wmelonaut.drip            0        0        0        0      38367 
10.autmelon.wmelonaut.drip           0        0        0        0      37950 
 
1*10.sprptt.potato.flood             20000    20000    20000    20000    20000 
1*10.sprptt.potato.sprink            22000    22000    22000    22000    22000 
1*10.sprptt.potato.drip              23000    23000    23000    23000    23000 
 
1*4.sumtmt.tomato.flood              35000    35000    35000    35000    35000 
1*4.sumtmt.tomato.drip               40250    40250    40250    40250    40250 
5*7.sumtmt.tomato.flood                0      27000    27000    27000    27000 
5*7.sumtmt.tomato.drip                 0      31050    31050    31050    31050 
8*10.sumtmt.tomato.flood               0        0        0        0      20000 
8*10.sumtmt.tomato.drip                0        0        0        0      23000 
 
1*4.sumegg.eggplant.flood            25000    25000    25000    25000    25000 
1*4.sumegg.eggplant.drip             28750    28750    28750    28750    28750 
5*7.sumegg.eggplant.flood              0      20000    20000    20000    20000 
5*7.sumegg.eggplant.drip               0      23000    23000    23000    23000 
8*10.sumegg.eggplant.flood             0        0        0        0      13000 
8*10.sumegg.eggplant.drip              0        0        0        0      14950 
I.3.2. irrigation requirements (cubic meter/ha) 
table waterreq(rr,agz,c,irr,t) 
* irrigation requirement by mantika, agro-climatic zone, crop, irrigation method 
* and month (cubic meters per hectare per month) 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
1*4.1.wheat.flood 0 0 783 1198 1546 1216 
1*4.2.wheat.flood 0 0 880 1348 1739 1368 
1*4.3.wheat.flood 0 0 978 1498 1932 1520 
1*4.4.wheat.flood 0 0 1174 1798 2319 1824 
1*4.5.wheat.flood 0 0 1467 2247 2898 2281 
1*4.1.wheat.sprink 0 0 704 1079 1391 1095 
1*4.2.wheat.sprink 0 0 792 1213 1565 1232 
1*4.3.wheat.sprink 0 0 880 1348 1739 1368 
1*4.4.wheat.sprink 0 0 1057 1618 2087 1642 
1*4.5.wheat.sprink 0 0 1321 2022 2609 2053 
5*7.1*2.wheat.flood 0 0 1027 1841 2243 1328 
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5*7.3.wheat.flood 0 44 1404 2011 2259 1651 
5*7.4.wheat.flood 0 340 1922 2227 2653 1628 
5*7.5.wheat.flood 242 577 1931 2636 2832 1595 
5*7.1*2.wheat.sprink 0 0 924 1657 2020 1195 
5*7.3.wheat.sprink 0 39 1264 1809 2032 1487 
5*7.4.wheat.sprink 0 306 1731 2004 2388 1466 
5*7.5.wheat.sprink 218 519 1738 2372 2549 1435 
8*10.1*5.wheat.flood 67 833 1991 2548 2809 1775 
8*10.1*5.wheat.sprink 61 749 1792 2294 2528 1598 
       
1*4.1.barley.flood 0 0 754 703 913 0 
1*4.2.barley.flood 0 0 848 791 1027 0 
1*4.3.barley.flood 0 0 942 879 1141 0 
1*4.4.barley.flood 0 640 1130 1055 1369 0 
1*4.5.barley.flood 0 960 1413 1318 1711 0 
1*4.1.barley.sprink 0 0 678 633 821 0 
1*4.2.barley.sprink 0 0 763 712 924 0 
1*4.3.barley.sprink 0 0 848 791 1027 0 
1*4.4.barley.sprink 0 576 1017 949 1232 0 
1*4.5.barley.sprink 0 864 1272 1187 1540 0 
5*7.1*2.barley.flood 0 290 1101 1287 1290 0 
5*7.3.barley.flood 0 322 1223 1430 1434 0 
5*7.4.barley.flood 0 404 1528 1588 1593 0 
5*7.5.barley.flood 189 577 1910 1765 1770 0 
5*7.1*2.barley.sprink 0 262 989 1158 1161 0 
5*7.3.barley.sprink 0 290 1101 1287 1290 0 
5*7.4.barley.sprink 0 363 1375 1430 1434 0 
5*7.5.barley.sprink 170 519 1719 1588 1593 0 
8*10.1*5.barley.flood 27 695 1642 1401 1456 0 
8*10.1*5.barley.sprink 24 625 1477 1262 1312 0 
       
1*7.1*5.intmaiz.flood 0 0 0 0 0 2133 
1*7.1*5.intmaiz.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 1920 
8*10.1*5.intmaiz.flood 0 0 0 0 0 1971 
8*10.1*5.intmaiz.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 1775 
       
1*10.1.lentil.flood 0 0 0 912 912 0 
1*10.2.lentil.flood 0 0 0 1064 1064 0 
1*10.3.lentil.flood 0 0 0 1327 1327 0 
1*10.4.lentil.flood 0 0 760 1520 1520 0 
1*10.5.lentil.flood 0 0 760 1672 1672 0 
1*10.1.lentil.sprink 0 0 0 821 821 0 
1*10.2.lentil.sprink 0 0 0 958 958 0 
1*10.3.lentil.sprink 0 0 0 1195 1195 0 
1*10.4.lentil.sprink 0 0 684 1368 1368 0 
1*10.5.lentil.sprink 0 0 684 1505 1505 0 
       
1*10.1.chick.flood 0 0 0 912 912 0 
1*10.2.chick.flood 0 0 0 1064 1064 0 
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1*10.3.chick.flood 0 0 0 1327 1327 0 
1*10.4.chick.flood 0 0 760 1520 1520 0 
1*10.5.chick.flood 0 0 760 1672 1672 0 
1*10.1.chick.sprink 0 0 0 821 821 0 
1*10.2.chick.sprink 0 0 0 958 958 0 
1*10.3.chick.sprink 0 0 0 1195 1195 0 
1*10.4.chick.sprink 0 0 684 1368 1368 0 
1*10.5.chick.sprink 0 0 684 1505 1505 0 
       
1*10.1*2.bdbean.flood 0 380 1143 2169 2137 0 
1*10.3*5.bdbean.flood 0 836 1237 2348 2315 0 
1*10.1*2.bdbean.sprink 0 342 1029 1952 1923 0 
1*10.3*5.bdbean.sprink 0 752 1114 2114 2084 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sybean.flood 0 0 0 0 1199 2824 
1*10.1*5.sybean.sprink 0 0 0 0 1079 2541 
       
1*7.1*2.autsugar.flood 0 0 1195 3227 5540 7685 
1*7.3.autsugar.flood 0 0 1797 3517 5646 9470 
1*7.4.autsugar.flood 0 186 2922 3894 6468 9264 
1*7.5.autsugar.flood 205 772 2919 4588 6979 9149 
1*7.1*2.autsugar.sprink 0 0 1074 2903 4986 6917 
1*7.3.autsugar.sprink 0 0 1618 3167 5082 8523 
1*7.4.autsugar.sprink 0 166 2628 3505 5822 8338 
1*7.5.autsugar.sprink 184 694 2627 4129 6280 8234 
8*10.1*5.autsugar.flood 0 872 2434 3589 5600 8150 
8*10.1*5.autsugar.sprink 0 784 2190 3230 5040 7336 
       
1*10.1.winsugar.flood 0 0 357 1769 2876 4341 
1*10.2.winsugar.flood 0 0 429 2123 3450 5211 
1*10.3.winsugar.flood 0 760 465 2300 3738 5644 
1*10.4*5.winsugar.flood 0 912 537 2654 4314 6513 
1*10.1.winsugar.sprink 0 0 322 1593 2589 3908 
1*10.2.winsugar.sprink 0 0 386 1911 3105 4689 
1*10.3.winsugar.sprink 0 684 418 2070 3364 5080 
1*10.4*5.winsugar.sprink 0 821 483 2388 3882 5861 
       
1*7.1*5.sesame.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*7.1*5.sesame.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.sesame.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.sesame.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1.peanut.flood 0 0 0 2280 3040 3040 
1*10.2.peanut.flood 0 0 0 2736 3648 3648 
1*10.3.peanut.flood 0 0 0 2964 3952 3952 
1*10.4*5.peanut.flood 0 0 0 3420 4560 4560 
1*10.1.peanut.sprink 0 0 0 2052 2736 2736 
1*10.2.peanut.sprink 0 0 0 2462 3283 3283 
1*10.3.peanut.sprink 0 0 0 2668 3557 3557 
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1*10.4*5.peanut.sprink 0 0 0 3078 4104 4104 
1*10.1.peanut.drip 0 0 0 1824 2432 2432 
1*10.2.peanut.drip 0 0 0 2189 2918 2918 
1*10.3.peanut.drip 0 0 0 2371 3162 3162 
1*10.4*5.peanut.drip 0 0 0 2736 3648 3648 
       
1*10.1.cumin.flood 0 0 760 1216 0 0 
1*10.2.cumin.flood 0 0 912 1459 0 0 
1*10.3.cumin.flood 0 0 988 1581 0 0 
1*10.4.cumin.flood 0 0 1140 1824 0 0 
1*10.5.cumin.flood 0 0 1216 1976 0 0 
1*10.1.cumin.sprink 0 0 684 1094 0 0 
1*10.2.cumin.sprink 0 0 821 1313 0 0 
1*10.3.cumin.sprink 0 0 889 1423 0 0 
1*10.4.cumin.sprink 0 0 1026 1642 0 0 
1*10.5.cumin.sprink 0 0 1094 1778 0 0 
       
1*4.1*5.cotton.flood 0 0 0 1230 1806 2829 
1*4.1*5.cotton.sprink 0 0 0 1107 1625 2546 
1*4.1*5.cotton.drip 0 0 0 984 1444 2263 
5*7.1*5.cotton.flood 0 0 0 2471 3069 4457 
5*7.1*5.cotton.sprink 0 0 0 2223 2763 4011 
5*7.1*5.cotton.drip 0 0 0 1977 2455 3567 
8*10.1*5.cotton.flood 0 0 0 2174 2639 3286 
8*10.1*5.cotton.sprink 0 0 0 1956 2374 2958 
8*10.1*5.cotton.drip 0 0 0 1739 2111 2630 
       
1*7.1*5.autmelon.flood 0 0 0 0 0 2949 
1*7.1*5.autmelon.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 2654 
1*7.1*5.autmelon.drip 0 0 0 0 0 2359 
8*10.1*5.autmelon.flood 0 0 0 0 0 2529 
8*10.1*5.autmelon.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 2277 
8*10.1*5.autmelon.drip 0 0 0 0 0 2023 
       
1*10.1*5.summelon.flood 0 0 0 0 0 3417 
1*10.1*5.summelon.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 3075 
1*10.1*5.summelon.drip 0 0 0 0 0 2733 
       
1*7.1*5.sprptt.flood 0 0 904 2768 4619 4949 
1*7.1*5.sprptt.sprink 0 0 815 2491 4157 4454 
1*7.1*5.sprptt.drip 0 0 724 2215 3695 3960 
8*10.1*5.sprptt.flood 0 325 1192 2364 3789 4656 
8*10.1*5.sprptt.sprink 0 292 1072 2126 3411 4191 
8*10.1*5.sprptt.drip 0 260 953 1891 3032 3726 
       
1*10.1*5.sumtmt.flood 0 0 0 0 2181 4106 
1*10.1*5.sumtmt.drip 0 0 0 0 1745 3285 
       
1*10.1*5.sumegg.flood 0 0 0 0 1841 3119 
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1*10.1*5.sumegg.drip 0 0 0 0 1473 2494 
 
+ Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1*4.1.wheat.flood 0 0 0 0 243 0 
1*4.2.wheat.flood 0 0 0 0 273 0 
1*4.3.wheat.flood 0 0 0 0 304 0 
1*4.4.wheat.flood 0 0 0 0 365 0 
1*4.5.wheat.flood 0 0 0 0 456 0 
1*4.1.wheat.sprink 0 0 0 0 219 0 
1*4.2.wheat.sprink 0 0 0 0 246 0 
1*4.3.wheat.sprink 0 0 0 0 273 0 
1*4.4.wheat.sprink 0 0 0 0 328 0 
1*4.5.wheat.sprink 0 0 0 0 410 0 
5*7.1*2.wheat.flood 0 0 0 0 62 0 
5*7.3.wheat.flood 0 0 0 0 359 0 
5*7.4.wheat.flood 0 0 0 0 382 0 
5*7.5.wheat.flood 0 0 0 0 379 221 
5*7.1*2.wheat.sprink 0 0 0 0 57 0 
5*7.3.wheat.sprink 0 0 0 0 324 0 
5*7.4.wheat.sprink 0 0 0 0 343 0 
5*7.5.wheat.sprink 0 0 0 0 342 198 
8*10.1*5.wheat.flood 0 0 0 0 476 82 
8*10.1*5.wheat.sprink 0 0 0 0 429 74 
       
1*4.1.barley.flood 0 0 0 0 243 0 
1*4.2.barley.flood 0 0 0 0 273 0 
1*4.3.barley.flood 0 0 0 0 304 0 
1*4.4.barley.flood 0 0 0 0 365 0 
1*4.5.barley.flood 0 0 0 0 456 0 
1*4.1.barley.sprink 0 0 0 0 219 0 
1*4.2.barley.sprink 0 0 0 0 246 0 
1*4.3.barley.sprink 0 0 0 0 273 0 
1*4.4.barley.sprink 0 0 0 0 328 0 
1*4.5.barley.sprink 0 0 0 0 410 0 
5*7.1*2.barley.flood 0 0 0 0 294 0 
5*7.3.barley.flood 0 0 0 0 306 165 
5*7.4.barley.flood 0 0 0 0 342 182 
5*7.5.barley.flood 0 0 0 0 379 228 
5*7.1*2.barley.sprink 0 0 0 0 248 9 
5*7.3.barley.sprink 0 0 0 0 276 149 
5*7.4.barley.sprink 0 0 0 0 306 165 
5*7.5.barley.sprink 0 0 0 0 342 205 
8*10.1*5.barley.flood 0 0 0 0 397 73 
8*10.1*5.barley.sprink 0 0 0 0 357 65 
       
1*7.1*5.intmaiz.flood 3074 4832 4037 883 0 0 
1*7.1*5.intmaiz.sprink 2768 4349 3634 795 0 0 
8*10.1*5.intmaiz.flood 2769 4365 3657 686 0 0 
8*10.1*5.intmaiz.sprink 2493 3929 3291 617 0 0 
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1*10.1.lentil.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.lentil.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.lentil.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.4.lentil.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.5.lentil.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1.lentil.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.lentil.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.lentil.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.4.lentil.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.5.lentil.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1.chick.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.chick.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.chick.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.4.chick.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.5.chick.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1.chick.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.chick.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.chick.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.4.chick.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.5.chick.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*2.bdbean.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3*5.bdbean.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1*2.bdbean.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3*5.bdbean.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sybean.flood 4220 3051 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1*5.sybean.sprink 3797 2745 0 0 0 0 
       
1*7.1*2.autsugar.flood 0 0 0 0 11 0 
1*7.3.autsugar.flood 0 0 0 0 577 0 
1*7.4.autsugar.flood 0 0 0 0 612 0 
1*7.5.autsugar.flood 0 0 0 0 605 64 
1*7.1*2.autsugar.sprink 0 0 0 0 9 0 
1*7.3.autsugar.sprink 0 0 0 0 519 0 
1*7.4.autsugar.sprink 0 0 0 0 550 0 
1*7.5.autsugar.sprink 0 0 0 0 545 58 
8*10.1*5.autsugar.flood 0 0 0 0 616 0 
8*10.1*5.autsugar.sprink 0 0 0 0 553 0 
       
1*10.1.winsugar.flood 2312 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.winsugar.flood 2776 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.winsugar.flood 3007 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.4*5.winsugar.flood 3469 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1.winsugar.sprink 2081 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.winsugar.sprink 2497 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.winsugar.sprink 2706 0 0 0 0 0 
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1*10.4*5.winsugar.sprink 3122 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*7.1*5.sesame.flood 4213 3868 2695 0 0 0 
1*7.1*5.sesame.sprink 3792 3482 2424 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.sesame.flood 4213 3868 2695 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.sesame.sprink 3792 3482 2424 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1.peanut.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.peanut.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.peanut.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.4*5.peanut.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1.peanut.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.peanut.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.peanut.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.4*5.peanut.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1.peanut.drip 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.peanut.drip 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.peanut.drip 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.4*5.peanut.drip 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1.cumin.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.cumin.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.cumin.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.4.cumin.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.5.cumin.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1.cumin.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.cumin.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.cumin.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.4.cumin.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.5.cumin.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*4.1*5.cotton.flood 4391 4156 3309 0 0 0 
1*4.1*5.cotton.sprink 3952 3740 2978 0 0 0 
1*4.1*5.cotton.drip 3513 3324 2647 0 0 0 
5*7.1*5.cotton.flood 5645 6142 4466 0 0 0 
5*7.1*5.cotton.sprink 5080 5528 4018 0 0 0 
5*7.1*5.cotton.drip 4515 4914 3572 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.cotton.flood 5057 5504 3972 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.cotton.sprink 4551 4954 3575 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.cotton.drip 4046 4403 3178 0 0 0 
       
1*7.1*5.autmelon.flood 1581 2341 2812 0 0 0 
1*7.1*5.autmelon.sprink 1423 2107 2531 0 0 0 
1*7.1*5.autmelon.drip 1265 1873 2250 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.autmelon.flood 2380 2633 2497 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.autmelon.sprink 2142 2370 2248 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.autmelon.drip 1905 2107 1997 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.summelon.flood 3265 2918 0 0 0 0 
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1*10.1*5.summelon.sprink 2938 2627 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1*5.summelon.drip 2611 2335 0 0 0 0 
       
1*7.1*5.sprptt.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*7.1*5.sprptt.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*7.1*5.sprptt.drip 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.sprptt.flood 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.sprptt.sprink 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8*10.1*5.sprptt.drip 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sumtmt.flood 4271 2175 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1*5.sumtmt.drip 3417 1740 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sumegg.flood 4148 2455 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1*5.sumegg.drip 3318 1964 0 0 0 0 
I.3.3. labour requirements by month (hour/ha) 
table   labourreq(rr,agz,c,irr,t)  
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
1*10.1*5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 4 13 22 17 0 
1*10.1*5.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.barley.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 4 13 17 9 0 
1*10.1*5.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.intmaiz.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 0 52 
       
1*10.1.lentil.rain 2 0 1 0 201 0 
1*10.2.lentil.rain 6 0 0 0 221 0 
1*10.3*5.lentil.rain 3 0 0 0 0 150 
1*10.1*5.lentil.(flood,sprink,drip) 23 13 14 10 13 118 
       
1*10.1.chick.rain 0 0 2 0 3 118 
1*10.2.chick.rain 0 0 2 0 1 91 
1*10.3*5.chick.rain 0 0 2 0 1 50 
1*10.1*5.chick.(flood,sprink,drip) 23 13 14 10 13 118 
       
1*10.1*5.bdbean.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 53 94 29 58 90 
       
1*10.1*5.sybean.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 30 30 
       
1*5.1*3.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 12 25 36 272 
1*5.4.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 12 25 36 260 
1*5.5.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 12 25 36 248 
6.1*3.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 12 25 36 213 
6.4.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 12 25 36 218 
6.5.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 12 25 36 182 
7.1*2.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 12 25 36 220 
7.3.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 12 25 36 219 
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7.4*5.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 12 25 36 218 
8*10.1*5.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 12 25 36 281 
       
1*10.1*5.winsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 57 5 0 12 25 36 
       
1*10.1*5.sesame.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.peanut.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 24 44 109 82 71 
       
1*10.1.cumin.rain 2 0 1 0 247 0 
1*10.2.cumin.rain 6 0 0 0 236 0 
1*10.3.cumin.rain 3 0 0 0 0 165 
1*10.4*5.cumin.rain 3 0 0 0 0 110 
1*10.1*5.cumin.(flood,sprink,drip) 2 0 10 10 247 0 
       
1.1.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
1.2.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
1.3.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
1.4.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
1.5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
2.1.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
2.2.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
2.3*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
3.1.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
3.2.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
3.3*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
4.1.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
4.2.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
4.3.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
4.4*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
5.1*3.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 87 30 198 
5.4.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 87 30 198 
5.5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 87 30 198 
6.1*3.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 87 30 198 
6.4.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 87 30 198 
6.5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 87 30 198 
7.1*2.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 87 30 198 
7.3.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 87 30 198 
7.4*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 87 30 198 
8.1*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
9.1*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
10.1*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 97 40 208 
       
1*10.1*5.autmelon.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 194 
1*10.1*5.autmelon.rain 0 0 0 0 0 94 
       
1*10.1*5.summelon.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 194 304 
1*10.1*5.summelon.rain 0 0 0 0 94 54 
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1*10.1*5.sprptt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 60 43 36 52 32 609 
       
1*10.1*5.sumtmt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 0 152 
       
1*10.1*3.sumegg.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 128 101 81 
 
 
+ Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1*10.1*5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 23 13 7 
1*10.1*5.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 2 0 
       
1*10.1*5.barley.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 23 13 7 
1*10.1*5.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 2 0 
       
1*10.1*5.intmaiz.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 89 43 29 63 0 0 
       
1*10.1.lentil.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.lentil.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3*5.lentil.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1*5.lentil.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1.chick.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.chick.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3*5.chick.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1*5.chick.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.bdbean.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sybean.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 30 40 0 0 0 0 
       
1*5.1*3.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 241 0 0 108 99 0 
1*5.4.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 230 0 0 108 99 0 
1*5.5.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 220 0 0 108 99 0 
6.1*3.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 189 0 0 108 99 0 
6.4.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 193 0 0 108 99 0 
6.5.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 161 0 0 108 99 0 
7.1*2.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 194 0 0 108 99 0 
7.3.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 194 0 0 108 99 0 
7.4*5.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 193 0 0 108 99 0 
8*10.1*5.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 248 0 0 108 99 0 
       
1*10.1*5.winsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 653 201 0 0 108 99 
       
1*10.1*5.sesame.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 40 40 390 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.peanut.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 283 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1.cumin.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.2.cumin.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.3.cumin.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1*10.4*5.cumin.rain 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1*5.cumin.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1.1.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 582 291 0 
1.2.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 512 256 0 
1.3.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 492 246 0 
1.4.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 445 223 0 
1.5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 450 225 0 
2.1.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 475 238 0 
2.2.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 439 219 0 
2.3*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 434 217 0 
3.1.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 483 241 0 
3.2.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 485 243 0 
3.3*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 515 257 0 
4.1.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 559 279 0 
4.2.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 534 267 0 
4.3.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 614 307 0 
4.4*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 498 249 0 
5.1*3.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 53 40 14 462 231 0 
5.4.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 53 40 14 462 231 0 
5.5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 53 40 14 473 236 0 
6.1*3.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 53 40 14 598 299 0 
6.4.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 53 40 14 487 244 0 
6.5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 53 40 14 415 207 0 
7.1*2.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 53 40 14 475 238 0 
7.3.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 53 40 14 404 202 0 
7.4*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 53 40 14 404 202 0 
8.1*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 443 222 0 
9.1*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 421 211 0 
10.1*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 62 50 24 342 171 0 
       
1*10.1*5.autmelon.(flood,sprink,drip) 104 54 285 0 0 0 
1*10.1*5.autmelon.rain 54 0 200 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.summelon.(flood,sprink,drip) 354 0 0 0 0 0 
1*10.1*5.summelon.rain 254 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sprptt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sumtmt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 486 456 305 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*3.sumegg.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 104 170 130 0 0 0 
I.3.4. physical inputs’ requirements (kg/ha) 
parameter input(rr,agz,in,c,irr) 
* quantities of fertilizers and seeds costs of other physical inputs (kg per hectare) 
/1*10.1*5.Nfert.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip)           400 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip)            200 
1*10.1*5.seed.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip)             350 
1*10.1*5.other.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip)            4000 
1*10.1.Nfert.wheat.rain                             100 
1*10.2.Nfert.wheat.rain                             50 
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1*10.1.Pfert.wheat.rain                             50 
1*10.2.Pfert.wheat.rain                             25 
1*10.1*5.seed.wheat.rain                            150 
1*10.1.other.wheat.rain                             3500 
1*10.2.other.wheat.rain                             2600 
1*10.3.other.wheat.rain                             2000 
1*10.4.other.wheat.rain                             1400 
1*10.5.other.wheat.rain                             1100 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.barley.(flood,sprink,drip)           300 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.barley.(flood,sprink,drip)           150 
1*10.1*5.seed.barley.(flood,sprink,drip)            300 
1*10.1*5.other.barley.(flood,sprink,drip)           3000 
1*10.1.Nfert.barley.rain                            100 
1*10.2.Nfert.barley.rain                            50 
1*10.1.Pfert.barley.rain                            50 
1*10.2.Pfert.barley.rain                            25 
1*10.1*5.seed.barley.rain                           200 
1*10.1.other.barley.rain                            2912 
1*10.2.other.barley.rain                            2136 
1*10.3.other.barley.rain                            1551 
1*10.4.other.barley.rain                            1011 
1*10.5.other.barley.rain                            964 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.intmaiz.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)     400 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.intmaiz.(flood,sprink,drip)          150 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.intmaiz.(flood,sprink,drip)          0 
1*10.1*5.seed.intmaiz.(flood,sprink,drip)           50 
1*10.1*5.other.intmaiz.(flood,sprink,drip)          2000 
 
1*10.1.Pfert.lentil.rain                            50 
1*10.2.Pfert.lentil.rain                            25 
1*10.1*5.seed.lentil.rain                           130 
1*10.1.other.lentil.rain                            2093 
1*10.2.other.lentil.rain                            1715 
1*10.3*5.other.lentil.rain                          1162 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.lentil.(flood,sprink,drip)           100 
1*10.1*5.seed.lentil.(flood,sprink,drip)            150 
1*10.1*5.other.lentil.(flood,sprink,drip)           2500 
 
1*10.1*5.seed.chick.rain                            120 
1*10.1.other.chick.rain                             990 
1*10.2.other.chick.rain                             765 
1*10.3*5.other.chick.rain                           605 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.chick.(flood,sprink,drip)            50 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.chick.(flood,sprink,drip)            50 
1*10.1*5.seed.chick.(flood,sprink,drip)             120 
1*10.1*5.other.chick.(flood,sprink,drip)            2000 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.bdbean.(flood,sprink,drip)           0 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.bdbean.(flood,sprink,drip)           250 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.bdbean.(flood,sprink,drip)           0 
1*10.1*5.seed.bdbean.(flood,sprink,drip)            150 
1*10.1*5.other.bdbean.(flood,sprink,drip)           3800 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.sybean.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      100 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.sybean.(flood,sprink,drip)           100 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.sybean.(flood,sprink,drip)           100 
1*10.1*5.seed.sybean.(flood,sprink,drip)            100 
1*10.1*5.other.sybean.(flood,sprink,drip)           6150 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    500 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    200 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    150 
1*10.1*5.seed.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)     17.5 
1*10.1*5.other.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    2000 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.winsugar.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    500 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.winsugar.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    200 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.winsugar.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    150 
1*10.1*5.seed.winsugar.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)     17.5 
1*10.1*5.other.winsugar.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    2000 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.sesame.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      100 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.sesame.(flood,sprink,drip)           100 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.sesame.(flood,sprink,drip)           0 
1*10.1*5.seed.sesame.(flood,sprink,drip)            100 
1*10.1*5.other.sesame.(flood,sprink,drip)           1150 
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1*10.1*5.Nfert.peanut.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      500 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.peanut.(flood,sprink,drip)           250 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.peanut.(flood,sprink,drip)           100 
1*10.1*5.seed.peanut.(flood,sprink,drip)            75 
1*10.1*5.other.peanut.(flood,sprink,drip)           6500 
 
1*10.1.Nfert.cumin.rain                             50 
1*10.2.Nfert.cumin.rain                             25 
1*10.1.Pfert.cumin.rain                             60 
1*10.2.Pfert.cumin.rain                             30 
1*10.3.Pfert.cumin.rain                             15 
1*10.1*5.seed.cumin.rain                            37 
1*10.1.other.cumin.rain                             454 
1*10.2.other.cumin.rain                             427 
1*10.3*5.other.cumin.rain                           250 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.cumin.(flood,sprink,drip)            50 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.cumin.(flood,sprink,drip)            60 
1*10.1*5.seed.cumin.(flood,sprink,drip)             35 
1*10.1*5.other.cumin.(flood,sprink,drip)            450 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip)           400 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip)           150 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip)           50 
1*10.1*5.seed.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip)            110 
1*10.1*5.other.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip)           8266 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.autmelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    225 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.autmelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    170 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.autmelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    0 
1*10.1*5.seed.autmelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)     10 
1*10.1*5.other.autmelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    14000 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.summelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    325 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.summelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    170 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.summelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    0 
1*10.1*5.seed.summelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)     10 
1*10.1*5.other.summelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)    15000 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.sprptt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      500 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.sprptt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      500 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.sprptt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      250 
1*10.1*5.seed.sprptt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)       3000 
1*10.1*5.other.sprptt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      8500 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.sumtmt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      250 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.sumtmt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      250 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.sumtmt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      100 
1*10.1*5.seed.sumtmt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)       19 
1*10.1*5.other.sumtmt.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      9500 
 
1*10.1*5.Nfert.sumegg.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      300 
1*10.1*5.Pfert.sumegg.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      200 
1*10.1*5.Kfert.sumegg.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      50 
1*10.1*5.seed.sumegg.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)       19 
1*10.1*5.other.sumegg.(flood,sprink,drip,rain)      8600 
        / 
 
I.3.5. rental machinery costs (SP/ha) 
table rentalmachcost(rr,agz,c,irr,t) 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun 
1*4.1*5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 2000 
1*4.1.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 1500 
1*4.2.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 1200 
1*4.3.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 600 
1*4.4.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 500 
1*4.5.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 350 
5*7.3.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 3000 
5*7.4.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 3100 
5*7.5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 3000 
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5*7.2.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 2393 
5*6.1*3.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 1000 
5*6.4.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 650 
5*6.5.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 50 
7*10.1*2.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 3086 
7*10.3.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 1520 
7*10.4*5.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 0 104 
8.1*4.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 3091 
8.5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 3243 
9.1*5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 2629 
10.1*5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 2884 
       
1*4.1*5.barley.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 2000 0 
1*4.1.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 1100 0 
1*4.2.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 850 0 
1*4.3.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 550 0 
1*4.4.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 273 0 
1*4.5.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 224 0 
5*7.1*5.barley.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 1300 0 
5*6.1*3.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 402 0 
5*6.4.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 155 0 
5*10.5.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 146 0 
7*10.1*2.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 822 0 
7*10.3.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 389 0 
7*10.4.barley.rain 0 0 0 0 133 0 
8*10.1*5.barley.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 2000 0 
       
1*10.1*5.intmaiz.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 0 4000 
       
1*10.1.lentil.rain 300 0 0 0 0 2135 
1*10.2.lentil.rain 300 0 0 0 0 1911 
1*10.3*5.lentil.rain 0 0 0 0 0 1162 
1*10.1*5.lentil.(flood,sprink,drip)      
       
1*10.1.chick.rain 720 0 0 0 0 3168 
1*10.2.chick.rain 600 0 0 0 0 1728 
1*10.3*5.chick.rain 400 0 0 0 0 704 
1*10.1*5.chick.(flood,sprink,drip) 3600 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.bdbean.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 2300 0 300 300 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sybean.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 2125 0 
       
1*10.1*5.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.winsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 500 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sesame.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1*10.1*5.peanut.(flood,sprink,drip) 3500 3500 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1.cumin.rain 2500 0 0 0 0 2745 
1*10.2.cumin.rain 2000 0 0 0 0 2625 
1*10.3.cumin.rain 1000 0 0 0 0 1500 
1*10.4*5.cumin.rain 1000 0 0 0 0 1260 
       
1*10.1*5.cumin.(flood,sprink,drip) 3600 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 1000 1000 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.autmelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 0 5000 
       
1*10.1*5.summelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sprptt.(flood,sprink,drip) 3000 0 400 400 500 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sumtmt.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 3850 
       
1*10.1*5.sumegg.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 4550 0 700 
 
+ Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1*4.1*5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 3000 1000 
1*4.1.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 1500 0 
1*4.2.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 1000 0 
1*4.3.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 850 0 
1*4.4.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 750 0 
1*4.5.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 600 0 
5*7.3.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 3000 1000 
5*7.4.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 3000 1000 
5*7.5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 3000 1000 
5*7.2.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 3000 1000 
5*6.1*3.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 850 0 
5*6.4.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 750 0 
5*6.5.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 600 0 
7*10.1*2.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 1000 0 
7*10.3.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 850 0 
7*10.4*5.wheat.rain 0 0 0 0 750 0 
8.1*4.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 2500 900 
8.5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 2500 900 
9.1*5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 2500 900 
10.1*5.wheat.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 2500 900 
       
1*4.1*5.barley.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 2500 900 0 
1*4.1.barley.rain 0 0 0 1500 0 0 
1*4.2.barley.rain 0 0 0 1000 0 0 
1*4.3.barley.rain 0 0 0 850 0 0 
1*4.4.barley.rain 0 0 0 750 0 0 
1*4.5.barley.rain 0 0 0 600 0 0 
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5*7.1*5.barley.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 2000 1000 0 
5*6.1*3.barley.rain 0 0 0 850 0 0 
5*6.4.barley.rain 0 0 0 750 0 0 
5*10.5.barley.rain 0 0 0 600 0 0 
7*10.1*2.barley.rain 0 0 0 1000 0 0 
7*10.3.barley.rain 0 0 0 850 0 0 
7*10.4.barley.rain 0 0 0 750 0 0 
8*10.1*5.barley.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 2500 900 0 
       
1*10.1*5.intmaiz.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 1000 0 0 
       
1*10.1.lentil.rain 0 0 0 0 0 1300 
1*10.2.lentil.rain 0 0 0 0 0 750 
1*10.3*5.lentil.rain 0 0 0 0 0 750 
1*10.1*5.lentil.(flood,sprink,drip)      
       
1*10.1.chick.rain 0 0 0 0 0 1100 
1*10.2.chick.rain 0 0 0 0 0 800 
1*10.3*5.chick.rain 0 0 0 0 0 600 
1*10.1*5.chick.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.bdbean.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sybean.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 3600 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.autsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 4500 500 0 
       
1*10.1*5.winsugar.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 4500 
       
1*10.1*5.sesame.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 2700 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.peanut.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1.cumin.rain 0 0 0 0 0 1300 
1*10.2.cumin.rain 0 0 0 0 0 750 
1*10.3.cumin.rain 0 0 0 0 0 750 
1*10.4*5.cumin.rain 0 0 0 0 0 750 
       
1*10.1*5.cumin.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.cotton.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 0 0 0 2000 0 
       
1*10.1*5.autmelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.summelon.(flood,sprink,drip,rain) 5000 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sprptt.(flood,sprink,drip) 1000 0 0 0 0 0 
       
1*10.1*5.sumtmt.(flood,sprink,drip) 0 700 700 0 0 0 
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1*10.1*5.sumegg.(flood,sprink,drip) 700 0 0 0 0 0 
I.3.6. Diesel requirements for pumping irrigation water (litre/ha) 
table dieselreq(rr,c,irr,wtr,agz)  
* diesel requirements by crops - irrigation technique and agro-ecological zones (litre per hectare) 
* These numbers have been estimated based on water requirements 
                            1          2          3          4          5 
1*4.wheat.flood.riv        85          96        107        128        160 
1*4.wheat.sprink.riv       77          86        96         115        144 
1*4.wheat.flood.net         0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.wheat.sprink.net       77          86        96         115        144 
1*4.wheat.flood.wel        640        720        800        960        1200 
1*4.wheat.sprink.wel       576        648        720        864        1080 
5*7.wheat.flood.riv        284        284        338        400        455 
5*7.wheat.sprink.riv       256        256        304        360        410 
5*7.wheat.flood.net        284        284        338        400        455 
5*7.wheat.sprink.net       256        256        304        360        410 
5*6.wheat.flood.wel        568        568        675        800        910 
5*6.wheat.sprink.wel       511        511        608        720        819 
7.wheat.flood.wel          710        710        844        1000       1138 
7.wheat.sprink.wel         639        639        760        900        1024 
8*10.wheat.flood.riv       298        299        299        300        300 
8*10.wheat.sprink.riv      268        269        269        270        270 
8*10.wheat.flood.net       298        299        299        300        300 
8*10.wheat.sprink.net      268        269        269        270        270 
8*10.wheat.flood.wel       596        597        598        599        600 
8*10.wheat.sprink.wel      536        537        538        539        540 
 
1*4.barley.flood.riv       45          50         56        78         100 
1*4.barley.sprink.riv      40          45         50        70         90 
1*4.barley.flood.net        0          0           0        0          0 
1*4.barley.sprink.net      40          45         50        70         90 
1*4.barley.flood.wel       335        377        419        585        752 
1*4.barley.sprink.wel      302        340        377        527        677 
5*7.barley.flood.riv       149        149        177        244        244 
5*7.barley.sprink.riv      134        134        159        219        219 
5*7.barley.drip.riv        119        119        142        195        195 
5*7.barley.flood.net       149        149        177        244        244 
5*7.barley.sprink.net      134        134        159        219        219 
5*7.barley.drip.net        119        119        142        195        195 
7.barley.flood.wel         372        372        442        609        713 
7.barley.sprink.wel        335        335        398        549        642 
8*10.barley.flood.riv      156        157        157        183        188 
8*10.barley.sprink.riv     141        141        141        165        169 
8*10.barley.flood.net      156        157        157        183        188 
8*10.barley.sprink.net     141        141        141        165        169 
8*10.barley.flood.wel      312        313        313        365        376 
8*10.barley.sprink.wel     281        282        282        329        338 
 
1*4.intmaiz.flood.riv      620        620        620        620        620 
1*4.intmaiz.sprink.riv     558        558        558        558        558 
1*4.intmaiz.flood.net       0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.intmaiz.sprink.net     558        558        558        558        558 
1*4.intmaiz.flood.wel      1431       1431      1431        1431       1431 
1*4.intmaiz.sprink.wel     1288       1288      1288        1288       1288 
5*10.intmaiz.flood.riv     382        382        382        382        382 
5*10.intmaiz.sprink.riv    343        343        343        343        343 
5*10.intmaiz.flood.net     382        382        382        382        382 
5*10.intmaiz.sprink.net    343        343        343        343        343 
5*10.intmaiz.flood.wel     763        763        763        763        763 
5*10.intmaiz.sprink.wel    687        687        687        687        687 
 
$ontext 
8*10.intmaiz.flood.riv     203        203        203        203        203 
8*10.intmaiz.sprink.riv    183        183        183        183        183 
8*10.intmaiz.flood.net     203        203        203        203        203 
8*10.intmaiz.sprink.net    183        183        183        183        183 
8*10.intmaiz.flood.wel     405        405        405        405        405 
8*10.intmaiz.sprink.wel    365        365        365        365        365 
$offtext 
 
1*4.lentil.flood.riv       21          24         30         43        46 
1*4.lentil.sprink.riv      18          22         27         39        42 
1*4.lentil.flood.net        0          0          0          0         0 
1*4.lentil.sprink.net      18          22         27         39        42 
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1*4.lentil.flood.wel       154        180        224        321        347 
1*4.lentil.sprink.wel      139        162        202        289        312 
5*7.lentil.flood.riv       68          71        95         134        131 
5*7.lentil.sprink.riv      62          64        85         120        118 
5*7.lentil.flood.net       68          71        95         134        131 
5*7.lentil.sprink.net      62          64        85         120        118 
5*6.lentil.flood.wel       137        142        189        267        263 
5*6.lentil.sprink.wel      123        128        170        241        237 
7.lentil.flood.wel         171        177        237        334        329 
7.lentil.sprink.wel        154        160        213        301        296 
8*10.lentil.flood.riv       72        75         84         100        87 
8*10.lentil.sprink.riv      65        67         76         90         78 
8*10.lentil.flood.net       72        75         84         100        87 
8*10.lentil.sprink.net      65        67         76         90         78 
8*10.lentil.flood.wel      143        149        168        200        173 
8*10.lentil.sprink.wel     129        134        151        180        156 
 
1*4.chick.flood.riv        21          24        30          43        46 
1*4.chick.sprink.riv       18          22        27          39        42 
1*4.chick.flood.net         0          0         0            0        0 
1*4.chick.sprink.net       18          22        27          39        42 
1*4.chick.flood.wel        154        180        224        321        347 
1*4.chick.sprink.wel       139        162        202        289        312 
5*7.chick.flood.riv        68          71        95         134        131 
5*7.chick.sprink.riv       62          64        85         120        118 
5*7.chick.flood.net        68          71        95         134        131 
5*7.chick.sprink.net       62          64        85         120        118 
5*6.chick.flood.wel        137        142        189        267        263 
5*6.chick.sprink.wel       123        128        170        241        237 
7.chick.flood.wel          171        177        237        334        329 
7.chick.sprink.wel         154        160        213        301        296 
8*10.chick.flood.riv       72          75        84         100        87 
8*10.chick.sprink.riv      65          67        76         90         78 
8*10.chick.flood.net       72          75        84         100        87 
8*10.chick.sprink.net      65          67        76         90         78 
8*10.chick.flood.wel       143        149        168        200        173 
8*10.chick.sprink.wel      129        134        151        180        156 
 
1*4.bdbean.flood.riv       66          66         76        76         76 
1*4.bdbean.sprink.riv      59          59         69        69         69 
1*4.bdbean.flood.net        0          0          0         0          0 
1*4.bdbean.sprink.net      59          59         69        69         69 
1*4.bdbean.flood.wel       492        492        572        572        572 
1*4.bdbean.sprink.wel      443        443        515        515        515 
5*7.bdbean.flood.riv       218        194        242        238        217 
5*7.bdbean.sprink.riv      197        175        217        215        195 
5*7.bdbean.flood.net       218        194        242        238        217 
5*7.bdbean.sprink.net      197        175        217        215        195 
5*6.bdbean.flood.wel       437        388        483        477        434 
5*6.bdbean.sprink.wel      393        350        435        429        391 
7.bdbean.flood.wel         546        486        604        596        542 
7.bdbean.sprink.wel        492        437        543        536        488 
8*10.bdbean.flood.riv      229        204        214        179        143 
8*10.bdbean.sprink.riv     207        184        193        161        129 
8*10.bdbean.flood.net      229        204        214        179        143 
8*10.bdbean.sprink.net     207        184        193        161        129 
8*10.bdbean.flood.wel      458        408        428        357        286 
8*10.bdbean.sprink.wel     413        367        385        321        257 
 
1*4.sybean.flood.riv       545        545        545        545        545 
1*4.sybean.sprink.riv      491        491        491        491        491 
1*4.sybean.flood.net        0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.sybean.sprink.net      491        491        491        491        491 
1*4.sybean.flood.wel       1258       1258      1258        1258       1258 
1*4.sybean.sprink.wel      1132       1132      1132        1132       1132 
5*7.sybean.flood.riv       335        335        335        335        335 
5*7.sybean.sprink.riv      302        302        302        302        302 
5*7.sybean.flood.net       335        335        335        335        335 
5*7.sybean.sprink.net      302        302        302        302        302 
5*6.sybean.flood.wel       671        671        671        671        671 
5*6.sybean.sprink.wel      604        604        604        604        604 
7.sybean.flood.wel         579        579        579        579        579 
7.sybean.sprink.wel        521        521        521        521        521 
8*10.sybean.flood.riv      178        178        178        178        178 
8*10.sybean.sprink.riv     161        161        161        161        161 
8*10.sybean.flood.net      178        178        178        178        178 
8*10.sybean.sprink.net     161        161        161        161        161 
8*10.sybean.flood.wel      356        356        356        356        356 
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8*10.sybean.sprink.wel     321        321        321        321        321 
 
1*4.autsugar.flood.riv     340        340        405        450        487 
1*4.autsugar.sprink.riv    306        306        364        405        439 
1*4.autsugar.flood.net      0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.autsugar.sprink.net    306        306        364        405        439 
1*4.autsugar.flood.wel     983        983        1170       1300       1408 
1*4.autsugar.sprink.wel    885        885        1053       1170       1267 
5*7.autsugar.flood.riv     340        340        405        450        487 
5*7.autsugar.sprink.riv    306        306        364        405        439 
5*7.autsugar.flood.net     340        340        405        450        487 
5*7.autsugar.sprink.net    306        306        364        405        439 
5*6.autsugar.flood.wel     983        983        1170      1300        1408 
5*6.autsugar.sprink.wel    885        885        1053      1170        1267 
7.autsugar.flood.wel       983        983        1170      1300        1408 
7.autsugar.sprink.wel      885        885        1053      1170        1267 
8*10.autsugar.flood.riv    139        139        139        139        139 
8*10.autsugar.sprink.riv   125        125        125        125        125 
8*10.autsugar.flood.net    139        139        139        139        139 
8*10.autsugar.sprink.net   125        125        125        125        125 
8*10.autsugar.flood.wel    277        277        277        277        277 
8*10.autsugar.sprink.wel   249        249        249        249        249 
 
1*4.winsugar.flood.riv     340        340        405        450        487 
1*4.winsugar.sprink.riv    306        306        364        405        439 
1*4.winsugar.flood.net      0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.winsugar.sprink.net    306        306        364        405        439 
1*4.winsugar.flood.wel     983        983        1170      1300        1408 
1*4.winsugar.sprink.wel    885        885        1053      1170        1267 
5*7.winsugar.flood.riv     340        340        405        450        487 
5*7.winsugar.sprink.riv    306        306        364        405        439 
5*7.winsugar.flood.net     340        340        405        450        487 
5*7.winsugar.sprink.net    306        306        364        405        439 
5*6.winsugar.flood.wel     983        983        1170      1300        1408 
5*6.winsugar.sprink.wel    885        885        1053      1170        1267 
7.winsugar.flood.wel       983        983        1170      1300        1408 
7.winsugar.sprink.wel      885        885        1053      1170        1267 
8*10.winsugar.flood.riv    139        139        139        139        139 
8*10.winsugar.sprink.riv   125        125        125        125        125 
8*10.winsugar.flood.net    139        139        139        139        139 
8*10.winsugar.sprink.net   125        125        125        125        125 
8*10.winsugar.flood.wel    277        277        277        277        277 
8*10.winsugar.sprink.wel   249        249        249        249        249 
 
1*4.sesame.flood.riv       780        780        780        780        780 
1*4.sesame.sprink.riv      702        702        702        702        702 
1*4.sesame.flood.net        0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.sesame.sprink.net      702        702        702        702        702 
1*4.sesame.flood.wel       1800       1800       1800       1800       1800 
1*4.sesame.sprink.wel      1620       1620       1620       1620       1620 
5*10.sesame.flood.riv      480        480        480        480        480 
5*10.sesame.sprink.riv     432        432        432        432        432 
5*10.sesame.flood.net      480        480        480        480        480 
5*10.sesame.sprink.net     432        432        432        432        432 
5*6.sesame.flood.wel       960        960        960        960        960 
5*6.sesame.sprink.wel      864        864        864        864        864 
7*10.sesame.flood.wel      828        828        828        828        828 
7*10.sesame.sprink.wel     746        746        746        746        746 
 
1*4.peanut.flood.riv       94         113        122        141        141 
1*4.peanut.sprink.riv      85         102        110        127        127 
1*4.peanut.drip.riv        75          90        98         113        113 
1*4.peanut.flood.net        0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.peanut.sprink.net      85         102        110        127        127 
1*4.peanut.drip.net        75          90        98         113        113 
1*4.peanut.flood.wel       706        847        918        1059       1059 
1*4.peanut.sprink.wel      635        762        826        953        953 
1*4.peanut.drip.wel        565        678        734        847        847 
5*7.peanut.flood.riv       313        334        387        441        402 
5*7.peanut.sprink.riv      282        301        349        397        361 
5*7.peanut.drip.riv        251        267        310        353        321 
5*7.peanut.flood.net       313        334        387        441        402 
5*7.peanut.sprink.net      282        301        349        397        361 
5*7.peanut.drip.net        251        267        310        353        321 
5*6.peanut.flood.wel       627        669        775        882        803 
5*6.peanut.sprink.wel      564        602        697        794        723 
5*6.peanut.drip.wel        501        535        620        706        643 
7.peanut.flood.wel         783        836        969        1103       1004 
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7.peanut.sprink.wel        705        752        872        993        904 
7.peanut.drip.wel          627        669        775        882        803 
8*10.peanut.flood.riv      329        352        343        331        265 
8*10.peanut.sprink.riv     296        316        309        298        239 
8*10.peanut.drip.riv       263        281        275        265        212 
8*10.peanut.flood.net      329        352        343        331        265 
8*10.peanut.sprink.net     296        316        309        298        239 
8*10.peanut.drip.net       263        281        275        265        212 
8*10.peanut.flood.wel      657        703        686        661        529 
8*10.peanut.sprink.wel     592        632        617        595        477 
8*10.peanut.drip.wel       526        562        549        529        424 
 
1*4.cumin.flood.riv        22          27        29         33         36 
1*4.cumin.sprink.riv       20          24        26         30         32 
1*4.cumin.flood.net         0          0         0           0         0 
1*4.cumin.sprink.net       20          24        26         30         32 
1*4.cumin.flood.wel        167        200        217        250        270 
1*4.cumin.sprink.wel       150        180        195        225        243 
5*7.cumin.flood.riv        74          79        92         104        102 
5*7.cumin.sprink.riv       67          71        82         94         92 
5*7.cumin.flood.net        74          79        92         104        102 
5*7.cumin.sprink.net       67          71        82         94         92 
5*6.cumin.flood.wel        148        158        183        209        204 
5*6.cumin.sprink.wel       133        142        165        188        184 
7.cumin.flood.wel          185        198        229        261        256 
7.cumin.sprink.wel         167        178        206        235        230 
8*10.cumin.flood.riv        78        83         81         78         68 
8*10.cumin.sprink.riv       70        75         73         71         61 
8*10.cumin.flood.net        78        83         81         78         68 
8*10.cumin.sprink.net       70        75         73         71         61 
8*10.cumin.flood.wel       155        166        162        156        135 
8*10.cumin.sprink.wel      140        149        146        141        121 
 
1*4.cotton.flood.riv       1300       1300       1300       1300       1300 
1*4.cotton.sprink.riv      1170       1170       1170       1170       1170 
1*4.cotton.drip.riv        1040       1040       1040       1040       1040 
1*4.cotton.flood.net        0          0          0           0          0 
1*4.cotton.sprink.net      1170       1170       1170       1170       1170 
1*4.cotton.drip.net        1040       1040       1040       1040       1040 
1*4.cotton.flood.wel       3000       3000       3000       3000       3000 
1*4.cotton.sprink.wel      2700       2700       2700       2700       2700 
1*4.cotton.drip.wel        2400       2400       2400       2400       2400 
5*10.cotton.flood.riv       800        800        800        800        800 
5*10.cotton.sprink.riv      720        720        720        720        720 
5*10.cotton.drip.riv        640        640        640        640        640 
5*10.cotton.flood.net       800        800        800        800        800 
5*10.cotton.sprink.net      720        720        720        720        720 
5*10.cotton.drip.net        640        640        640        640        640 
5*6.cotton.flood.wel       1600       1600      1600        1600       1600 
5*6.cotton.sprink.wel      1440       1440      1440        1440       1440 
5*6.cotton.drip.wel        1280       1280      1280        1280       1280 
7*10.cotton.flood.wel      1380       1380      1380        1380       1380 
7*10.cotton.sprink.wel     1242       1242      1242        1242       1242 
7*10.cotton.drip.wel       1104       1104      1104        1104       1104 
 
1*4.autmelon.flood.riv     421        421        421        421        421 
1*4.autmelon.sprink.riv    379        379        379        379        379 
1*4.autmelon.drip.riv      336        336        336        336        336 
1*4.autmelon.flood.net      0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.autmelon.sprink.net    379        379        379        379        379 
1*4.autmelon.drip.net      336        336        336        336        336 
1*4.autmelon.flood.wel     971        971        971        971        971 
1*4.autmelon.sprink.wel    873        873        873        873        873 
1*4.autmelon.drip.wel      776        776        776        776        776 
5*7.autmelon.flood.riv     259        259        259        259        259 
5*7.autmelon.sprink.riv    233        233        233        233        233 
5*7.autmelon.drip.riv      207        207        207        207        207 
5*7.autmelon.flood.net     259        259        259        259        259 
5*7.autmelon.sprink.net    233        233        233        233        233 
5*7.autmelon.drip.net      207        207        207        207        207 
5*6.autmelon.flood.wel     518        518        518        518        518 
5*6.autmelon.sprink.wel    466        466        466        466        466 
5*6.autmelon.drip.wel      414        414        414        414        414 
7.autmelon.flood.wel       446        446        446        446        446 
7.autmelon.sprink.wel      402        402        402        402        402 
7.autmelon.drip.wel        357        357        357        357        357 
8*10.autmelon.flood.riv    138        138        138        138        138 
8*10.autmelon.sprink.riv   124        124        124        124        124 
 137 
8*10.autmelon.drip.riv     110        110        110        110        110 
8*10.autmelon.flood.net    138        138        138        138        138 
8*10.autmelon.sprink.net   124        124        124        124        124 
8*10.autmelon.drip.net     110        110        110        110        110 
8*10.autmelon.flood.wel    275        275        275        275        275 
8*10.autmelon.sprink.wel   247        247        247        247        247 
8*10.autmelon.drip.wel     220        220        220        220        220 
 
1*4.summelon.flood.riv     571        571        571        571        571 
1*4.summelon.sprink.riv    514        514        514        514        514 
1*4.summelon.drip.riv      457        457        457        457        457 
1*4.summelon.flood.net      0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.summelon.sprink.net    514        514        514        514        514 
1*4.summelon.drip.net      457        457        457        457        457 
1*4.summelon.flood.wel     1317       1317       1317       1317       1317 
1*4.summelon.sprink.wel    1185       1185       1185       1185       1185 
1*4.summelon.drip.wel      1054       1054       1054       1054       1054 
5*7.summelon.flood.riv     351        351        351        351        351 
5*7.summelon.sprink.riv    316        316        316        316        316 
5*7.summelon.drip.riv      281        281        281        281        281 
5*7.summelon.flood.net     351        351        351        351        351 
5*7.summelon.sprink.net    316        316        316        316        316 
5*7.summelon.drip.net      281        281        281        281        281 
5*6.summelon.flood.wel     702        702        702        702        702 
5*6.summelon.sprink.wel    632        632        632        632        632 
5*6.summelon.drip.wel      562        562        562        562        562 
7.summelon.flood.wel       606        606        606        606        606 
7.summelon.sprink.wel      545        545        545        545        545 
7.summelon.drip.wel        485        485        485        485        485 
8*10.summelon.flood.riv    187        187        187        187        187 
8*10.summelon.sprink.riv   168        168        168        168        168 
8*10.summelon.drip.riv     150        150        150        150        150 
8*10.summelon.flood.net    187        187        187        187        187 
8*10.summelon.sprink.net   168        168        168        168        168 
8*10.summelon.drip.net     150        150        150        150        150 
8*10.summelon.flood.wel    373        373        373        373        373 
8*10.summelon.sprink.wel   336        336        336        336        336 
8*10.summelon.drip.wel     299        299        299        299        299 
 
1*4.sprptt.flood.riv       639        639        639        639        639 
1*4.sprptt.sprink.riv      575        575        575        575        575 
1*4.sprptt.drip.riv        511        511        511        511        511 
1*4.sprptt.flood.net        0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.sprptt.sprink.net      575        575        575        575        575 
1*4.sprptt.drip.net        511        511        511        511        511 
1*4.sprptt.flood.wel       1475       1475      1475        1475       1475 
1*4.sprptt.sprink.wel      1327       1327      1327        1327       1327 
1*4.sprptt.drip.wel        1180       1180      1180        1180       1180 
5*7.sprptt.flood.riv       393        393        393        393        393 
5*7.sprptt.sprink.riv      354        354        354        354        354 
5*7.sprptt.drip.riv        315        315        315        315        315 
5*7.sprptt.flood.net       393        393        393        393        393 
5*7.sprptt.sprink.net      354        354        354        354        354 
5*7.sprptt.drip.net        315        315        315        315        315 
5*6.sprptt.flood.wel       787        787        787        787        787 
5*6.sprptt.sprink.wel      708        708        708        708        708 
5*6.sprptt.drip.wel        629        629        629        629        629 
7.sprptt.flood.wel         678        678        678        678        678 
7.sprptt.sprink.wel        611        611        611        611        611 
7.sprptt.drip.wel          543        543        543        543        543 
8*10.sprptt.flood.riv      209        209        209        209        209 
8*10.sprptt.sprink.riv     188        188        188        188        188 
8*10.sprptt.drip.riv       167        167        167        167        167 
8*10.sprptt.flood.net      209        209        209        209        209 
8*10.sprptt.sprink.net     188        188        188        188        188 
8*10.sprptt.drip.net       167        167        167        167        167 
8*10.sprptt.flood.wel      418        418        418        418        418 
8*10.sprptt.sprink.wel     376        376        376        376        376 
8*10.sprptt.drip.wel       334        334        334        334        334 
 
1*4.sumtmt.flood.riv       615        615        615        615        615 
1*4.sumtmt.drip.riv        492        492        492        492        492 
1*4.sumtmt.flood.net        0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.sumtmt.drip.net        492        492        492        492        492 
1*4.sumtmt.flood.wel       1418       1418      1418        1418       1418 
1*4.sumtmt.drip.wel        1135       1135      1135        1135       1135 
5*7.sumtmt.flood.riv       378        378        378        378        378 
5*7.sumtmt.drip.riv        303        303        303        303        303 
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5*7.sumtmt.flood.net       378        378        378        378        378 
5*7.sumtmt.drip.net        303        303        303        303        303 
5*6.sumtmt.flood.wel       756        756        756        756        756 
5*6.sumtmt.drip.wel        605        605        605        605        605 
7.sumtmt.flood.wel         652        652        652        652        652 
7.sumtmt.drip.wel          522        522        522        522        522 
8*10.sumtmt.flood.riv      201        201        201        201        201 
8*10.sumtmt.drip.riv       161        161        161        161        161 
8*10.sumtmt.flood.net      201        201        201        201        201 
8*10.sumtmt.drip.net       161        161        161        161        161 
8*10.sumtmt.flood.wel      402        402        402        402        402 
8*10.sumtmt.drip.wel       321        321        321        321        321 
 
1*4.sumegg.flood.riv       558        558        558        558        558 
1*4.sumegg.drip.riv        446        446        446        446        446 
1*4.sumegg.flood.net        0          0          0          0          0 
1*4.sumegg.drip.net        446        446        446        446        446 
1*4.sumegg.flood.wel       1288      1288        1288      1288        1288 
1*4.sumegg.drip.wel        1030      1030        1030      1030        1030 
5*7.sumegg.flood.riv       343        343        343        343        343 
5*7.sumegg.drip.riv        275        275        275        275        275 
5*7.sumegg.flood.net       343        343        343        343        343 
5*7.sumegg.drip.net        275        275        275        275        275 
5*6.sumegg.flood.wel       687        687        687        687        687 
5*6.sumegg.drip.wel        549        549        549        549        549 
7.sumegg.flood.wel         592        592        592        592        592 
7.sumegg.drip.wel          474        474        474        474        474 
8*10.sumegg.flood.riv      183        183        183        183        183 
8*10.sumegg.drip.riv       146        146        146        146        146 
8*10.sumegg.flood.net      183        183        183        183        183 
8*10.sumegg.drip.net       146        146        146        146        146 
8*10.sumegg.flood.wel      365        365        365        365        365 
8*10.sumegg.drip.wel       292        292        292        292        292 
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I.4.  data of parameters differentiated at farm typology level 
I.4.1 – farm fixed factors 
* Al-Hassakeh mantikas (rr) from 1 to 4 
* Al-Rakka mantikas (rr) from 5 to 7 
* Der-ez-Zor mantikas (rr) from 8 to 10 
* 1 = Al-Hassakeh 
* 2 = Kameshli 
* 3 = Al Malkiyeh 
* 4 = Ras Elein 
* 5 = Al-Rakka 
* 6 = Al-Thawra 
* 7 = Tal Abiad 
* 8 = Deir-Ezzour 
* 9 = Al-Mayadeen 
* 10 = Bokmal 
* data in this table are given by representative farming system where; 
* cash is the availbility of cash (SP) 
* land is the availability of land (farm size per ha) 
* sprink is a dummy that represents the availability of sprinkler irrigation. it takes zero if it is 
* absent 
* drip is a dummy that represents the availability of drip irrigation. it takes zero if it is absent 
* number represents the number of farms represented by each farming system 
* agz represents the agro-climatic zone where the farming system is located 
* river is a dummy that takes the value of one if the irrigation source is a river, zero otherwise 
* net is a dummy that takes the value of one if the irrigation source is a public canal, zero       
* otherwise 
* well is a dummy that takes the value of one if the irrigation source is a private well, zero      
* otherwise 
* cottonls represents the maximum area that each farming system can cultivate with cotto imposed by 
* the licensing system 
* autsugls represents the maximum area that each farming system can cultivate with automn sugarbeet 
* imposed by the licensing system 
* winsugls represents the maximum area that each farming system can cultivate with winter sugarbeet 
* imposed by the licensing system 
* barlreq represents the minimum area that each farming system must grow under barley in order to   
* feed the sheep to avoid buying feed from the market 
         cash           land      sprink    drip     number      agz     river   
1.1     1500000        15.56         0        0        90         1        0     
1.2     1500000        17.63         0        0        3319       2        0     
1.3     500000          6.76         0        0        1542       3        0     
1.4     1000000         9.94         0        0        2347       4        0     
1.5     600000          5.61         0        0        3937       5        0     
1.6     1500000        17.66         1        0        180        2        0     
1.7     600000          8.26         1        0        32         3        0     
1.8     1500000        17.61         0        0        205        2        1     
1.9     200000          5.82         0        0        653        3        1     
1.10    400000         10.84         0        0        495        4        1     
1.11    100000          4.80         0        0        1946       5        1     
1.12    1300000        18.07         0        0        99         2        0     
1.13    100000          5.13         0        0        280        3        0     
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1.14    500000         11.20         0        0        672        4        0     
1.15    400000          5.13         0        1        1065       3        0     
2.1     1500000        13.92         0        0        4734       1        0     
2.2     2000000        17.72         0        0        815        2        0     
2.3     2000000        16.34         0        0        330        3        0     
2.4     1300000        12.77         1        0        250        1        0     
2.5     1800000        17.81         1        0        192        2        0     
3.1     1500000        13.78         0        0        997        1        0     
3.2     600000          4.76         0        0        184        3        0     
3.3     1300000        13.87         0        1        353        1        0     
3.4     1500000        11.86         0        1        166        2        0     
3.5     1300000        14.12         1        1        761        1        0     
3.6     1200000        13.46         1        0        760        1        0     
3.7     1500000        11.86         1        0        28         2        0     
3.8     600000          4.76         1        0        10         3        0     
3.9     1200000        14.37         0        0        420        1        1     
3.10    1200000        14.37         0        0        15         1        0     
4.1     2500000        24.53         0        0        3152       2        0     
4.2     1500000        13.63         0        0        78         3        0     
4.3     1800000        17.92         0        0        36         4        0     
4.4     3000000        27.04         0        1        222        1        0     
4.5     3000000        27.04         1        0        22         1        0     
4.6     2500000        24.52         1        0        132        2        0     
4.7     1500000        18.13         0        0        1845       1        1     
4.8     1500000        14.60         0        0        1290       2        1     
4.9     2000000        24.15         0        0        89         2        0     
5.1     400000          4.78         0        0        64         3        0     
5.2     400000          4.63         0        0        1960       4        0     
5.3     450000          5.55         0        0        1975       5        0     
5.4     250000          4.78         0        0        35         3        1     
5.5     200000          3.72         0        0        2122       4        1     
5.6     280000          5.64         0        0        4145       5        1     
5.7     220000          4.78         0        0        13         3        0     
5.8     200000          4.24         0        0        10546      4        0     
5.9     260000          5.19         0        0        3390       5        0     
6.1     500000          6.02         0        0        25         3        0     
6.2     260000          3.90         0        0        230        4        0     
6.3     220000          3.33         0        0        2703       5        0     
6.4     350000          6.02         0        0        236        3        1     
6.5     150000          3.90         0        0        420        4        1     
6.6     150000          3.49         0        0        3557       5        1     
6.7     300000          6.02         0        0        155        3        0     
6.8     250000          5.44         0        0        1010       5        0     
7.1     1000000        10.11         0        0        3596       2        0     
7.2     750000          9.24         0        0        775        3        0     
7.3     500000          8.47         0        0        85         4        0     
7.4     1000000        10.17         0        0        986        2        1     
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7.5     800000          9.25         0        0        62         3        1     
7.6     900000          9.95         0        0        367        2        0     
7.7     800000          9.24         0        0        10         3        0     
8.1     150000          2.46         0        0        2974       4        0     
8.2     150000          1.86         0        0        8625       5        0     
8.3     150000          2.16         0        0        21462      5        1     
9.1     150000          2.02         0        0        22728      5        1     
10.1    150000          2.12         0        0        155        5        0     
10.2    100000          2.04         0        0        15304      5        1     
+          punet  pwell   cottonls    autsugls    winsugls     barlreq      rac     
1.1          0      1       3.33        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0025   
1.2          0      1       3.26        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0025   
1.3          0      1       0.85        0.00        0.00         0.86      0.0050   
1.4          0      1       0.62        0.00        0.00         1.72      0.0040   
1.5          0      1       0.39        0.00        0.00         0.80      0.0045   
1.6          0      1       3.27        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0020   
1.7          0      1       1.13        0.00        0.00         0.47      0.0035   
1.8          0      0       3.36        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0020   
1.9          0      0       0.82        0.00        0.00         0.48      0.0050   
1.10         0      0       1.04        0.00        0.00         1.74      0.0025   
1.11         0      0       0.45        0.00        0.00         0.65      0.0045   
1.12         1      0       3.44        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0020   
1.13         1      0       0.82        0.00        0.00         0.12      0.0040   
1.14         1      0       1.28        0.00        0.00         1.19      0.0035   
1.15         0      1       0.82        0.00        0.00         0.12      0.0040   
2.1          0      1       3.93        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0020   
2.2          0      1       4.02        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0020   
2.3          0      1       4.20        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0025   
2.4          0      1       2.79        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0015   
2.5          0      1       4.03        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0025   
3.1          0      1       3.24        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0025   
3.2          0      1       1.90        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0050   
3.3          0      1       3.15        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0030   
3.4          0      1       5.11        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0030   
3.5          0      1       3.75        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0025   
3.6          0      1       2.65        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0030   
3.7          0      1       4.11        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0035   
3.8          0      1       1.90        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0040   
3.9          0      0       3.52        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0025   
3.10         1      0       3.52        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0030   
4.1          0      1       4.68        0.00        0.00         0.21      0.0010   
4.2          0      1       1.32        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0030   
4.3          0      1       2.50        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0020   
4.4          0      1       6.76        0.00        0.00         0.04      0.0020   
4.5          0      1       6.76        0.00        0.00         0.06      0.0020   
4.6          0      1       4.67        0.00        0.00         0.21      0.0015   
4.7          0      0       3.81        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0020   
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4.8          0      0       3.92        0.00        0.00         0.03      0.0020   
4.9          1      0       4.22        0.00        0.00         0.25      0.0025   
5.1          0      1       1.53        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0040   
5.2          0      1       1.31        0.10        0.00         0.00      0.0050   
5.3          0      1       1.58        0.15        0.00         0.03      0.0030   
5.4          0      0       1.53        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0060   
5.5          0      0       1.71        0.08        0.00         0.00      0.0060   
5.6          0      0       1.74        0.15        0.00         0.01      0.0055   
5.7          1      0       1.53        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0050   
5.8          1      0       1.40        0.10        0.00         0.00      0.0055   
5.9          1      0       1.56        0.15        0.00         0.03      0.0050   
6.1          0      1       2.38        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0050   
6.2          0      1       0.69        0.00        0.00         0.05      0.0050   
6.3          0      1       0.42        0.10        0.00         0.26      0.0050   
6.4          0      0       2.38        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0060   
6.5          0      0       0.69        0.00        0.00         0.05      0.0070   
6.6          0      0       0.40        0.06        0.00         0.12      0.0045   
6.7          1      0       2.38        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0070   
6.8          1      0       1.07        0.03        0.00         0.12      0.0030   
7.1          0      1       3.23        0.00        0.35         0.05      0.0020   
7.2          0      1       2.28        0.00        0.00         1.12      0.0050   
7.3          0      1       0.00        0.00        0.00         5.47      0.0050   
7.4          0      0       3.46        0.00        0.25         0.08      0.0035   
7.5          0      0       2.39        0.00        0.00         0.00      0.0050   
7.6          1      0       3.69        0.00        0.25         0.00      0.0040   
7.7          1      0       2.10        0.00        0.00         3.05      0.0035   
8.1          0      1       0.63        0.09        0.00         0.01      0.0010   
8.2          0      1       0.19        0.05        0.00         0.01      0.0025   
8.3          0      0       0.43        0.06        0.00         0.01      0.0010   
9.1          0      0       0.21        0.04        0.00         0.00      0.0025   
10.1         0      1       0.60        0.08        0.00         0.01      0.0025   
10.2         0      0       0.49        0.08        0.00         0.01      0.0040   
;                                                                                   
I.4.2. irrigation water availability (cubic meter) 
table wateravail(rr,fff,t) 
* irrigation water availability of individual farming systems 
            Jan          Feb          Mar         Apr          May           Jun    
1.1        25204        25204        25204        25204        25204        25204   
1.2        30781        30781        30781        30781        30781        30781   
1.3        12996        12996        12996        12996        12996        12996   
1.4        22010        22010        22010        22010        22010        22010   
1.5        16005        16005        16005        16005        16005        16005   
1.6        28253        28253        28253        28253        28253        28253   
1.7        14277        14277        14277        14277        14277        14277   
1.8          0            0          13831        25148        33170        30587   
1.9          0            0          5128         8623         11314         9657   
1.10         0          1284         13791        21173        27579        21157   
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1.11         0          651          6670         10341        13470        10489   
1.12         0           0           14200        25824        34059        31416   
1.13         0           0            4424        7766         10717        9591    
1.14         0          942          14451        22871        29821        23869   
1.15        9895        9895         9895         9895         9895         9895    
2.1        23270        23270        23270        23270        23270        23970   
2.2        30583        30583        30583        30583        30583        30583   
2.3        32597        32597        32597        32597        32597        32597   
2.4        18490        18490        18490        18490        18490        18490   
2.5        30617        30617        30617        30617        30617        30617   
3.1        22150        22150        22150        22150        22150        22150   
3.2        10199        10199        10199        10199        10199        10199   
3.3        21150        21150        21150        21150        21150        21150   
3.4        21467        21467        21467        21467        21467        21467   
3.5        20279        20279        20279        20279        20279        20279   
3.6        19411        19411        19411        19411        19411        19411   
3.7        21112        21112        21112        21112        21112        21112   
3.8        9180         9180         9180         9180          9180        9180    
3.9         0            0           10806        18782        24938        24208   
3.10        0            0           8731         17690        23770        23610   
4.1        44084        44084        44084        44084        44084        44084   
4.2        27474        27474        27474        27474        27474        27474   
4.3        42747        42747        42747        42747        42747        42747   
4.4        41125        41125        41125        41125        41125        41125   
4.5        39360        39360        39360        39360        39360        39560   
4.6        39672        39672        39672        39672        39672        39672   
4.7        29022        29022        29022        29022        29022        29022   
4.8        25660        25660        25660        25660        25950        25950   
4.9          0           0           18418        32978        43413        39570   
5.1        12753        12753        12753        12753        12753        12753   
5.2        15351        15351        15351        15351        15351        15351   
5.3        19316        19316        19316        19316        19316        19316   
5.4          0            149         4790        10818        12625        14613   
5.5          0           1954        10995        16080        19567        20679   
5.6         1011         2614         8354        17408        19920        22189   
5.7          0            149         4790        10818        12625        16383   
5.8          0           1009         5843        10963        13781        16746   
5.9         942          2411         7641        15723        17758        19877   
6.1        21056        21056        21056        21056        21056        21056   
6.2        12163        12163        12163        12163        12163        12163   
6.3        10470        10470        10470        10470        10470        10470   
6.4          0            166         5358        13852        16296        21056   
6.5          0           1609         9055        12296        14964        14597   
6.6         1110         2779         8937        12939        14206        11015   
6.7          0            166         5358        13852        16296        21056   
6.8         1485         3556        11771        19741        21932        16893   
7.1        25931        25931        25931        25931        25931        25931   
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7.2        24573        24573        24573        24573        24573        24573   
7.3        17509        17509        17509        17509        17509        17509   
7.4          0            244         7685        22764        27941        27028   
7.5          0            363        10089        20707        23984        26612   
7.6          0            708         7482        22968        29136        27649   
7.7          0           1345        10935        20534        23175        20543   
8.1         6562         6562         6562        6562          6562        6562    
8.2         5630         5566         5566        5566          5566        5566    
8.3         166          1736         4180        6454          7676        6901    
9.1         120          9536        22920        32283        36412        28164   
10.1        7504         7504         7504        7504          7504        7504    
10.2         76          1064         2432        4256          5016        5016    
+             Jul          Aug          Sep          Oct          Nov          Dec   
1.1          25204        25204        25204        25204        25204        25204  
1.2          30781        30781        30781        30781        30781        30781  
1.3          12996        12996        12996        12996        12996        12996  
1.4          22010        22010        22010        22010        22010        22010  
1.5          16005        16005        16005        16005        16005        16005  
1.6          28253        28253        28253        28253        28253        28253  
1.7          14277        14277        14277        14277        14277        14277  
1.8          15643        14619        11244          0           4093        0      
1.9           3774        3929         3015           0           1598        0      
1.10          5042        4772          3799          0           4310        0      
1.11          2500        2367          1884          0           2083        0      
1.12         16009        14982        11525          0           4203        0      
1.13          3797         3953        3033           0           1375        0      
1.14          6201        5869          4673          0           4508        0      
1.15          9895        9895          9895        9895          9895        9895   
2.1          23270        23270        23270        23270        23270        23270  
2.2          30583        30583        30583        30583        30583        30583  
2.3          32597        32597        32597        32597        32597        32597  
2.4          18490        18490        18490        18490        18490        18490  
2.5          30617        30617        30617        30617        30617        30617  
3.1          22150        22150        22150        22150        22150        22150  
3.2          10199        10199        10199        10199        10199        10199  
3.3          21150        21150        21150        21150        21150        21150  
3.4          21467        21467        21467        21467        21467        21467  
3.5          20279        20279        20279        20279        20279        20279  
3.6          19411        19411        19411        19411        19411        19411  
3.7          21112        21112        21112        21112        21112        21112  
3.8           9180        9180          9180        9180          9180        9180   
3.9          16765        15771        12747          0           2769        0      
3.10         15605        15884        12650          0           2769        0      
4.1          44084        44084        44084        44084        44084        44084  
4.2          27474        27474        27474        27474        27474        27474  
4.3          42747        42747        42747        42747        42747        42747  
4.4          41125        41125        41125        41125        41125        41125  
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4.5          39360        39360        39360        39360        39360        39360  
4.6          39672        39672        39672        39672        39672        39672  
4.7          29022        29022        29022        29022        29022        29022  
4.8          25660        25660        25660        25660        25660        25660  
4.9          19270        18741        14361          0           5723        0      
5.1          12753        12753        12753        12753        12753        12753  
5.2          15351        15351        15351        15351        15351        15351  
5.3          19316        19316        19316        19316        19316        19316  
5.4          10976        10843        12450          0          1228         0      
5.5          13903        12744        11105          0          2189         18     
5.6          17512        19378        19074         1055        1699         867    
5.7          10976        10843        12450          0          1228         0      
5.8          13020        13870        16222         366         1138         2      
5.9          16606        18378        18360        1069         1554         825    
6.1          21056        21056        21056        21056        21056        21056  
6.2          12163        12163        12163        12163        12163        12163  
6.3          10470        10470        10470        10470        10470        10470  
6.4          16047        16360        16461          0          1375         0      
6.5           8064        7530         11588          0          1804         28     
6.6           5232        4790          8098         219         1797         997    
6.7          16047        16360        16461          0          1375         0      
6.8          11652        12576        14008         609         2340         1356   
7.1          25931        25931        25931        25931        25931        25931  
7.2          24573        24573        24573        24573        24573        24573  
7.3          17509        17509        17509        17509        17509        17509  
7.4          23497        24511        24137          30         630          0      
7.5          16125        16445        16523          0          2574         0      
7.6          24879        25991        25318          14         715          0      
7.7          14402        14572        15162          0          2782         738    
8.1           6562        6562          6562        6562         6562         6562   
8.2           5566        5566          5566        5566         5566         5566   
8.3           3104        3754          2905         184         1248         207    
9.1           9547        11544         8807         620         5455         924    
10.1          7504        7504          7504        7504         7504         7504   
10.2          3648        4256          3344         304         608          91     
;                                                                                    
I.4.2. family labour availability (hour) 
table famlabav(rr,fff,t) Family labour availability (hours per month) 
$ontext 
Family labour availability was chosen differently according to the local conditions. In Al-Hassakeh 
where almost all farms are managed directly by sharecroppers, 
we assumed high number of family labour availability. These numbers are calculated by dividing the 
total farm size by 3, assuming that each 3 hectares requires one 
full-time labourer, then the resulting number was multipied by 150 which is the number of hours per 
month. The justification is that sharecropping labour has 
all the characteristics of family labour (I have to find theoritical support for this argument, or 
present a discussion that makes uses of theorems of sharecropping) 
In Al-Rakka, where all farms are managed directly by the owners, we assumed that each family devotes 
2 memebers full time and one part-time (50% of its time) 
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The only exception is Tal-Abiad, where farms are mostly managed by investors from outside the 
region, here we assumed only one family labourer full time. 
In Deir-ez-Zor, where farms are also managed by owners, we assume that each family devotes two 
members full time only. 
Although some may argue that in Al-Rakka and Der-ez-Zor, families may be able to devote more 
memebrs, we have observed from the survey that in general 
other family memebrs are involed in other activities: e.g. livetstock (sheep), public employment, or 
working abroad, etc. 
$offtext    
               jan        feb        mar        apr        may        jun      
1.1            828        828        828        828        828        828      
1.2            873        873        873        873        873        873      
1.3            338        338        338        338        338        338      
1.4            434        434        434        434        434        434      
1.5            270        270        270        270        270        270      
1.6            847        847        847        847        847        847      
1.7            414        414        414        414        414        414      
1.8            912        912        912        912        912        912      
1.9            286        286        286        286        286        286      
1.10           487        487        487        487        487        487      
1.11           228        228        228        228        228        228      
1.12           940        940        940        940        940        940      
1.13           257        257        257        257        257        257      
1.14           465        465        465        465        465        465      
1.15           256        256        256        256        256        256      
2.1            695        695        695        695        695        695      
2.2            654        654        654        654        654        654      
2.3           1256        1256       1256      1256        1256      1256      
2.4            693        693        693        693        693        693      
2.5            655        655        655        655        655        655      
3.1            673        673        673        673        673        673      
3.2            202        202        202        202        202        202      
3.3            672        672        672        672        672        672      
3.4            695        695        695        695        695        695      
3.5            699        699        699        699        699        699      
3.6            648        648        648        648        648        648      
3.7            671        671        671        671        671        671      
3.8            195        195        195        195        195        195      
3.9            720        720        720        720        720        720      
3.10           734        734        734        734        734        734      
4.1           1210        1210       1210      1210        1210      1210      
4.2            636        636        636        636        636        636      
4.3            681        681        681        681        681        681      
4.4           1137        1137       1137      1137        1137      1137      
4.5           1135        1135       1135      1135        1135      1135      
4.6           1204        1204       1204      1204        1204      1204      
4.7            940        940        940        940        940        940      
4.8           1156        1156       1156      1156        1156      1156      
4.9           1167        1167       1167      1167        1167      1167      
 147 
5*6.1*9         375        375        375        375        375        375      
7.1*7           150        150        150        150        150        150      
8*10.1*3        300        300        300        300        300        300      
+               jul        aug        sep        oct        nov        dec    
1.1             828        828        828        828        828        828    
1.2             873        873        873        873        873        873    
1.3             338        338        338        338        338        338    
1.4             434        434        434        434        434        434    
1.5             270        270        270        270        270        270    
1.6             847        847        847        847        847        847    
1.7             414        414        414        414        414        414    
1.8             912        912        912        912        912        912    
1.9             286        286        286        286        286        286    
1.10            487        487        487        487        487        487    
1.11            228        228        228        228        228        228    
1.12            940        940        940        940        940        940    
1.13            257        257        257        257        257        257    
1.14            465        465        465        465        465        465    
1.15            256        256        256        256        256        256    
2.1             695        695        695        695        695        695    
2.2             654        654        654        654        654        654    
2.3             1256      1256        1256      1256        1256      1256    
2.4             693        693        693        693        693        693    
2.5             655        655        655        655        655        655    
3.1             673        673        673        673        673        673    
3.2             202        202        202        202        202        202    
3.3             672        672        672        672        672        672    
3.4             695        695        695        695        695        695    
3.5             699        699        699        699        699        699    
3.6             648        648        648        648        648        648    
3.7             671        671        671        671        671        671    
3.8             195        195        195        195        195        195    
3.9             720        720        720        720        720        720    
3.10            734        734        734        734        734        734    
4.1             1210      1210        1210      1210        1210      1210    
4.2             636        636        636        636        636        636    
4.3             681        681        681        681        681        681    
4.4             1137      1137        1137      1137        1137      1137    
4.5             1135      1135        1135      1135        1135      1135    
4.6             1204      1204        1204      1204        1204      1204    
4.7             940        940        940        940        940        940    
4.8             1156      1156        1156      1156        1156      1156    
4.9             1167      1167        1167      1167        1167      1167    
5*6.1*9         375        375        375        375        375        375    
7.1*7           150        150        150        150        150        150    
8*10.1*3        300        300        300        300        300        300    
;                                                                        
